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This thesis contributes long-run perspectives to the research on international macroeconomics
and macro-finance. Chapters 2 and 3, analyze international financial linkages and their
evolution over the past 150 years. Chapter 4 analyzes external adjustment under the pre-1914
Gold Standard – a fixed exchange rate regime in many ways reminiscent of today’s euro area.
Finally, chapter 5 uses the accumulated financial crisis experience since 1870 to evaluate the
financial crisis forecasting performance of modern machine learning algorithms.
Chapter 2, titled “Global risk-taking, exchange rates and monetary policy", revisits one of the
core ideas in international macroeconomics, the idea that floating exchange rates help to
decouple local interest rates from foreign rates. I find that this is only the case for safe rates,
but not for risky rates. For risky rates, I find that their co-movement has increased over the 20th
century, regardless of exchange rate regime. Why have floating exchange rates become less
effective in decoupling risky rates? I argue that the growing role of leverage-constrained banks
in global asset markets is key. More specifically, I introduce an international banking model
in which banks’ leverage constraints induce excessive volatility into risky rates, and their
arbitrage activity spreads this volatility internationally, thus overwhelming floating exchange
rates, which are already pinned down by safe rates.
In chapter 3, which is joint work with Òscar Jordà, Alan M. Taylor and Moritz Schularick,
we analyze the international co-movement of financial cycles and the effect of U.S. monetary
policy on global asset prices. We show that the co-movement of financial variables has
increased in the long run. The sharp increase in the co-movement of global equity markets
in the past three decades is particularly notable. We demonstrate that fluctuations in risk
premiums, and not risk-free rates and dividends, account for most of the observed equity
price synchronization post-1980. We also show that U.S. monetary policy has come to play an
important role as a source of fluctuations in risk appetite across global equity markets.
Chapter 4, titled "When do fixed exchange rates work? Evidence from the Gold Standard"
explores the circumstances under which a fixed exchange rate regime works. In joint work
with Yao Chen, we empirically and theoretically analyze one of the world’s largest and most
durable fixed exchange rate regimes, the Gold Standard. External adjustment under the Gold
Standard was associated with few, if any, output costs. In this chapter, we evaluate how flexible
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prices, international migration, and monetary policy contributed to this benign adjustment
experience. For this purpose, we build and estimate an open economy model for the Gold
Standard (1880-1913). We find that the output resilience of Gold Standard members that
underwent external adjustment was primarily a consequence of flexible prices. When hit
by a shock, quickly adjusting prices induced import- and export responses that stabilized
incomes. Crucial in this regard was a historical contingency: namely large primary sectors,
whose flexibly priced products drove the export booms that stabilized output during major
external adjustments.
Finally, chapter 5 contributes to the literature on financial crisis forecasting, using high
dimensional data and modern machine learning algorithms. In this chapter, titled “Spotting
the danger zone: Forecasting financial crises with classification tree ensembles and many predictors",
I introduce classification tree ensembles (CTEs) to the banking crisis forecasting literature. I
show that CTEs substantially improve out-of-sample forecasting performance over best practice
early-warning systems. CTEs enable policymakers to correctly forecast 80% of crises with
a 20% probability of incorrectly forecasting a crisis. These findings are based on a long-run
sample (1870− 2011), and two broad post-1970 samples which together cover almost all known
systemic banking crises. More particular, I show that the marked improvement in forecasting
performance over conventional best practice models results from the combination of many
classification trees into an ensemble, and the use of many predictors (i.e., > 100).
2
Chapter 2
Global risk-taking, exchange rates, and
monetary policy
2.1. Introduction
In this paper, I revisit one of the central ideas in international macroeconomics, the idea that
floating exchange rates decouple local interest rates from foreign rates. The effectiveness of
floating exchange rates in decoupling local interest rates has been confirmed by empirical
evidence based on safe interest rates, such as central bank policy rates or government bond
yields (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2005; Shambaugh, 2004). Recent research, however,
has suggested that floating exchange rates can become overwhelmed by global financial forces
that bind together risky rates, such as bank lending rates or corporate bond yields (Passari and
Rey, 2015; Rey, 2016). On the basis of new long-run time series for safe and risky interest rates,
I find that floating exchange rates have indeed become less effective at decoupling risky rates
than safe rates. I introduce an open economy model that rationalizes this phenomenon with
the growing role of leverage-constrained banks in global asset markets (see Adrian, Etula and
Muir, 2014; Adrian, Moench and Shin, 2016).
In the empirical part of this paper I present two pieces of evidence for the decreasing
effectiveness of floating exchange rates. First, in a co-movement analysis I show that, during
the late 20th century, floating exchange rates reduced the co-movement of local safe rates with
foreign safe rates by around 80%, while the corresponding figure for risky rates is considerably
less, or statistically indistinguishable from 0, depending on which risky rate one looks at. I also
show that this is a relatively new phenomenon. In the early 20th century, floating exchange
rates were effective at decoupling risky rates.
Second, in order to compare the transmission of financial center monetary policy shocks
to pegs and floats I look at the global effects of U.S. monetary policy shocks today and the
global effects of U.K. monetary policy shocks in the early 20th century. For this purpose, I
constructed a monetary policy shock measure for the Bank of England (BoE) from 1880 to
1913, and hand-collected an international dataset of monthly safe- and risky rates. On the
basis of the new pre-1914 BoE shock measure, as well as the post-1970 Fed shock measure
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by Romer and Romer (2004), I compare the response of pegs and floats to financial center
monetary policy shocks.1 The results underscore the findings from the co-movement analysis:
While floating exchange rates are effective at shielding local safe rates from financial center
policy rate shocks, they are ineffective at shielding local risky rates. Again I can show that this
is a recent phenomenon. Earlier in the 20th century floating exchange rates were still effective
at decoupling risky rates from financial center policy rate shocks.
Why have floating exchange rates become less effective in decoupling risky rates? I argue
that the growing role of leverage-constrained banks in global asset markets is key. More
specifically I introduce an international banking model in which the interplay of leverage
constraints, mark-to-market accounting, and costly equity adjustment gives rise to excess
volatility in risky rates (see Adrian and Shin, 2009, 2010; Adrian, Etula and Muir, 2014; Adrian,
Moench and Shin, 2016). In an open economy framework, this excess movement in risky rates
overwhelms the floating exchange rate, which is already pinned down by the cross-country
differential in safe rates.
To better understand the proposed mechanism consider a positive shock to the foreign
safe rate. The nominal exchange rate adjusts to equalize expected safe returns across the two
regions. At the same time foreign banks sell risky assets until their price has fallen sufficiently
to compensate for the higher funding cost. The drop in risky asset prices furthermore erodes
foreign and home bank equity. Subject to leverage constraints, and because raising new equity
is costly, the banks will adjust their leverage by reducing their risk-taking even further. This
sell-off of risky assets generates an excessive fall in risky asset prices (i.e., an excessive rise in
risky rates). The nominal exchange rate cannot compensate for this excess rise in risky rates,
because it is already pinned down by safe rates. Thus, the exchange rate ceases to function as
an equalizer of expected returns for risky rates. Instead, risky returns are equalized across
regions through risk premium spillovers, as banks arbitrage away expected return differentials
between home and foreign risky assets. The calibrated model indicates that this international
risk-taking channel can account for about 50% of the spillovers of U.S. monetary policy into the
risky rates of floats.
The finding that floating exchange rates have become ineffective at decoupling local
risky rates does not imply that floating exchange rates are not worth having. After all, a
floating exchange rate provides economic policymakers with one more degree of freedom
for achieving their policy goals. However, my findings suggest that the world economy
has become a considerably more demanding environment to operate in for policymakers.
Increasing financial spillovers can drive a wedge between conventional targets of monetary
policy, such as output and employment gaps, and other policy goals, such as financial stability
targets. This divergence in policy targets worsens the trade-offs involved in the application of
existing policy instruments. Thus policymakers may find themselves in want of additional
instruments in their policy toolkit.
My findings are also of relevance to current debates about how to robustify open economies
1I use the extended shock series provided by Cloyne and Hürtgen (2016)
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against financial shocks from abroad (Rey, 2013; Passari and Rey, 2015). The finding that
floating exchange rates were effective at decoupling risky rates in the early 20th century
suggests that excessively volatile risk premiums and their international spillover is not an
inevitable consequence of financial globalization. Hence, the implementation of capital controls
– de facto financial deglobalization – is not the only way in which monetary authorities can
reassert their control over local interest rates. Instead, my findings suggest that institutional
reform, aimed at lightening the interaction between leverage-constraints and mark-to-market
accounting, can help to reconcile capital mobility with monetary autonomy. In this regard, the
institutions that underpinned financial globalization at the beginning of the 20th century are
worth another look.2
This paper is closely related to several strands of literature. First, my work adds to the
trilemma literature (Keynes, 1930; Fleming, 1962; Dornbusch, 1976; Padoa-Schioppa, 1982;
Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997; Shambaugh, 2004; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2005; Bluedorn
and Bowdler, 2011; Klein and Shambaugh, 2015; Bekaert and Mehl, 2017; Obstfeld and Taylor,
2017; Obstfeld, Ostry and Qureshi, 2017).3 The trilemma states that each economy can pursue
only two out of the following three macroeconomic policies: mobile capital, stable exchange
rates and independent interest rates. The empirical trilemma literature has tested whether
capital controls and floating exchange rates are indeed associated with more independent
interest rates. Most contributions have found that this is indeed the case. My findings confirm
this as far as safe rates are concerned.4
Second, this paper contributes to a recent literature that has challenged the trilemma’s
validity. The so-called dilemma view put forward by Rey (2013) proposes that floating
exchange rates no longer provide an effective insulation against global financial forces (see
Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015; Passari and Rey, 2015; Georgiadis and Mehl, 2015; Ha,
2016; Cerutti, Claessens and Rose, 2017). As a result, the trilemma has turned into a dilemma,
according to which monetary autonomy can only be established through capital controls. In
this paper I confirm that extensive risk premium spillovers have rendered floating exchange
rates ineffective at shielding local risky rates. My findings thus reconcile the trilemma and
dilemma views. While I find that the trilemma holds for safe rates, the dilemma holds for
2This is not to say that systematic window-dressing is a solution. However, the proposed model
mechanism opens the door for frictions, that delay the translation of asset price volatility into balance
sheet volatility, to play a stabilizing role.
3This literature in turn is closley related another empirical strand of interantional macroeconomics, that
tests the validity of (un-)covered interest rate parity (UIP) (see Froot and Thaler, 1990; Bekaert, Wei
and Xing, 2007; Lothian and Wu, 2011; Pikoulakis and Wisniewski, 2012; Stavrakeva and Tang, 2015)
4Obstfeld, Ostry and Qureshi (2017) present evidence that the transmission of global financial shocks
is magnified under fixed exchange rate regimes. However, their findings indicate that the peg-float
dichotomy is less marked when it comes to stock returns, debt and equity portfolio flows, as well as
cross-border banking flows (also see Cerutti, Claessens and Puy, 2015). My findings confirm that the
decoupling power of floating exchange rates depends on the type of financial variable. The proposed
model furthermore suggests that the ease of arbitrage and the degree of leverage are crucial for
understanding which financial variables can achieve decoupling through floating exchange rates.
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risky rates.5
Finally, the open economy model I propose builds on closed economy models introduced
by Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand (2012) and Adrian and Boyarchenko (2013b), which study
the macroeconomic implications of value-at-risk (VaR) constrained banks. More generally,
this paper adds to the theoretical literature that analyzes the role of financial frictions in
the international transmission of shocks (Kollmann, Enders and Müller, 2011; Ueda, 2012;
Kalemli-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri, 2013; Alpanda and Aysun, 2014). Among these, the
model I propose is most closely related to accounts that highlight the role of asset prices in
synchronizing financial conditions across borders (Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2008; Devereux
and Yetman, 2010; Dedola and Lombardo, 2012).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: In the empirical part, sections 2.2.1
and 2.2.2 outline the econometric strategies I employ. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 introduce the
annual and monthly interest rate datasets. Sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 present the empirical results.
The international risk-taking channel is outlined in section 2.3. To quantitatively evaluate this
channel I introduce, discuss and calibrate an open economy banking model in sections 2.4.1,
2.4.3 and 2.4.3. Finally, in section 2.4.4 I confront the model with the empirical results and
assess to which extent the model accounts for the observed co-movement in risky rates among
floats. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2. Empirical analysis of exchange rate regimes and interest rates
This first part of this paper empirically characterizes the relation between exchange rate regime
and interest rate co-movement in two ways. In order to connect to the existing literature on
interest rate co-movement I start with a regression-based co-movement analysis that checks
whether interest rates co-moved differently among pegs and floats. After that, this section
presents a conditional analysis of the transmission of financial center monetary policy shocks
to pegs and floats.
2.2.1. Interest rate co-movement analysis
Methodological approach
In order to see how globally synchronized risk premiums can render floating exchange rates
ineffective compare the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) equation with its risk premium
augmented equivalent. In the basic UIP equation
ik,t = il,t +Etekl,t+1 − ekl,t, (2.1)
5This strand of the literature is also closely related to another strand that analyzes the financial spillovers
that emanate from financial centers (see Kim, 2001; Canova, 2005; Miniane and Rogers, 2007; Ehrmann
and Fratzscher, 2009; Bruno and Shin, 2015). Relatedly, Forbes and Warnock (2012), Fratzscher (2012),
Cerutti, Claessens and Puy (2015) and Ha and So (2017) present empirical evidence that global factors
are important for understanding capital flows.
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the co-movement of country k’s nominal safe rate (ik,t) with country l’s (il,t) depends only
upon the expected changes in the nominal exchange rate (Etekl,t+1 − ekl,t). For fixed exchange
rates Etekl,t+1 − ekl,t = 0, and absent any frictions in international capital markets, arbitrage
ensures that ik,t equals il,t, and hence safe rates co-move perfectly, i.e. corr(ik,t, il,t) = 1. Floating
exchange rates break this link: Given any home and foreign interest rate, ik,t and il,t, the
expected change in the nominal exchange rate (Etekl,t+1 − ekl,t) adjusts until the non-arbitrage
condition in (2.1) is satisfied.
In the risk premium augmented UIP equation
rk,t = il,t + ρl,t +Etekl,t+1 − ekl,t (2.2)
the co-movement of risky interest rates rk,t = ik,t + ρk,t no longer only depends on the ex-
pected depreciation of the exchange rate, but also on the co-movement of the risk-premiums,
cov(ρk,t, ρl,t).6 Here I use the term “risk premium” to refer to any spread between safe and
risky asset returns, regardless of whether it is related to fundamental default risk or not. For
example, I also use the term “risk premium” to refer to interest rate spreads that open up due
to limits of arbitrage.
The dilemma hypothesis as proposed by Rey (2013) posits that the ebb and flow in risk
appetite is highly correlated internationally, i.e. cov(ρk,t, ρl,t) >> 0. In this scenario, even if two
economies have a floating exchange rate and their fundamentals are otherwise unrelated, their
risky rates will nevertheless co-move, i.e. cov(rk,t, rl,t) > 0. It is in this sense that a floating
exchange rate has become a less powerful tool in decoupling an economy from international
capital markets.
Nominal interest rates are known to be highly persistent and are thus often treated as unit
root processes (see Shambaugh, 2004), that are potentially affected by problems of spurious
correlation (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Phillips, 1986).7 This also holds for the five interest
rates I am studying here, for which the unit root test by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (1996)
rejects the unit root hypothesis in only 10%, 5%, 9.5%, 4% and 2% of the spells for the short-
term safe rate, the long-term risk free rate, mortgage rates, bank lending rate and private
bond yield respectively.8 In the following analysis I treat all interest rate series as near-unit
root processes, whose asymptotic properties are more similar to the asymptotic properties
of non-stationary processes than stationary ones (Phillips, 1988). In line with the existing
literature I therefore base my analysis on the first differenced interest rate series in order to
6Equations 2.1 and 2.2 can be derived as the linear Taylor approximations for the first order conditions
of a risk neutral investor that can choose between investing in a safe or a risky asset. In this case r, ρ
and e are log-deviations from steady state.
7Nominal interest rates are no unit root processes strictly speaking as they are bounded from below by
zero. Furthermore Stanton (1997) observes that while nominal interest rates are indistinguishable from
a unit root process at low and medium interest rate levels, mean reversion is stronger when interest
rate levels are very high or very low.
8I determined the lag length for the unit root test regressions according to modified AIC (Ng and
Perron, 2001).
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ensure correct results. After first differencing, equation 2.2 becomes





where ∆ denotes the first difference-operator. For credible pegs the exchange rate is fixed,
Et(ekl,t+1) = ekl,t, and thus equation 2.3 could be brought to the data as
∆rk,t = β1∆il,t + β2∆ρl,t + ukl,t, (2.4)
where u indicates the error term. First differencing also nets out time-invariant country-specific
level-characteristics in interest rates and risk premiums. These include interest rate-level
differences due to differences in capital stock accumulation and overall economic development,
as well as persistent institutional and political differences that are associated with persistent
differences in risk premium levels.
Among two countries k and l with an absolutely fixed exchange rate and an integrated
financial market for safe bonds the expected coefficient estimate for β1 would be 1. Historically,
most fixed exchange rate regimes allowed for some fluctuations of the nominal exchange rate
within a narrow target zone. Cases of absolutely fixed exchange rates are rare and restricted to
currency unions, such as the euro area, or fully dollarized economies, such as Panama. For this
reason the following analysis defines a peg as a country whose exchange rate stays within a
narrow a +/−2% horizontal band. Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005) present simulation
evidence that in such target zone regimes UIP coefficient estimates should be expected to be
substantially smaller than 1, around 0.5 and even smaller if central banks conduct an aggressive
interest rate smoothing policy within their target zone band. In practice the presence of various
kinds of arbitrage costs can be expected to drive another wedge between domestic and global
rates, further lowering β̂1 and β̂2 (hatted parameters denote parameter estimates). Generally,
however, β̂1 should be expected to be positive and significantly larger than 0 among pegs.
The sign and size of β̂2 depends on the extent of financial market integration for risky as
well as safe assets. When the markets for both, safe and risky assets, are perfectly integrated
β̂2 should equal 1, i.e. risk premiums are equalized across borders (see Dedola and Lombardo,
2012). If either the market for safe or risky assets are not perfectly integrated there is some
scope for ρk and ρl to deviate from one another. Practically β̂2 might deviate from 1 not
only due to frictions in international asset markets, but also due to imperfect cross-country
comparability of the risk rate series. In general, however, among financially open economies
and when comparing assets of the same risk-class across countries β̂2 should be expected to
be positive – particularly so for the case of extensive risk premium spillovers posited by the
dilemma hypothesis.
For economies with a floating exchange rate, uncovered interest rate parity can be satisfied
through movements in either the expected exchange rate Etekl,t+1 or the spot exchange rate
ekl,t instead of movements in the safe rate or the risk premium. Consequently, estimates of
β1 among floats should be expected to lie below that among pegs. Various factors however
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suggest that β̂1 will not equal 0. First, the lack of the expected change in the exchange rate in
specification 2.4 constitutes an omitted variable problem.9 Second, shocks might be correlated
across countries provoking synchronized central bank responses even among floats. Finally,
even central banks that do not directly target the exchange rate respond to foreign interest rate
shocks to the extent that any of their targets, be it inflation or output gaps, gets affected by it.
Despite these caveats it will be informative to take a look at the regression results, also in order
to get an idea of how the results presented here relate to results reported by key reference
papers that have applied similar UIP regressions (Shambaugh, 2004; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and
Taylor, 2005). In order to sharpen the peg-float contrast, I will exclude countries that follow
an intermediate exchange rate regime, such as a managed float or a crawling peg from the
following analysis (see Klein and Shambaugh, 2015).
In the following I will make use of a regression equation that allows to directly compare
interest rate co-movement among pegs and floats, and that allows to statistically test whether
floating exchange rates have the power to decouple domestic interest rates:
∆rk,t = β0 + β1∆rl,t + β2∆rl,t ∗ f loatkl,t + ukl,t , (2.5)
where f loat denotes a float dummy taking the value 1 for free floats and 0 for strict pegs. r
the risky rate, and u is the error term. In this specification β1 indicates the strength of the
co-movement of domestic risky rates with foreign risky rates among pegs and β2 indicates
the efficacy of a floating exchange rate in decoupling the domestic risky rate from their
foreign counterpart. On the basis of this specification it is possible to give an indication of the





The ratio quantifies the effectiveness of a floating exchange rate in decoupling local interest
rates from foreign ones. A value of -1 indicates that a floating exchange rate has the power to
9In this case the use of ex post realized exchange rates as proxies for their ex ante expected counterparts
has proven of little help in alleviating this omitted variable problem. Several papers in the literature
have shown that in the case of floating exchange rates the uncovered interest parity equation does
not hold when proxying ex ante exchange rate expectations with ex post realized exchange rates (e.g.
Froot and Thaler, 1990). A recent exception are Lothian and Wu (2011), who, using ex post realized
exchange rates as a proxy for expected exchange rates, find UIP to hold on their 200-year sample for
U.K, U.S. and French returns. The bias this omitted variable problem induces in β1 could be positive
or negative depending on economic circumstances. Foreign interest rate changes could be positively
correlated with the expected depreciation term if there is an economic crisis with capital outflows
that the central bank tries to rein in through higher policy rates. Such scenarios would result in an
overestimate of the systematic co-movement in interest rates among floats. The same holds for the
mirror image of this scenario, i.e. a safe haven where capital inflows put upward pressure on the
exchange rate, but who at the same time lowers its policy rates. A downward bias in β1 would follow
from scenarios in which lower policy rates and an expected exchange rate depreciation are the result of
an anticipated period of sluggish economic growth. In general, however, there is no reason to believe
that among floats β1 would be systematically overestimated due to this omitted variable problem, and
hence among floats β1 can be expected to be lower than among pegs if UIP holds.
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completely uncouple domestic rates from foreign ones. A value of 0 indicates that floating
exchange rates are completely ineffective. The analogous measure can be calculated for safe
rates.
Finally, the above argument assumes an open capital account. If effective capital controls
are in place this constitutes another way domestic interest rates can diverge from the base
country’s rate. In order to sharpen the focus on the peg-float dichotomy the following analysis
focuses on open pegs and open floats only, excluding bilateral country-pair-year observations
in which any of the two countries in the pair has capital controls in place.
Data
In this section I introduce the dataset and discuss the important issue of exchange rate regime
classification. The core of the dataset comprises annual interest rate data from the latest vintage
of the Jordà-Schularick-Taylor (JST) Macrohistory Database (Jordà, Schularick and Taylor, 2016,
http://www.macrohistory.net/data/). This database ranges from 1870 to 2015 and covers 17
countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K. and the U.S.. Combined,
these 17 countries make up more than 30% of world GDP throughout the sample period. For
the post-1950 period I extended this sample by an additional 156 countries for which interest
rate data was available from public sources, either the IMF’s International Financial Statistics,
national statistical offices or national central banks (see table 2.16).
Interest rates: To compare the co-movement of short-term risk free rates with risky rates I
make use of the short-term safe rate contained in the JST database. Concerning risky rates,
there exist various candidate rates. Risk premiums differ according to the riskiness of the
underlying investment projects. Lending secured by mortgages may carry a lower premium
than bank lending to businesses. Furthermore, the institutional framework within which
intermediation takes place matters for the riskiness of an investment. Most notable here is
the distinction between bank lending and capital market based lending. For this reason the
following analysis will also look at corporate bond yields. Long-run series from 1870 to 2015
on these risky rates have recently been compiled for the above listed 17 country sample by
Zimmermann (2017) (mortgage- and bank lending rates) and Kuvshinov (2017) (corporate
bond yields). The broader post-1950 sample draws from various public sources.10
Maturity also matters. While short-term safe rates range from overnight rates (interbank
lending) to 3-month rates (treasury bills) the maturity of the average corporate bond underlying
the corporate bond yield series centers around 10 years.11 In order not to confound risk
10Data availability differs widely across series. Only few countries host liquid corporate bond markets.
Coverage for the private bond yield series is thus generally lower than that for the mortgage rate- or
bank lending rate series.
11The average maturity of the mortgage contracts underlying the mortgage rate series are also at
the longer end of the maturity range, whereas the bank lending series reflects the price of risky
intermediation at shorter maturities.
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premiums effects with term premiums effects the following analysis corrects for the term
premium. This term premium is calculated as the difference between short-term safe rates
and long-term safe rates. For the long-run 17-country sample the long-run government bond
yield series I use also comes from Kuvshinov (2017), while for the additional 156 countries in
the post-1950 sample I again draw from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, national
statistical offices and national central banks.
Due to its scope the sample contains various extreme episodes, outliers that if not dropped
would dominate any non-robust estimation procedure. I thus drop any country-pair-year
observation in which the first difference of the domestic or base country interest rate exceeds
50 ppts. This excludes the most severe cases of hyperinflation and financial panic from the
analysis.
Finally I followed Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005) in making the following sample
adjustments: I dropped country-pair-year observations in which one of the countries changes
its exchange rate status from peg to float or vice versa. I deleted the war years 1914-1918 and
1939-1945, and in order to remove administered non-market rates from the sample I dropped
spells during which interest rates stay constant for more than 2 years.
Exchange rate regime: The classification of the exchange rate regime has long been rec-
ognized as an important issue in the empirical trilemma literature (Klein and Shambaugh,
2015). Before World War 2 my peg dummy follows Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004)
and Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005); thereafter I rely on the exchange rate regime
classification scheme of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) (1940-1959) and the Shambaugh
exchange rate classification dataset (1960-2014) (Shambaugh, 2004; Klein and Shambaugh,
2008; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2010).12 Thus my peg dummy takes the value of 1 if
a country was on the gold standard before 1940. From 1940 on it is 1 for economies, whose
exchange rate stays within a +/−2% band, and 0 otherwise.13 The distinction between pegs
and floats becomes less clear-cut over time, because the trilemma gets “cornered” more often
by intermediate regimes, such as crawling pegs and managed floats (Klein and Shambaugh,
2015). In order to focus on the peg-float distinction I abstract from such intermediate regimes
and focus on strict pegs and free floats only, strict pegs being defined as countries whose
exchange rate remains within a +/−2% horizontal band.
With respect to the selection of the base country against which other countries peg, I for
the most part follow Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2015) and Shaumbaugh’s exchange rate
regime classification dataset. With only a few exceptions in the 17-country pre-1914 sample,
the U.K. is usually treated as the base country. For the Netherlands, Norway, Italy and the U.K.
itself, however, Germany is considered the base country (see Morys, 2010, on the details of
12I switch from the Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) to the Shambaugh (2004) exchange rate
classification scheme at the earliest possible date in order to make my results more comparable to the
latter, whose findings constitute a key reference for my analyisis.
13I follow Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005) in not considering one-off re-alignements as breaks
in the peg regime. Similarly, single-year pegs are recoded as floats, as they quite likely simply reflect
a lack of variation in the exchange rate.
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who followed who during the pre-1914 Gold Standard). In the interwar period exchange rate
relations become more complex. With a few exceptions the following holds for the 17 country
interwar sample: The U.S. is the base until its devaluation in 1933. Thereafter France takes
over as base from 1933 to 1935. From 1936 onwards, with France’s exit from gold, the U.S.
becomes the general base again.14 Exceptions to this general pattern are the following cases
(see Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010): Two countries, Canada and Italy follow the U.S. after its exit
from gold. Thus the U.S. remains their base throughout the interwar years. The sterling bloc,
consisting of Australia, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Japan leave the Gold Standard
in 1931 shortly after the U.K., which thus remains their base country until 1939.15 After 1945,
and up to 1959 in general the U.S. continues to be the base for the 17 country sample. The only
exception to this is Australia which remains part of the Sterling bloc. Furthermore Germany is
treated as the U.S.’s base country. From 1960 on I for the most part rely on the base country
classification from the Shambaugh exchange rate classification dataset.16
The peg dummy together with the base country indicator allows me to construct a bilateral
dataset and a bilateral peg dummy which reflects the exchange rate regime prevailing between
any country-pair at any point in time. Thus in years when Italy was pegged against Germany,
and Germany against the U.S. also Italy and the U.S. are treated as a fixed exchange rate pair.
Similarly in years when both, Canada and Japan, are pegged against the USD Canada and
Japan are also treated as a fixed exchange rate pair. I construct the bilateral peg dummy that
indicates whether the exchange rate between any two countries k and l is fixed or floating in
three steps.
First, on the basis of the peg dummy and the base country series it is possible to determine
country-pairs that entertain an indirect peg status. Historically, there exist hardly any cases of
more indirect pegs than those of second order, meaning that two countries’ exchange rates are
linked to one another indirectly through a chain of pegs involving two other countries (see the
above example on Italy and the U.S.). Figure 2.1 gives a schematic description of all possible
indirect bilateral peg relations.
Second, I separate the country-pairs with indeterminate bilateral exchange rate status from
the bilateral floats. If there were no missing values with respect to the peg status and the base
country for any observations, the set of bilateral floats would simply be the complement of
the bilateral peg set. However, there are several missing values for the peg and base country
variables. Thus in many years it is impossible to determine whether a country-pair entertains
an indirect peg. In this case I set the bilateral peg dummy to missing, with one exception: It
is possible to determine that two countries’ exchange rate is floating regardless of whether
information on the respective base countries is missing if the peg dummy equals zero for both
14In 1932, between the U.K. exit and the U.S. exit from gold France is treated as the base for the U.S..
15Here I deviate from the base classification by Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2015), who define a hybrid
base interest rate as the average of French, U.K. and U.S. rates. The reported results however are
robust to the base rate definition in Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2015).
16One exception is Australia, which up to 1966 is pegged to the British pound (GBP), at which point the
U.K. devalues but the Australian dollar does not follow.
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countries.
Figure 2.1: Bilateral pegs
Direct pegs
k l k l
Indirect pegs (1st order)
k l k l
k l
Indirect pegs (2nd order)
k l k l
k lk l
Notes: Circles indicate countries. Arrows indicate peg relations, with the arrow head pointed towards the base
country.
Finally, once the set of bilateral pegs and indeterminate cases have been identified the
set of bilateral floats is the remaining complement. This approach allows me to exploit the
many indirect pegs and floats contained in the sample. This approach drastically increases the
number of bilateral country-pair observations over the more conventional approach of only
considering country-pairs in which at least one of the countries is a canonical base country
(either the U.S., the U.K. or Germany) (Shambaugh, 2004; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor,
2005).
Capital controls: Capital controls are an important conditioning variable when testing the
effectiveness of floating exchange rates in decoupling local interest rates. For the post-Bretton
Woods period I use the latest vintage of the openness indicator by Chinn and Ito (2008) in
order to separate open economies from ones with significant capital controls in place.17 The
openness indicator by Chinn and Ito (2008) exhibits a trimodal distribution (see Klein and
Shambaugh, 2015) of open economies, closed economies, and a middle group of countries
with some capital controls, but fewer and less stringent ones than the closed economy group. I
construct a capital control dummy that treats only observations with an openness indicator
above or equal to .79 (separating the highest mode) as open economies and all others as
17In some cases I fill missing values for the post-1973 data by gleaning at the openness indicator
provided by Quinn, Schindler and Toyoda (2011).
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closed.18
During the Bretton Woods era most countries had implemented capital controls of one kind
or another. The few exceptions, such as Canada between 1952 and 1967 or Germany between
1957 and 1972 are documented in the dataset by Quinn, Schindler and Toyoda (2011) or by
Beckers (2006). For the interwar years I rely on the capital control data from the League of
Nations that has been compiled by Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2004), the capital account
openness information contained in Eichengreen and Irwin (2010) and again the openness
indicator by Quinn, Schindler and Toyoda (2011). Finally for the pre-1914 years I follow
Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005) with respect to the capital control dummy in that I
treat capital controls as alien to that period.
Results
In order to empirically assess the extent to which international co-movement in risk premiums
has compromised the effectiveness of floating exchange rates I will first study the degree of
co-movement of risk-premiums. After having established that risk premiums co-move globally,
this section provides a quantitative assessment of the degree to which floating exchange rates
have been overwhelmed by global co-movement in risk premiums.
The global co-movement of risk premiums: To analyze the co-movement of risk premiums
I run regressions of the form
∆ρk,t = β0 + β1∆ρl,t + ekl,t, (2.7)
where ρk,t and ρl,t denote the risk premiums in countries k and l respectively. The risk premium
in mortgage rates and private bond yields is calculated as the difference between the risky
rate and the long-term safe rate, whereas the bank lending risk premium is calculated as the
difference between the bank lending rate and the short-term safe rate, due to the generally
shorter maturity of the underlying bank loans. I furthermore compare the co-movement in
risk premiums with the co-movement of safe rates.
The results displayed in table 2.1 indicate that there is significant co-movement in inter-
national risk premiums. Co-movement is strongest for the risk premiums calculated from
mortgage rates and private bond yields. As a robustness check, figure 2.9 in the appendix
shows the equivalent results obtained from risk-premiums that I have calculated by subtracting
base-country safe rates instead of local safe rates from local risky rates (i.e. U.S., U.K., and
Germany safe rates). For these risk premiums the co-movement is even closer.
Floats at risk? The previous paragraph has shown that risk premiums co-move internation-
ally. To which extent does this practically invalidate the trilemma for risky rates? To address
18An important reason for this rather strict separation of economies with an open capital account from
economies with partly regulated capital accounts is that for the international equalization of risk
premiums for assets within the same risk class to occur capital markets for safe as well as risky assets
have to be integrated (see Dedola and Lombardo, 2012).
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Table 2.1: International co-movement of safe rates and risk premiums
Safe rates Risk premia
∆iST ∆iLT ∆ρMort ∆ρBank ∆ρCorp
β1 0.013** 0.038** 0.056** 0.013*** 0.150**
(0.006) (0.017) (0.027) (0.005) (0.073)
N 271204 15252 4874 7903 1449
R2 0.04 0.23 0.29 0.17 0.10
Notes: Estimated β1 coefficients from regression equation 2.7. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags of autocorrelation). All specifications include country-pair
fixed effects. Periods: Pre-1914 (1874-1913), Interwar (1925-1938), Bretton Woods (1950-1969),
Post-Bretton Woods (1974-2015). Sample excludes WW1 (1914-1918) and WW2 (1939-1945) pe-
riods, as well as outliers, defined as absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts.
this question I estimate regression equation 2.5 and show the decoupling power of floating
exchange rates (equation 2.6). The analogous measure for safe rates is obtained by substituting
the risky rate r in equation 2.5 with a safe rate i and using the resulting coefficient estimates to
form the DCP ratio.19
The coefficient estimates and the ratio are displayed in table 2.2. Clearly, among pegs there
exists strong and significant co-movement of domestic interest rates with foreign safe- and
risky rates. The estimated coefficients on the float-interaction term suggest that a floating
exchange rate is effective at decoupling local safe rates. For them, a floating exchange rate
achieves an −87% to −96% reduction in co-movement; similarly so for mortgage rates. With
respect to the more risky bank lending rate and corporate bond yields the estimated coefficients
suggest that floating exchange rates are ineffective, with insignificant DCPs of −19% and an
insignificant 11% respectively. The evidence thus supports the thesis that a floating exchange
rate is less useful in achieving domestic monetary autonomy when it comes to risky rates than
for safe rates.
The emergence of a global risk premium co-movement: Is strong international co-movement
in risk premiums a new phenomenon or have risk premium spillovers always overcome flexible
exchange rates? In order to answer this question I look at the co-movement of risk premiums
in four sub-samples: The pre-1914 Gold Standard era, the interwar years, the Bretton Woods
era and the post-Bretton Boods period. The interwar subsample excludes the years 1919 - 1924
and 1931 - 1935, the chaotic construction- and collapse-years of the interwar Gold Standard.
The Bretton Woods subsample starts in 1950 and lasts until 1969, the beginning of a phase of
speculative attacks that ushers in the end of the Bretton Woods era.
The subsample results are displayed in table 2.3. Safe short-term and long-term rates have
exhibited significant international co-movement throughout the past 150 years. Unsurprisingly
co-movement among safe rates was stronger in earlier sub-periods – the pre-1914 Gold
19In order to avoid giving excessive weight to Eurozone interest rates I only considered German interest
rates and dropped other Eurozone members’ rates from the analysis.
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Table 2.2: The decoupling power of floating exchange rates
Safe rates Risky rates
∆iST ∆iLT ∆rMort ∆rBank ∆rCorp
β1 0.10** 0.59*** 0.27*** 0.38*** 0.47***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
β2 ( f loat) -0.09* -0.57*** -0.21*** -0.07 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
DCP -87% -96% -79% -19% 11%
(7.92) (3.15) (15.20) (18.55) (25.87)
N 17344 5854 4018 2451 1067
R2 0.35 0.31 0.35 0.29 0.40
Notes: DCP – decoupling power of floating exchange rates. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in paren-
theses (accounting for 3 lags of autocorrelation). All specifications include country-pair fixed effects.
Periods: Pre-1914 (1874-1913), Interwar (1919-1938), Bretton Woods (1950-1972), Post-Bretton Woods
(1973-2007). Sample excludes WW1 (1914-1918) and WW2 (1939-1945) periods, as well as outliers,
defined as absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2.3: The rise of risk premium co-movement
Safe rates Risk premia
∆iST ∆iLT ∆ρMort ∆ρBank ∆ρCorp
Pre-1914
β1 0.13*** 0.17*** 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
N 3032 2542 1113 169 596
R2 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.03
Interwar
β1 0.25*** 0.05 0.10 0.13** -0.01
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
N 686 609 382 190 278
R2 0.24 0.10 0.08 0.43 0.22
Bretton Woods
β1 0.05*** 0.20*** -0.01 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
N 6017 3328 943 805 739
R2 0.24 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.02
Post-Bretton Woods
β1 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.13***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04)
N 249943 33751 5498 13609 1246
R2 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.06 0.02
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags of autocorrelation). All
specifications include country-pair fixed effects. Periods: Pre-1914 (1874-1913), Interwar (1919-1938),
Bretton Woods (1950-1972), Post-Bretton Woods (1973-2007). Sample excludes WW1 (1914-1918) and
WW2 (1939-1945) as well as outliers, defined as absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts.
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Standard, the Gold Exchange Standard of the interwar years and the Bretton Woods system –
all gold-based fixed exchange rate regimes. In contrast, extensive international co-movement
of risk premiums is a rather new phenomenon that is unique to the post-1973 period. Only
for the interwar years is there some indication of international risk premium co-movement as
evidenced by the significant coefficient for the bank-lending risk premium.20
The declining effectiveness of floating exchange rates: To get an idea of what the emergence
of global co-movement in risk premiums means for the decoupling power of floating exchange
rates over time this section presents a sub-period analysis of regression equation 2.5 and the
decoupling power (DCP) ratio (equation 2.6). I consider the same four subsamples introduced
earlier. Table 2.4 shows the results.
The pre-1914 era stands out as an era in which floating exchange rates had strong de-
coupling power. DCPs for the most part indicate that the co-movement from pegging the
exchange rate is completely compensated for by floating.21 The decoupling power in the
interwar years is similarly strong. Note, however, that the coefficients for corporate bond
yields reverse sign. During the Bretton Woods era DCPs among bank lending rates and
corporate bond yields are low, while DCPs for safe rates and mortgage lending rates remain
high. In the immediate post-WW2 decades financial regulation, capital controls and the sheer
absence of some financial markets broke the link between domestic and foreign risky rates.22
Finally, in the post-Bretton Woods era, the overall degree of independence afforded by floating
exchange rates has reached its lowest point in the past 150 years. Among bank lending rates
and corporate bond yields floating exchange rates’ decoupling power ranges from −59% to a
statistically insignificant −26%.
The appendix presents the results of various additional analyses, which check the robust-
ness of the findings presented here. Removing countries of dubious data quality from the
sample yields very similar results (table 2.10). Among advanced economies floating exchange
rates are somewhat less effective at decoupling risky rates (table 2.11) than among emerging
markets (table 2.12).23 With an eye on sample comparability over time, table 2.13 considers
only the 17 early developing economies that are part of the pre-1914 sample for the post-1973
20For the subsample regressions I dispense with capital control regressors. The temporal dimension
acts as a control for the degree of financial integration (see Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2005).
Capital controls were low or non-existent prior to 1914, they were then built up during World War I
and subsequently rolled back until the international monetary system broke apart during the Great
Depression. The Bretton Woods era was characterized by strict capital controls, which then again
were rolled back after the Bretton Woods regime came to an end.
21A DCP statistic below −100% points towards negative interest rate co-movement among floats.
22The Bretton Woods subsample is relatively short. The empirical UIP literature has long recognized
that short samples are prone to yield paradoxical parameter estimates due to periods of imperfect
expectation formation. For example, during the 1980s disinflation inflation expectations remained
stubbornly high for a prolonged period. Such ex post expectation errors are more likely to dominate
parameter estimates on short samples than on long ones (Lothian and Wu, 2011).
23This conforms with recent findings by Obstfeld, Ostry and Qureshi (2017) who show that, for a
sample of emerging market economies, a floating exchange rate is still associated with more economic
independence.
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Table 2.4: Effectiveness of floating for decoupling from global interest rates, all coefficients
Safe rates Risky rates
∆iST ∆iLT ∆rMort ∆rBank ∆rCorp
Pre-1914
β1 0.19*** 0.42*** 0.10*** 0.33*** 0.31***
β2 ( f loat) -0.13*** -0.40*** -0.10 -0.27** -0.41***
DCP -71% -95% -96% -82% -133%
(11.65) (7.66) (54.35) (16.87) (31.37)
N 3032 2542 1382 210 596
R2 0.07 0.13 0.10 0.18 0.08
Interwar
β1 0.38*** 0.23 0.26** 0.79*** -0.13**
β2 ( f loat) -0.38*** -0.26 -0.20* -0.77*** 0.11*
DCP -99% -109% -77% -97% -88%
(8.37) (23.89) (18.51) (6.04) (25.90)
N 686 609 519 216 278
R2 0.28 0.11 0.10 0.33 0.06
Bretton Woods
β1 0.14*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.26*** 0.31***
β2 ( f loat) -0.16*** -0.16 -0.15*** 0.02 0.15
DCP -115% -63% -94% 8% 48%
(46.02) (35.91) (38.27) (24.17) (37.71)
N 4907 2455 1110 771 518
R2 0.32 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.18
Post-Bretton Woods
β1 0.08*** 0.14*** 0.15** 0.23*** 0.62***
β2 ( f loat) -0.06*** -0.11** -0.11* -0.12*** -0.13
DCP -76% -81% -76% -50% -20%
(10.23) (9.48) (13.13) (10.96) (19.14)
N 165930 21100 10498 8912 674
R2 0.07 0.19 0.16 0.13 0.30
Notes: DCP – decoupling power. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags
of autocorrelation). All specifications include country-pair fixed effects. Periods: Pre-1914 (1874-1913),
Interwar (1919-1938), Bretton Woods (1950-1972), Post-Bretton Woods (1973-2007). Sample excludes
WW1 (1914-1918) and WW2 (1939-1945) periods, as well as outliers, defined as absolute interest rate
movements in excess of 50 ppts. R2 and the number of observations N refer to the underlying regres-
sions from which the parameters for the calculation of the decoupling power DCP have been obtained.
18
sample. Again, floating exchange rates exhibit decoupling power for safe rates, but not for
risky ones. Finally, instead of considering 1-year changes in interest rates I also looked at 2-year
changes. Some findings in the literature suggest that this approach reduces errors-in-variables
problems and thus gives UIP a fairer chance to be born out by the data (Lothian and Simaan,
1998; Chinn, 2006). The results are very similar (table 2.14).
Sofar, the results suggest that risky rate co-movement differs in important ways from
safe rate co-movement across exchange rate regimes. The presented co-movement analysis,
however, does not distinguish between co-movement due to correlated exogenous shocks and
co-movement due to endogenous transmission. For this reason the following section analyzes
the response of pegs’ and floats’ interest rates to monetary policy shocks from financial center
countries.
2.2.2. Financial center monetary policy transmission to pegs and floats
The second piece of evidence for the declining decoupling power of floating exchange rates
in shielding local risky rates is born out by the study of the international transmission of
financial center monetary policy shocks. For this purpose I look at the international spillover
effects of two important financial centers’ monetary policy: the Bank of England’s discount
rate policy, prior to 1914, and the Federal Reserve’s interest rate policy, after 1973. The focus
lies on discerning systematic differences in the reaction of pegs’ and floats’ interest rates. In
contrast to the previous section’s co-movement analysis this section makes causal claims as
to the effectiveness of floating exchange rates in shielding local interest rates from monetary
policy conducted in important financial centers.
Today, the U.S. dollar is an important vehicle currency that underpins today’s global
financial system.24 U.S. monetary policy decisions thus have global reach (see Kim, 2001;
Canova, 2005; Uribe and Yue, 2006; Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Mac´kowiak, 2007; Craine
and Martin, 2008; Asgharian and Nossman, 2011; Bluedorn and Bowdler, 2011; Hausman and
Wongswan, 2011; Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012; Chudik, Smith et al., 2013; Georgiadis, 2016;
Kose et al., 2017). More particularly, Fed policy has been shown to influence risk appetite
not only in the U.S. (Bekaert, Hoerova and Duca, 2013; Gertler and Karadi, 2015) but globally
(Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015; Rey, 2016). Of particular interest here are recent findings
that that U.S. monetary policy today has international knock on effects irrespective of exchange
24The U.S. dollar at the beginning of the 21st century makes up more than 30% of central banks’
foreign exchange reserves, accounts for more than 40% of global exchange market turnover, 40%
of OTC derivatives and the majority of international banking liabilities (Frankel, 2011). U.S. dollar-
denominated assets of banks outside the U.S. amounts to around 10 trillion USD, about equalling the
total assets of the U.S. commercial banking sector (Shin, 2012). USD credit extended by banks and
bond investors to non-financial sector borrowers outside the USA is about 7 trillion USD. Also, around
80% of USD-denominated bank credit issued outside the U.S. has been issued by non-U.S. banks
(see McCauley, McGuire and Sushko, 2015). Furthermore U.S. equity markets constitute between
30 and 40% of global equity market capitalization and between 2000 and 2013 U.S. government and
corporate bonds constituted between one third and one half of global bond market capitalization.
About two thirds of the global stock of corporate bonds outstanding are issued in USD (according to
Meryll Lynch Global Corporate and High Yield Index).
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rate regime (Passari and Rey, 2015; Rey, 2016).25
Prior to 1914 the pound sterling was the world’s leading foreign reserve-currency and its
leading vehicle currency.26 Thus financial conditions in London had international ramifications.
Indeed in the late 19th century the global reach of U.K. monetary policy found its expression
in the famous hyperbole that, if the Bank of England raised its discount rate to 7 percent, it
could even “attract gold from the moon”.
To see how effective floating exchange rates have been in decoupling domestic rates from
financial center shocks I compare the interest rate responses of pegs and floats to U.K. monetary
policy shocks prior to 1914 and U.S. monetary policy shocks in the late 20th and early 21st
centuries. For this purpose this section introduces a monetary policy shock measure for the
Bank of England (BoE) from 1880 to 1913, as well as a new dataset of hand-collected monthly
policy- and risky rates. The BoE policy shock measure was inspired by the narrative policy
shock measure introduced by Romer and Romer (2004) in that it isolates exogenous movements
in the policy rate by accounting for the information available to policymakers at the time of
their policy decision. On the basis of the new pre-1914 shock measure for BoE policy and
the post-1966 shock measure by Romer and Romer (2004) for Fed policy it is then possible to
analyze the differential response of pegs and floats to financial center monetary policy shocks
in the pre-1914 and post-1973 eras.
Methodological approach
In order to analyze the international response to monetary policy in the financial center I
estimate a set of impulse response functions through local projections (Jorda, 2005).












δhmSt−m f loatk,t + uk,t+h, h = 0, ..., H (2.8)
25The transmission of U.S. monetary policy occurs through different channels. First, it affects the
balance sheet capacity of global financial intermediaries that fund themselves in USD. This channel
will be fleshed out in a model and quantitatively assessed in the second part of this paper. Relatedly,
if contractionary U.S. monetary policy raises the USD exchange rate this impairs the risk-taking
capacity of financial institutions whose USD liabilities exceed their USD assets (Bruno and Shin,
2015). Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) show that U.S. monetary policy influences global banks’ internal
funding markets. Also, U.S. monetary policy may directly act as a focal point that synchronizes
perceptions of asset price-risk among international investors (see Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2013).
26The vast majority of foreign public debt was denominated in pound sterling (Chit¸u, Eichengreen and
Mehl, 2014a), about 60% of world trade was invoiced in this curreny (Frankel, 2011; Eichengreen and
Flandreau, 2012), it made up the majority of central bank foreign exchange reserves (Lindert, 1969)
and London was the world’s preeminent financial hub dominating the global foreign exchange market
(Flandreau and Jobst, 2005, 2009). At the same time the London stock exchange was the world’s most
extensive market place at which borrowers and lenders from all over the world were matched. About
one third of all negotiable securities in the world were quoted there (Cassis, Grossman and Schenk,
2016, p.299). The Bank of England was ascribed the role of “conductor of the international orchestra”
of central banks (Kindleberger, 1984; Eichengreen, 1987).
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where αk are country-fixed effects, ∆h+1rk,t+h are h-year changes rates in the interest rate rk and
uk,t+h are error terms.27 The {γh0}h=1,...,H in expression 2.8 allows me to sketch out the average
behavior of international risky and safe interest rates over the H months following a U.S. policy
rate shock St (post-1973) or a U.K. discount rate shock (pre-1914), while the {δh0}h=1,...,H allow
me to investigate the differential in responses between pegs and floats. f loatk,t is a dummy
variable that is 1 in periods when country k’s exchange rate relative to the center country
floats, has been floating for the previous 12 months, and will be floating for the following 36
months (H = 36). Analogously the dummy is 0 in months when the exchange rate is fixed in
the current month, was fixed throughout the previous 12 months and continuous to be fixed
in the 36 months to come. This definition ensures that estimated impulse response functions
clearly distinguish between pegs and floats; any episodes in which countries switch from
floating exchange rates to fixed ones and vice versa are thus eliminated from the sample. In
all cases I make use of the bilateral peg dummy described in section 2.2.1.
In order to take into account differences in capital account openness I drop all country-
month observations affected by capital controls from the sample in order to focus on the role
of the exchange rate regime. For this purpose I use the capital control indicator described in
section 2.2.1.
Data
Pre-1914 BoE monetary policy shocks: Prior to 1914 the BoE’s key policy rate was its
discount rate, i.e. the rate at which eligible paper (mostly 3-month bills of exchange) could
be exchanged for BoE notes at the BoE’s discount window.28 In the spirit of Romer and
Romer (2004) I consider a monetary policy rate shock measure which tries to correct for the
endogeneity in discount rate changes by purging them of information that was available to
market participants and policymakers’ at the time of the policy decision. The resulting shock
measure constitutes discount rate changes that deviated from the rules implicit in the Gold
Standard, and that came as a surprise to market participants and the wider public.
On which information was the BoE’s discount rate decision based? Most crucially prior to
1914 the BoE’s discount rate decision was informed by the composition of its balance sheet.
Changes in the discount rate were primarily targeted at ensuring the gold-convertibility of
BoE notes through a sufficiently high ratio of liquid assets (i.e. gold or assets that were quickly
convertible into gold) to liquid liabilities. Most important in this respect was the “proportion".
The proportion was the ratio of total reserves to the sum of deposits and post bills.29 Total
reserves were made up of notes, gold- and silver coins. The notes-part of total reserves was
made up of “notes in the bank”, i.e. notes that were backed by the Issue Department of the
27This specification allows for a contemporaneous effect of the shocks St on the interest rate.
28The following description of BoE monetary policy operations draws extensively from Sayers (1976).
29Deposits included public and private deposits, the majority being private. Post bills constituted an
alternative to bank notes, but were safer to send through post. They constituted only a minor part of
the Banking Department’s liabilities.
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Bank of England with gold bullion or gold coin.30 The proportion’s prominence in the central
bankers’ minds is evident in the fact that it was calculated and reported in the BoE’s daily
accounts, with occasional counterfactual proportions being calculated and scribbled into the
daily accounts by the directors.
Another item in the BoE’s balance sheet that was influential in deciding upon the discount
rate level was the weekly change in the value of bills discounted. If at the going rate the
discount window was accessed frequently, and the resulting asset swap from (gold-backed)
notes to discounted bills quickly lowered the BoE’s Banking Department’s reserves the BoE was
more inclined to increase its discount rate. In this way discount rate policy was systematically
countercyclical to money demand and economic activity more generally.
As regards timing, an up to date version of the balance sheet was presented to BoE
directors every morning, including on Thursdays when the Court of Directors usually accepted
the discount rate change proposed by the Governor. On Thursday mornings the Directors
would be handed an individual copy of the BoE’s balance sheet, which also was the last piece
of information available to the Governor on the basis of which to make his discount rate
proposal. Usually the bank’s Governor stuck to the discount rate proposal already made by
the Committee of Treasury on Wednesdays. Formally however the Governor had the right to
deviate from this proposal. Thus if the Thursday morning balance sheet should contain some
new information according to which the Governor saw the discount rate proposal from the
previous day unfit he could change it. In this sense the Thursday morning balance sheet, with
the latest figures from Wednesday constituted the latest information set of decision makers at
the BoE.31
Given this balance sheet information I regress the weekly change in the BoE’s discount rate
(∆it) on the proportion (pt), the change in the proportion, the change in discounts (∆dt), as
well as 1 lag of all these. Finally I add the previous week’s discount rate level (it−1) among the
regressors, in order to capture mean reversion in the discount rate.












ηm∆dt+m + St (2.9)
The estimated residual Ŝt constitutes the resulting monetary shock measure.32 This shock
series is displayed in figure 2.2 (this is the monthly mean of the weekly shocks).
As a validation exercise I check whether the weekly shock series is correlated with changes
30The gold backing exempted a fiduciary note issue whose amount was increased on an irregular basis.
31Occasionally, in response to a crisis situation, the Governor had the power to enact a so-called
“Governor’s rise”, i.e. an unscheduled change in the discount rate which then would be retrospectively
accepted by the following session of the Court of Directors. In these cases I take the Governor’s
information set to have been the balance sheet at the day of the unscheduled discount rate change,
containing balance sheet information up to the previous day.
32In contrast to the shock measure proposed by Romer and Romer (2004) this setup does not include
any forward looking information. Indeed professional economic forecasts only became a common
feature of economic policy making later. As such the focus on backward looking balance sheet
information, provided though on a daily basis, reflects one of the more mechanistic aspects of central
banking under the gold standard.
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in the mentioning of the BoE’s discount rate policy in the day following the discount rate
decision. A surprising discount rate change should be reflected in a subsequent increase in the
news coverage of the policy move. For this purpose I ran a word search for the term “bank rate”
in the daily newspaper The Guardian. I then regressed the absolute value of the weekly discount
rate shock on the change in word counts for “bank rate”, as well as absolute changes in the
discount rate. The results are shown in table 2.5. The correlation between the absolute discount
rate shock and the word count is highly significant. Thus the calculated shock measure reflects
policy moves that were perceived as surprising enough by contemporary observers to warrant
increased news coverage.
Post-1973 Fed monetary policy shocks: For the post-1973 era I use the narrative shock
measure that was introduced by Romer and Romer (2004) and subsequently extended by
Coibion et al. (2012). This shock measure attempts to isolate exogenous variation in the
intended Federal Fund rate by purging it from information about the economy that central
bankers had at the time they decided upon their new policy rate. In contrast to the previously
introduced shock measure for the BoE, today’s central bankers base their decision not mainly
on the central bank’s balance sheet, but instead on the information they have about the
past, present and expected future behavior of the economy. Thus Romer and Romer (2004)
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Table 2.5: Validation: Correlation with word counts from The Guardian
(1) (2)
”Bank rate” count 0.0279** 0.0269**
(2.3840) (2.3383)
Month FE No Yes
Observations 2008 2008
adjusted R2 0.90 0.91
Dependent variable: absolute value of discount rate shock. Additional controls: ab-
solute changes in the discount rate and a constant. t-statistics in parentheses.
used the Federal Reserve’s internal estimates and forecasts about past, current and future
inflation, real output and unemployment to purge the intended Federal Fund rate of any
anticipated movements and obtain a residual that can be interpreted as a monetary policy
shock (analogously to equation 2.9). I use this monthly narrative shock series as the interest
rate shock measure St from 01:1973 until 12:2008, in order to assess the impact of U.S. monetary
policy on pegs’ and floats’ interest rates according to the local projection described earlier
(equation 2.8).
Pre-1914 monthly interest rate data: In order to investigate the international impact of pre-
1914 U.K. monetary policy on pegs and floats respectively I collected monthly short-term policy
rates and risky rates for Sweden, Denmark (pegs), Spain, Portugal (floats) and Japan (float
until 1897 and peg afterwards).33 The risky rate is either a bank lending rate or a corporate
bond yield index which I constructed from the coupon rates and bond prices reported in local
newspapers. The corporate bond yield index is an equal weighted average of the corporate
bond yields of private companies. Importantly, the bond yield index only makes use of bonds
that were denominated in local currency.34
Post-1973 monthly interest rate data: For the post-1973 years, the monthly time series for
safe and risky rates come from the same sources as the annual data do: the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics, national statistical offices or national central banks. For the risky rate I use
lending rates for unsecured bank lending to private corporations and households of relatively
short maturities. The safe rate usually is the central bank’s policy rate, a short-term money
market rate or the current yield of a short-term government bond. In total the sample covers
48 countries (see table 2.17).
33In Portugal gold convertibility ceased in 1891 from which point on the discount rate is not used to
stabilize the exchange rate. In Spain gold convertibility ceased in 1883 and a de facto fiat money
system was established as silver convertibility became irrelevant (Martín-Aceña, 2007).
34While floating pound-sterling denominated bonds on the London Stock Exchange was a first choice
for many companies located in peripheral economies, a substantial fraction of bonds was nevertheless
issued in domestic currency in the home market (Mitchener and Pina, 2016).
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Results
Pre-1914 Bank of England policy spillovers: The top two panels in figure 2.3 displays how
the world reacted to a +1 ppt increase in the BoE’s discount rate in the first era of financial
globalization prior to 1914. The left figure displays how safe policy rates of pegs (black solid
line) and floats (blue dashed line) responded. As can be seen, floats exhibited no response,
while pegs exhibit a full +1 ppt increase in their safe rate within about 12 months. The blue
points on the floats’ impulse response indicates whether the floats’ response differs statistically
significantly from the pegs’ response according to a Wald test for equality of responses.
The upper right panel displays the equivalent IRFs for risky rates. Again the pegs exhibit a
complete pass-through while floats respond little. In general floating exchange rates were an
effective instrument for decoupling domestic interest rates – risky and safe – from BoE policy.
Post-1973 Federal Reserve policy spillovers: The lower half of figure 2.3 shows the differ-
ential effect of Fed interest rate shocks on pegs and floats. For safe rates, the pass-through
among pegs is complete and takes place within six months. Floats’ safe rates also react, but
far less so, exhibiting about two fifth, or 40%, of the response of floats. The floats’ response
is indicative of the long-run increase in the global synchronization of underlying economic
fundamentals (Bordo and Helbling, 2011), which induces central banks to synchronize policy
rates, even among floats. The difference to the pegs’ response, however, is still significant at
the 95%-level throughout the 36-month horizon.
The difference between pegs and floats, however, is no longer significant for risky rates.
In contrast to the early 20th century floating exchange rates have become much less effective
in insulating an economy’s risky rates from U.S. monetary policy shocks in the Post-Bretton
Woods era of financial globalization. In particular, in the aftermath of a contractionary U.S.
policy rate shock, the spread of floats’ risky rates over floats’ safe rates increases by around 0.4
ppts, closing the gap to the pegs’ response. In contrast, the pegs’ response does not exhibit a
similar increase in spreads. All movement in the pegs’ risky rate comes from movement in the
safe rate.35
I also considered a subsample of advanced economies, on which most of the recent evidence
in the dilemma literature is based on (Passari and Rey, 2015; Rey, 2016). I find that for advanced
economies post-1973, floating exchange rates are associated with somewhat more risky rate
independence in the short-run. After 12 months, however, the peg-float difference has again
vanished (see figure 2.7 in the appendix).36
35The risky rate response for pegs is somewhat more sluggishly than the safe rate response. One reason
for this might be that the risky rates are mostly bank lending rates, which have been shown to exhibit
some rigidity (see Gerali et al., 2010).
36It is well known that many emerging markets’ ‘’safe rates” contain a risk premium (Mauro, Sussman
and Yafeh, 2002), which quickly react to U.S. monetary policy.
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Solid black line – response of pegs; dashed blue line – response of floats; Blue circles indicate the
point-wise rejection of the null hypothesis that the peg response equals the float response at the 90% sig-
nificance level, according to a two-sided Wald test. Confidence bands calculated on the basis of Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors (accounting for 36 monthly lags of autocorrelation). All specifications include
country fixed effects. Pre-1914 sample: 1880:1 to 1913:12; Post-Bretton Woods sample: 1973:1 to 2010:12.
In sum, these results underscore the long-run decline in the ability of floating exchange
rates to decouple local risky rates. The absence of extensive risk premium spillovers in the
early 20th century rendered floating exchange rates effective in decoupling safe, as well as
risky rates from their global counterparts. By the late 20th century, however, risk premium
spillovers have become pervasive enough to seriously qualify the effectiveness of floating
exchange rates with respect to risky rates.
2.3. Why do risk premiums co-move?
What lies behind the late 20th century rise in international risk premium synchronization?
The early and late 20th century financial globalizations were both underpinned by financial
openness. Financial openness allows international investors to engage in arbitrage until return
differentials between assets within the same risk class are eliminated, and hence risk premiums
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are equalized (see Dedola and Lombardo, 2012).37 Explanations based solely on financial
openness, however, beg the question of why risk premium co-movement among floats is
specific to the late 20th century and did not already occur in the early 20th century (see Quinn
and Voth, 2008). To understand this, it is key to understand the differences in the financial
institutions that underpinned both eras of financial globalization. In particular, the growing
importance of globalized banks, and the interplay of leverage constraints and mark-to-market
accounting they embody.38
2.3.1. The international risk-taking channel
To see how the combination of leverage constraints and mark-to-market accounting in global
banks opens the door to extensive risk premium spillovers, even among floats, consider the
following: When leverage-constrained banks become marginal investors in risky asset markets,
bank leverage can become a driving force for excessive movements in risky assets’ prices (Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand, 2012; Adrian and Boyarchenko,
2013b).39 Hence the movements in risky rates will be disproportional to movements in safe
rates, which are set by the central bank. In an open economy this gives rise to a conflict
between the international non-arbitrage conditions for safe and risky assets, because the
nominal exchange rate can adjust to satisfy only one of the two. For example, the nominal
exchange rate may satisfy the non-arbitrage condition for safe rates but not that for risky rates.
This however is no equilibrium, because investors will shed the overpriced risky asset and buy
the underpriced one until risky asset prices have adjusted sufficiently that the non-arbitrage
condition for risky assets is satisfied. It is in this sense that risk premiums can overwhelm
floating exchange rates and spill over from one currency area into another. Note the twofold
role of banks here. First, as marginal investors their leverage constraint drives a wedge
between the movement in safe and risky asset returns, and hence opens up the conflict for
the nominal exchange rate to either equalize expected returns for safe or risky rates. Second,
banks’ international arbitrage activity ensures that the disproportional movement in risky rates
spills over into the rest of the world.
From an individual bank’s perspective the corresponding events depict themselves as
37Also see Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011) and Alpanda and Aysun (2014) for theoretical accounts
in which the international equalization of returns is driven by the optimizing behavior of a global
bank, that exploits arbitrage opportunities across regions.
38While I concentrate on the explanatory power of differences in financial institutions Jordà et al. (2017b)
discuss several alternative explanations. For example, the pre-1914 Gold Standard introduced a
desynchronizing force into global finance, because one region’s gold inflows constituted another
region’s gold outflows. Thus, in contrast to today’s fiat money system global liquidity supply
in the 19th century Gold Standard was inelastic, rendering synchronized risk-taking less likely.
Behavioral explanations that attribute financial excess variation to systematic mis-judgements in
human psychology (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shiller, 2000; Akerlof and Shiller, 2010) and
to collective manias and panics (Kindleberger, 1978) face the difficulty of having to explain why
international investors’ behavior differs between the two eras of financial globalization, although they
presumably were subject to the same cognitive constraints.
39Adrian, Etula and Muir (2014) and Adrian, Moench and Shin (2016) present empirical evidence that
leverage-constrained banks are indeed influential marginal investors.
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follows: a fall in risky asset prices, that is not exactly offset by a movement in the exchange
rate, affects the bank’s leverage. Subject to a leverage constraint, and because issuing new
equity is costly, the bank sells risky assets to fulfill its leverage constraint. The bank, however,
does not sell risky assets indiscriminately. It sells home and foreign risky assets in a way that
ensures that the non-arbitrage condition between the two is satisfied. This chain of events
plays out simultaneously in different currency areas, because it pivots around a fall in global
asset prices that affects banks everywhere. In this way risk-taking becomes synchronized, even
among floats.40
2.3.2. Early vs. late 20th century financial institutions
How did financial globalization in the early 20th century look like to avoid extensive risk
premium spillovers? In the early 20th century, financial globalization in general took the form
of equity and debt securities traded on a stock exchange – first and foremost in London, but
also in Paris and other Western European financial centers. The securities traded on these stock
exchanges were a popular asset type with contemporary investors (Hoffman, Postel-Vinay
and Rosenthal, 2009). By the late 19th century, after decades of continuous refinements, stock
exchanges had struck a balance between competition and market regulations that (international)
investors and creditors preferred over alternative modes of intermediation (Cassis, Grossman
and Schenk, 2016, ch.11).
Among the financial institutions active on the stock exchange risk-sensitive funding and
leverage constraints were less of a concern than they are for big global banks today. Investment
trusts41 and closed-end mutual funds were among the most active in underwriting overseas
corporate securities. These institutions commonly pursued a long-term buy-and-hold invest-
ment strategy.42 In the meantime, the composition of their portfolio, let alone its market value,
could be hard to find out. Owing to the conservative balance sheet structure of these financial
institutions, investors however also had less to worry about in the first place. Investment
trusts typically invested less in equity than they issued ordinary shares themselves (Rutterford,
2009). The upshot of all this was the relative irrelevance of leverage constraints, and hence the
absence of procyclical intermediary risk-taking. To the contrary, in times of crisis important
global investors acted in a stabilizing way, by taking on debt in order to buy assets at depressed
prices (Chambers and Esteves, 2014) .
Wealthy private individuals were another major participant on stock exchanges (Michie,
1986), contributing an estimated 5 to 10% of British capital investment abroad (Feis, 1964, p.24).
Such investment typically is not affected by leverage constraints as it is rarely levered in the
first place.
40Note that the international risk-taking channel described here is different from the one described by
Bruno and Shin (2015), who focus on exchange rate valuation effects on banks’ balance sheets.
41The term investment trust here is meant to include investment trust companies, which are no legal
trusts, but which made up the majority of investment trust after the 1870s.
42Consequently, these financial institutions had little turnover and made no attempt to act as market
makers (Chambers and Esteves, 2014), a role which was firmly in the grips of stock exchanges.
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Finally, banks also played a role in early 20th century financial globalization. Especially
so in Germany and France, where financial systems were more bank-based to begin with.
However, banks tended to finance themselves through a comparatively stable base of deposits
(Feis, 1964). This also was the case in Germany where a handful of great universal banks
played a dominant role in underwriting, distributing and partly holding securities. Thus, to
the extent that they were influential in foreign investment, the depositor-enforced leverage
constraints of pre-1914 banks were most likely less stringent than those of today’s banks, whose
leverage faces surveillance from financial regulators and wholesale money market creditors
alike.
The financial globalization that started in the late 20th century differed in crucial ways
from that earlier in the 20th century. It was critically underpinned by large global banks
– financial intermediaries that face leverage constraints and mark their assets to market.43
Typical exemplars of today’s global financial intermediaries are Wall Street investment banks
and large European universal banks. These institutions’ assets to capital ratio – a measure of
their leverage – can be as high as 35 (see Eichengreen, 1999), but more typically centers around
10. These are commonly considered to be leverage-constrained institutions.44
Today’s global banks have a much broader range of operations than banks in the early 20th
century. They are influential players on many asset markets, such as commodity and derivative
exchanges, the interbank bond market and over the counter (OTC) transactions. Due to their
size banks can often act as market makers. The stock exchange, the unrivalled market place
for securities in the early 20th century, has become only one among many market places over
which global banks hold considerable sway. As a consequence, global banks’ risk-appetite
makes itself felt in asset markets throughout the world.
Vice versa, asset price movements throughout the world make themselves felt in global
banks’ risk-taking capacity. This is because the late 20th century has witnessed the spread
of mark-to-market accounting practices. By comparison, pre-1914 investment companies,
were intransparent. If they made their portfolios public at all, they did not mark their assets
to market. Only after 1945 did business laws start to require financial trusts to reveal the
current market value of investments in some way. It was even later in the 20th century that
mark-to-market was turned into standard accounting practice (Newlands, 1997, ch.12). By
the late 20th century, however, mark-to-market accounting had become so ingrained in global
finance, that asset price movements anywhere could impact banks’ balance sheets everywhere.
One particular type of formal leverage constraint that has come to characterize modern
43Many of these large banks were the result of mergers in which former investment banks became part
of universal institutions (Cassis, Grossman and Schenk, 2016, p.157).
44The exact forms and origins of the leverage-constraints faced by these institutions differ. Partly they
are market enforced, partly they take the form of regulatory requirements. Leverage-constraints
commonly address the need of the intermediary’s creditors to counter problems of agency – ensuring
the intermediary has enough ’skin in the game’. The late 20th century rise in bank leverage and
leverage constraints thus are related to various factors that are beyond the scope of this paper, such as
asymmetric remuneration schemes for bank management, limited liability, government guarantees,
such as deposit insurance, and the preferential tax treatment of debt.
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finance are value-at-risk (VaR) constraints.45 In its simplest form a VaR constraint states that
a bank’s equity has to be sufficient to cover bad scenario losses. VaR is a risk-management
metric that has its origins in the financial innovations of the 1970s and 1980s that led to a
proliferation of leverage and a growing need for an organization-wide risk metric. At the
same time innovations in information technology and the falling price of computation power
rendered VaR measures that had been proposed theoretically a few decades earlier practical
(see Markowitz, 1952; Roy, 1952; Tobin, 1958; Treynor, 1961; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; Mossin,
1966). As a consequence, VaR-like measures sprung up in trading environments during this
period (see Lietaer, 1971; Garbade, 1986, 1987). Over the following years the spread of internal
risk management techniques fed back into financial regulation and vice versa. In this way
VaR-based measures spread even further and became enshrined into international financial
regulation, such as the Basel accords or the EU’s capital adequacy directive (CAD) (Holton,
2003).46
In order to quantitatively assess the extent to which the rise of VaR-constrained financial
intermediaries can account for the observed international spillovers in risk premiums the
following section introduces an international banking model in which banks mark their assets
to market and face a VaR constraint.
2.4. A model of VaR constrained banking
This section rationalizes the empirical findings presented earlier through a two-country
banking model with value-at-risk (VaR) constrained banks. In the two-country model leverage-
constrained banks, that mark-to-market their assets, are marginal investors in global asset
markets. Banks maximize the expected discounted utility streams of their local shareholders.
They invest in an international portfolio of risky assets. This is funded through equity, as well
as domestic and foreign debt, for which they pay domestic and foreign safe rates. The VaR
constraint limits the banks’ asset to equity ratio. Because the expected returns on risky assets
exceed the costs of debt financing banks lever up to their VaR constraint.
45A new literature on VaR based and related funding constraints has recently sprung up (Brunnermeier
and Pedersen, 2009; Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand, 2012; Adrian and Boyarchenko, 2013a). One
particular advantage of this new generation of financial friction models over conventional credit-
channel formulations based on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
is that they generate procyclical risk-taking. Empirically, Adrian, Etula and Muir (2014) and Adrian,
Moench and Shin (2016) and have recently shown that intermediary leverage is a key for explaining
observable asset price patterns (also see He and Krishnamurthy, 2017). For this reason I model the
bank’s funding constraint as a VaR constraint, which states that the bank’s value at risk needs to be
covered by its equity.
46As a consequence a new literature on VaR-based and related risk-sensitive funding constraints has
recently sprung up (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Danielsson, Shin and Zigrand, 2012; Adrian
and Boyarchenko, 2013a). One particular advantage of this new generation of financial friction models
over conventional credit-channel formulations based on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) and
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) is that they generate procyclical leverage. Empirical support for this
framework comes from Adrian, Etula and Muir (2014) and Adrian, Moench and Shin (2016) who have
recently shown that intermediary leverage is a key for explaining observable asset price patterns.
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The banks’ optimizing behavior gives rise to arbitrage activity that ensures that the price
for domestic debt equals the price for foreign debt plus the expected exchange rate change.
In other words, uncovered interest rate parity holds for safe rates (in the linearized model).
In equilibrium a similar non-arbitrage condition has to hold for domestic and foreign risky
assets. However, when safe and risky rates do not move one-to-one, this gives rise to a conflict
between the non-arbitrage conditions for safe and risky assets. The nominal exchange rate
can adjust to satisfy only one of the two. For example, the nominal exchange rate may satisfy
the non-arbitrage condition for safe rates but not that for risky rates. This however is no
equilibrium, because investors will shed the overpriced risky asset and buy the underpriced
one until risky asset prices have adjusted sufficiently, so that the non-arbitrage condition for
risky assets is also satisfied. It is in this sense that risk premiums can overwhelm floating
exchange rates and spill over from one currency area into another.
In the model, safe and risky rates do not move one-to-one, due to the interplay of leverage
constraints, mark-to-market accounting practices, and costly equity adjustment. Consider
any shock that puts downward pressure on risky asset prices. The drop in risky asset prices
erodes foreign and home bank equity. Subject to VaR constraints, and because raising new
equity is costly, the banks will adjust their leverage by selling risky assets, putting even more
downward pressure on risky asset prices. The resulting sell-off of risky assets generates an
excessive increase in risky rates.
Note the twofold role of banks here. First, as marginal investors they drive a wedge
between the movements in safe rates and risky rates, and hence open up the conflict for the
nominal exchange rate to either equalize expected returns for the one or the other. Second,
banks’ international arbitrage activity ensures that any excess movement in risky rates spills
across borders.
2.4.1. Model outline
Figure 2.4 displays the model’s two banks and their balance sheets. I outline the model from
the home (H) bank’s perspective. The foreign (F) bank’s problem is symmetric, and foreign
variables are denoted with a star superscript (?). In order to clarify the proposed international
risk-taking channel the model exposition focuses on international capital markets and abstracts
from all other markets.47
The Home bank maximizes the expected discounted utility stream of its shareholders, who
receive utility from consumption (ct). Shareholder income is made up of dividends (mt) and a
fixed endowment (y), so that ct = mt + y.48 The bank buys risky home and foreign assets (bht




t ), and the bank funds these risky asset purchases through
equity (kt), as well as home and foreign debt (dht and d
f
t ) for which it pays risk-free rates (i
h
t
and i ft ). The superscript h denotes assets and debt denominated in home currency, and f those
47The model abstracts from consumer price dynamics. All variables are nominal and banks maximize
expected nominal profits, effectively assuming a stable price level.
48The endowment reflects any other income, besides bank dividends, that shareholders receive.
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denominated in foreign currency. The bank is subject to a VaR constraint, which states that
the bank’s (book) equity must suffice to cover its value at risk.49 The bank’s maximization
problem is furthermore constrained by the balance sheet identity and the law of motion for
equity, which states that equity equals previous period’s equity, plus profits, minus dividend
payouts:
max








s.t. equity law of motion: kt = kt−1 +Πt − ct + y (2.11)
balance sheet ID: kt + dht + d
f









VaR: Et{VaRt+1} ≤ kt, (2.13)
where capital (kt−1) and beginning of period realized profits (Πt) are state variables, y is a
fixed endowment and et is the nominal exchange rate (Home currency/Foreign currency). The
utility function has the CRRA form u(ct) = (c1−σt − 1)/(1− σ). In the context of the presented
banking model σ > 0 can be interpreted as a dividend smoothing motive. This also implies
that issuing new equity (mt < 0) is costly.
Profits (Πt) equal the expected returns from investing in risky assets, minus previous
period’s bank equity, minus the cost of debt and the cost of adjusting the foreign portfolio:














b ft−1 − o fb
)2
. (2.14)
49 The VaR constraint is based on book equity, because it features prominently in banking regulation
as well as in banks’ annual reports, for example in return on equity figures (Adrian, Boyarchenko
and Shin, 2015). Furthermore, in their empirical study on intermediary asset pricing Adrian, Moench
and Shin (2016) show that broker-dealer leverage calculated with book equity, not market equity, is
a key state variable for asset pricing. The VaR constraint is formulated as an inequality constraint
Et{VaRt+1 ≤ kt}, giving rise to a Kuhn-Tucker optimization problem. However, as long as the
expected return on risky assets exceeds the cost of debt-financing, and as long as the cost of equity
exceeds the cost of debt, the bank will lever up to the constraint and buy as many risky assets as




t denote the gross return of the two risky assets. This gross return is comprised of
a fixed coupon payment (ch and c f ), the risky asset’s price (qht and q
f
t ) and a repayment rate
(Dht , D
f
t ∈ (0, 1)), where q˜ht ≡ Dht (qht + ch).50 The risky assets can be thought of as corporate
bonds with a default rate 1− Dt, i.e. only a fraction Dt of the risky assets pays a coupon and
can be sold at price qt this period. The remaining fraction 1− Dt becomes worthless and pays
no coupon.
The bank receives funding in H and F currency at the safe policy rates iht and i
f
t . On the
liability side there furthermore is bank capital – the bank’s equity. As a consequence of σ > 0
the bank will not simply fulfill its VaR constraint through raising new equity. Instead, the
bank will partly fulfill its VaR constraint through adjustments in risk-taking. Finally, o fd and o
f
b
denote steady state gross foreign asset holdings. Foreign portfolio adjustment costs are needed
in order to pin down steady state foreign asset- and liability holdings (see Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe, 2003; Benigno, 2009).
The bank’s value at risk is defined as its bad scenario profits for next period








b ft − o fb
)2
, (2.15)
where q˜h,low denotes bad scenario gross returns on the risky home asset: q˜h,low ≡ Dh,low(qh,low +
ch). Dh,low and qh,low stand for a high default rate- and low asset price state.51 Given a stationary
distribution of risky asset prices, qh,low denotes a specific low percentile of that distribution.52
The safe rate follows an AR(1) process
iht = (1− χi)ih + χiiht−1 + eh,it , (2.16)
where ih without time index denotes the steady state gross safe rate, χi denotes the safe rate’s
persistence and eh,it is normally distributed, e
h,i
t ∼ N(0, σi).53










50The coupons ensure that in steady state risky asset returns exceed the cost of debt, and hence the
bank levers up to its VaR constraint.
51 In order to keep the exposition simple, this formulation abstracts from the correlation of returns
across assets.
52Adrian and Shin (2013) provide a microfoundation for VaR constraints in terms of a moral hazard
problem between the bank and its creditors.
53 Assuming the interest rate to be an exogenous process can favor the finding of extensive risk
premium spillovers in the sense that the safe rate is assumed not to work against the spillover. Or, put
differently, the existence of extensive risk premium spillovers is predisposed on their not provoking
an offsetting monetary policy response. Prior to 2007 monetary policy was usually not targeting risky
asset prices (see Fuhrer and Tootell, 2008).
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The bad scenario realization of rht is defined by D




The default rate also follows an AR(1) process
Dht = (1− χD)Dh + χDDht−1 + eh,Dt , (2.18)
with persistence χD and eh,Dt ∼ N(0, σD).54














q ft , (2.20)
where bhS and b
f
S are exogenously fixed supplies of the risky H and F asset, respectively. ψ
denotes the inverse demand elasticity of risky assets with respect to their price. When banks
sell risky assets, this parameter determines how much asset prices fall before non-bank agents
step in and stabilize asset prices.55 Alternatively ψ can be interpreted as a supply elasticity
which indicates by how much risky asset supply increases in the price of risky assets.
To focus on the international risk-taking channel I close the model with the foreign exchange
market equation
et = 1 +
1
φ
(ED ft ), (2.21)
where ED ft denotes the excess demand for foreign currency (see Branson and Henderson,
1985; Bruno and Shin, 2014).56 Thus the exchange rate (home currency/foreign currency)
is rising in the excess demand for foreign currency. This equation can be thought of as a
stand-in for the balance of payment equation in a more fully fledged model of the world
economy. It is supposed to complement the model’s endogenous capital account dynamics
with a current account counterpart. This is important because the resulting restriction on the
exchange rate endows the model with plausible capital account dynamics. The parameter ψ
can be interpreted as the current account’s sensitivity with respect to the exchange rate, i.e.
the trade elasticity.57 The full set of non-linear model equations is summarized in appendix
54While the exogenous process for Dt is not bounded from below, in the calibration the innovation
variance is small relative to its steady state, so that in the simulations Dt never becomes negative.
55These non-bank investors can be thought of as risk averse households who only step in once falling
asset prices have increased expected returns sufficiently to compensate for the riskiness of the
risky asset. Alternatively, Calvo (1998) provides an account in which leveraged investors that face
margin calls need to liquidate their asset holdings and sell them to less informed counterparts. As a
consequence of the resulting asymmetric information problem asset prices need to fall before less
informed investors step in.
56ED f is calculated as the capital flow residual resulting from subtracting all capi-
tal inflows from H into F from all capital outflows from H into F: ED ft =(
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bh,?t−1 − iht−1 dh,?t−1
)
.
57The foreign exchange market equation has also been used as a way to model foreign exchange market
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2.A.1. For the subsequent analysis I linearize the model around it’s nonstochastic steady state.
2.4.2. International transmission of safe and risky rates
What does the linearized model say about international co-movement in safe and risky interest
rates? To gain intuition the following exposition assumes that the foreign portfolio adjustment




t +Et{eˆt+1} − eˆt, (2.22)
where the hat (̂) denotes a variable’s percentage deviation from steady state. A fixed exchange
rate thus implies perfect co-movement among safe rates. By contrast, among floats, central
banks are free to set safe rates according to their policy goals, and the nominal exchange rate
will adjust to satisfy UIP-equation 2.22. In this way floating exchange rates provide effective
insulation for safe rates and the trilemma holds.
How about risky rates? The non-arbitrage condition for risky rates is
Et{rˆht+1} = Et{rˆ ft+1} +Ω(Et{eˆt+1} − eˆt) + (1−Ω)(rˆ f ,lowt − rˆh,lowt ), (2.23)
where Ω ≡ ihrh (1 + λβµ ) and variables without time index denote steady state values. Unlike
for safe rates, the exchange rate does not account for the entire risky rate differential across
regions.
In the following calibration Ω is less than 1. In this case the second term in equation 2.23
indicates that expected exchange rate changes drive a smaller wedge between the home and
foreign risky rate than they do between safe rates, thus contributing to risky rate co-movement
among floats. The third term says that whenever the foreign-home spread in bad scenario
returns goes up, the home risky return declines. The reason for this is that if foreign bad
scenario risky returns are higher than home ones then asset demand shifts to the foreign risky
asset.
Another perspective to look at this is through risk premiums. The risky rate equals safe
rate plus risk premium (ρt): rt ≡ it + ρt. To the extent that floating exchange rates decouple
safe rates any co-movement in risky rates must come from risk premiums. The home risk
premium’s percentage deviations from its steady state can be expressed as:
ρˆht = λˆt(r
h − rh,low)−Et{µˆt+1} +
( ih









Equation 2.24 shows that the model gives rise to a risk premium that fluctuates endogenously
with the development of three components: First, the marginal value of easing the VaR
imperfections that cause foreign exchange supply to be less than perfectly elastic. According to this
interpretation a lower ψ indicates a larger imperfection, and hence a less elastic foreign exchange
supply (see Hau and Rey, 2005).
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constraint (λˆt), times the differential between the safe rate and the bad scenario risky return,
with ih > rh,low. Intuitively, the tighter the VaR constraint, the larger the spread between
risky and safe rates from which the bank could profit if its VaR constraint was marginally
eased. Second, the risk premium is decreasing in the expected tightness of next period’s law
of motion constraint for equity (Et{µˆt+1}). The more abundant bank equity is expected to be
in the next period, the less likely it is that the bank has to engage in costly equity issuance,
and hence that shareholders have to cut their consumption. Therefore the bank engages in
more risk-taking today, which drives down the risk premium. Finally, the risk premium is also
decreasing in the differential between the safe rate and the bad scenario risky rate.
A comparison of the home risk premium in equation 2.24 with the foreign risk premium
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where I make use of the steady state relations r f = rh and r f ,low = rh,low. The first and second
terms in equation 2.25 are identical to the first and second terms in equation 2.24. The
equalization of risk premiums – the price of risk – is not surprising, given that financial
markets are integrated. However, the bank’s leverage constraint can, through its effect on the
risk premium, cause the risky rate to move in excess of safe rates. Any such excess movement
in the risky rate will be transmitted internationally by the bank’s arbitrage activity. The bank
will buy the risky asset with the higher return and sell the risky asset with the lower return
until the non-arbitrage condition 2.23 is satisfied. In equilibrium, this gives rise to risky rates
co-movement.58
2.4.3. Calibration
In this section I calibrate the model in order to evaluate the its quantitative implication for
the co-movement of risky rates among floats. The model is calibrated in such a way as to
render the F region’s relation to the H region reminiscent of the U.S.’s relation to the rest of
the world (ROW). However, except for the steady-state gross foreign asset positions and the
fixed endowments the home and foreign segments of the model are calibrated symmetrically.
The model is calibrated to a monthly frequency.
The monthly time preference rate is set to an annualized 0.9967 (i.e. an annual 0.96 =
0.996712). This corresponds to the annualized safe rate’s steady state, which is set to 4% – the
long-time empirical average of short-term safe rates. The monthly persistence of the safe rate
is set to 0.94. The standard deviation of the safe rate shock is calibrated to match the standard
deviation of the monthly narrative monetary policy shock series by Romer and Romer (2004).
In order to reflect the co-movement in safe rates documented in section 2.2.2 I also calibrate
58This risk premium spillover mechanism can bite even for low levels of cross-border asset holdings.
Only in the case of perfect autarky, when each bank holds only domestic assets and liabilities, is this
asset price channel shut down.
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the home and foreign safe rate shocks to be correlated with a correlation coefficient equal to
0.4. This is intended to account for the level of late 20th century co-movement in fundamentals
(see Bordo and Helbling, 2011) that induces correlated central bank responses, and hence
correlated safe rates.
The parameter σ is gleaned from Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011). In their banking
model they set σ = 1. The value of 1 is on the lower end of the values that are conventionally
chosen when parameterizing a representative household’s utility function. Among the most
important shareholders of global banks are investment funds, which presumably are less risk
averse than the average household.
The low repayment rate parameter (Dlow) was set to 0.971/12, implying an annualized bad
scenario default rate of 3%. This reflects the higher end of annual default rates for corporate
bonds over the past few decades (see Standard & Poor’s Global Fixed Income Research and
Standard & Poor’s CreditPro). For example, the global default rate on corporate bonds during
the 2008 financial crisis was slightly above 4%, while the default rate after the 2001 stock
market crash peaked at slightly below 4%. The value for the standard deviation of the default
shock (0.0003) was gleaned from Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011).59
I consider large U.S. investment banks and European universal banks to be the financial
institutions closest corresponding to the marginal investors depicted in the model. I set the
low asset price realization (qh,low) to target their asset to capital ratio. Prior to 2007 the total
(unweighted) asset to (book) equity ratios of these institutions were located in the 25 to 35
range (see Eichengreen, 1999). In the model, the asset side of the banks’ balance sheets only
depicts risky assets that are tradable. For big banks that manage a global portfolio such
tradable securities make up about one quarter to one third of their balance sheet (He, Khang
and Krishnamurthy, 2010; Baily, Bekker and Holmes, 2015). In order to bring the model to
the data I thus target three times the pre-crisis asset to capital ratio of 30, i.e. a capital-asset
ratio of 0.1. This can be thought of as effectively netting out non-traded safe assets and safe
liabilities, which are of no explicit interest with respect to the channel discussed here. As a
result of this, the impact of asset price variations on bank equity will be quantitatively realistic.
The risky bond coupon (c) is set to 0.005. Given the steady state price for the risky assets
this implies a 5.5% per year coupon on the steady state value of the risky bond. This is a
typical value located in the center of the range of empirically observable coupon rates for
corporate bonds.
The inverse elasticity of risky asset demand (ψ) is set to 0.0265. This value implies an
average 7.5% fall in ROW asset prices in response to a +1ppt innovation to the U.S. safe rate,
less if the ROW’s exchange rate is floating with respect to the U.S., more if the exchange rate
is is fixed. This conforms to recent post-1980 empirical evidence by Jordà et al. (2017b) for the
response of international equity prices to a +1ppt hike in the U.S. policy rate.60
59Also see delinquency rates on commercial and industrial loans since the late 1980s for similar numbers
(FRED, DRBLACBS).
60 Empirical estimates for the international impact of U.S. policy rate innovations within the day are
lower, ranging from 2.7% to 5% (Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2009; Laeven and Tong, 2012). The stronger
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Table 2.6: Calibration parameters
Parameters Value Source/Target
i SST safe rate 1.041/12 Longtime empirical average
β Time preference rate 0.9967 1/i
σ inverse IES 1 Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011)
Dlow Low repayment rate 0.971/12 S & P Global Fixed Income Research
D SST repayment rate 0.9851/12 S & P Global Fixed Income Research
qlow Low asset price 1 0.1 Bank capital-tradable assets ratio
c Risky asset coupon 0.005 5.5% SST coupon
ψ Inv. asset demand elast. 0.0265 H asset price response
τ Portfolio adj. cost 0.0001
φ Inv. FX demand elast. 0.66 1.5 trade elasticity
bhS H risky asset supply 36 Fin. Acc. of the U.S.; Lund et al. (2013)
bFS F risky asset supply 64 —"—
o fd H liabilities from F 4 —"—
ohd F liabilities from H 1 —"—
o fb H risky assets from F 5 —"—
ohb F risky assets from H 5 —"—
y H shareholder income 0.5 ROW income/U.S. income = 2
y? F shareholder income 0.25 capital income/total income = 1/3
Exogenous processes
χi Safe rate persistence 0.94
σi S.D. policy shock 0.003 Romer and Romer (2004) shock S.D.
corr Safe rate correlation 0.4 see empirical analysis (section 2.2.2)
χD Default rate persistence 0.98 Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011)
σD S.D. default shock 0.0003 Kollmann, Enders and Müller (2011)
I set the marginal portfolio adjustment cost (τ) to 0.0001. Given steady state foreign safe
asset holdings of 4 this implies that a 1% deviation from steady state drives only a 4 · 10−5 ppt
wedge between the home and foreign safe rates, rendering the portfolio adjustment term a
technicality for the sole purpose of determining steady state foreign asset holdings.
The parameter governing the sensitivity of the exchange rate with respect to capital account
imbalances (φ) is set to 0.66. This is consistent with standard estimates of the elasticity of
international trade with respect to tradable goods’ prices in current open economy macro
models.










S that describe global tradable asset supply and
determine the steady state gross foreign asset positions are set in such a way as to render
the F region’s relation to the H region reminiscent of the U.S.’s relation to the rest of the
world (ROW). For this purpose, I draw from the Financial Accounts of the U.S. together
with estimates of the world total of tradable assets (Lund et al., 2013). I normalize the world
total of tradable assets to 100. The fraction of U.S. tradable securities in the world total is 36.
Correspondingly bhS is set to 36 while b
h
S is set to 64. Turning to steady state foreign liability
responses presented by Jordà et al. (2017b) refer to a longer horizon of several years. As the interest
here is to sketch the international response to U.S. policy shocks over the course of several years my
choice of ψ targets the 7.5% figure.
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holdings, o fd is set to 4, while o
h
d is set to 1. This reflects the asymmetric importance of the
USD liabilities in the global financial system. The low value of 1 for ohd furthermore takes
into account that 70% of the liability side of the U.S. external portfolio is denominated in U.S.
dollars (see Lane and Shambaugh, 2010; Bénétrix, Lane and Shambaugh, 2015). To obtain
realistic valuation effects, I treat these liabilities as intra-U.S. liabilities in the current setup.
Steady state foreign asset holdings (o fb and o
h
b) are set to 5 each. This corresponds to the U.S.
holding 5/64 = 7.81% of ROW tradable assets, while the ROW holds 5/36 = 13.89% of U.S.
tradable assets.
Finally, I set the fixed endowments y and y? to 0.5 and 0.25. The U.S. value of 0.25 is set to
target the capital income share of bank shareholders. The U.S. capital income share ranges
from 0.25 to 0.34. Because the model is concerned with the fraction of the population that
owns risky assets I chose a value at the higher end of that range, 0.3 (see Constantinides,
Donaldson and Mehra, 2002). Taking into account that the model only depicts about one third
of the typical marginal investor’s balance sheet, I set y? such as to yield a steady state dividend
to income ratio of 0.1. The ROW value of 0.5 then follows from U.S. GDP being around one
third of world GDP in the post Bretton Woods period.
2.4.4. Results
In order to link the model part of this paper back to its empirical part this section reports
model outputs that correspond to the empirical results reported earlier: the decoupling power
of floating exchange rates for safe and risky rates, as well as the differential response of pegs
and floats to U.S. policy rate shocks.
Average global interest rate correlations and decoupling powers
First, consider the international correlation of safe and risky rates generated by the model. I
run a stochastic simulation based on the linearized model to obtain international correlations
for risky and safe rates depending on exchange rate regime status. Table 2.7 displays the
result. Safe and risky rates perfectly co-move among pegs, resulting in a correlation of 1. For
floats, interest rate co-movement differs whether one considers safe or risky rates. Safe rates’
correlation is 0.40 due to the calibration matching fundamental safe rates’ co-movement in the
data. Risky rates’ correlation on the other hand is 0.86.
Table 2.7: Model correlations
(1) (2)
Safe rates Risky Rates
Pegs’ correlation 1.00 1.00
Floats’ correlation 0.40 0.86
Second, I calculate the decoupling power of a floating exchange rate on the basis of 10, 000
simulations of the floater and peg model each. Each simulation is 480 months long, –40
years – i.e. comparable in length to the post-Bretton Woods sample. For comparability with
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the empirical results I aggregate the simulated series to an annual frequency and take first
differences. I then combine the data obtained from the simulations and run regressions
according to equation 2.5. On the basis of the resulting regression coefficients I then calculate
the decoupling power ratio 2.6. Table 2.8 displays the results. For safe rates the model exhibits
a close to 100% decoupling power for floating exchange rates. By contrast, for risky rates
floating exchange rates have only a 52% decoupling power. The safe rate-risky rate dichotomy
in the decoupling power of floating exchange rates in the model thus bears out the same
dichotomy as the data.
Table 2.8: Model decoupling powers
(1) (2)
Safe rates Risky Rates
Decoupling power 114% 52%
s.e. (45) (21)
Global response to U.S. monetary policy shocks
What does the calibrated model say about the response of floats’ risky rates to a monetary
policy shock in the financial center? I consider a +1 ppt innovation in the U.S. policy rate. I
simulate the model twice, once with the ROW featuring a flexible exchange rate with respect
to the USD, and once with a fixed exchange rate. In the fixed exchange rate model the ROW
country’s central banks sets its interest rate in such a way as to ensure a fixed nominal exchange
rate.61 The impact of a +1 ppt safe rate shock in the U.S. on international safe and risky rates
for the peg and the float are depicted in figure 2.5. The peg’s response is depicted as a solid
black line, the float’s response as a dashed blue line. For floats I further analyze the case of
zero underlying correlation, where safe rates between the U.S. and the ROW do not co-move
at all (dotted blue line).
For safe rates the distinction in exchange rate regime is clear: The peg fully imports
the foreign interest rate increase (solid black line), the float on the other hand does not. In
accordance with the calibration, the float’s safe rate reflects only 40% of the U.S. +1 ppt
hike. This is the degree of safe rate correlation observable in the data (dashed blue line). By
construction, in the zero underlying correlation case the floating ROW safe rate does not
respond at all.
How about risky rates? Here the peg-float dichotomy starts to blur somewhat. The floating
economy’s risky rate clearly reacts to the innovation in the U.S. safe rate, with the float’s risky
rate increasing by close to 1 ppt (dashed blue line). The pegged home economy’s risky rate
reacts more than the float’s risky rate (solid black line). On top of the full pass-through of the
U.S. safe rate, the peg’s risky rate also exhibits a risk premium spillover of about 0.5 ppts, a
feature which was absent in the empirical impulse responses reported earlier.62




t − o fb )/et + 0.01(1/et − 1/e¯), where the last penalty
term on exchange rate deviations implies exchange rate stabilization (see Benigno and Benigno, 2008)
62The interest rate responses obtained from the model are not hump-shaped as are their empirical
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When the fundamental co-movement in safe rates is set to 0 the floats’ response becomes
weaker. The international risk-taking channel on its own, without any fundamental safe rate
co-movement, can account for around 50% of the observed international risky rate response of
floats (see dotted line in figure 2.5).63
Figure 2.5: Pegs’ and floats’ response to a +1 ppt U.S. policy rate shock
Notes: Solid black line – response of pegs; dashed blue line – response of floats with fundamental safe
rate co-movement; dotted blue line – response of floats without fundamental safe rate co-movement.
To better understand the co-movement in risky rates figure 2.6 depicts various other
impulse response functions that show the forces at work. First, the +1 ppt policy rate hike
in the U.S. leads to a fall in risky asset prices, ranging from 5 to 10% (see Jordà et al., 2017b).
As assets are marked to market, falling asset prices negatively impact bank equity. This is
accompanied by an increasingly binding VaR constraint. Bank leverage, here defined as the
ratio of total asset to equity, goes up on impact as the banks’ shrinking asset side eats into
their equity. Thereafter, however, banks’ balance sheets start to recover over a prolonged phase
of deleveraging.
To get an impression of how much of the float’s response is due to exchange rate valuation
effects on intermediary balance sheets as described by Bruno and Shin (2015) I recalculate all
impulse responses for the case in which the home bank perfectly hedges its foreign currency
exposure, i.e. the value of its foreign currency denominated liabilities equals the value of its
foreign currency denominated assets.64 In particular I replace the banks’ first order conditions




t . Figure 2.8 in the
counterparts. In order to generate such an initially incomplete pass-through additional frictions
would be necessary.
63The peg-float differential among safe rates is not necessarily the same as that among risky rates. The
non-arbitrage condition for risky rates (equation 2.23) shows why. First, Ω < 1 lowers the distance
between the peg’s and the float’s risky rate response relative to the safe rate response. Second, the
difference in the bad scenario returns of the home and foreign risky assets also plays a role.
64Banks tend to hedge against currency mismatch in their balance sheet (see McCauley and McGuire,
2014).
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Figure 2.6: Pegs’ and floats’ response to a +1 ppt rate shock
Notes: Solid black line – response of pegs; dashed blue line – response of floats.
appendix shows that in this case the impulse responses are very similar.
In sum, given the co-movement in safe rates, the calibrated 2-region banking model
generates a risky rate response for floats that is close to its empirical counterpart. Without
the co-movement in safe rates, the proposed international risk-taking channel can account for
around half of the observed peak response of floats’ risky rates.
2.5. Conclusion
Extensive risk premium spillovers have rendered floating exchange rates relatively ineffective at
decoupling local risky rates from their global counterparts. In this sense my results do support
claims that the macroeconomic policy trilemma is morphing into a dilemma, according to
which floating exchange rates have become increasingly impotent in countering international
financial spillovers. However, this is a new phenomenon. Early in the 20th century floating
exchange rates were still effective at insulating local risky rates from foreign ones.
I rationalize the increasing ineffectiveness of floating exchange rates with the growing
importance of global banks as marginal investors in global asset markets. If financial global-
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ization is based on leverage-constrained banks, mark-to-market of asset prices synchronizes
risk-taking across borders, even among floats. Introducing an open economy model with
financial intermediaries that manage an international portfolio of risky assets, I show that this
international risk-taking channel can account for about 50% of the spillovers of U.S. monetary
policy into the risky rates of floats.
The finding that floating exchange rates have become ineffective at decoupling local risky
rates does not necessarily imply that floating exchange rates are not worth having. After all,
a floating exchange rate provides economic policymakers with one more degree of freedom
for achieving their policy goals. However, my findings suggest that the world economy has
become a considerably more demanding environment for policymakers to operate in. The
rise of financial spillovers can drive a wedge between conventional targets of monetary policy,
such as output and employment gaps, and other policy goals, such as financial stability targets.
This divergence in policy targets worsens the trade-offs involved in the application of existing
policy instruments. Policymakers may find themselves in need of additions to their policy
toolkit.
My findings are speak to current debates about how to robustify open economies against
financial shocks from abroad (Rey, 2013; Passari and Rey, 2015). The finding that floating
exchange rates were effective at decoupling risky rates in the early 20th century shows that
risk premium spillovers are not an inevitable consequence of financial globalization. Hence,
the implementation of capital controls – de facto financial deglobalization – is not the only
way in which monetary authorities can reassert their control over local interest rates. Instead,
my findings suggest that institutional reform, aimed at lightening the interaction between
leverage-constraints and mark-to-market accounting, can help to reconcile capital mobility with
monetary autonomy. In this regard, the institutions that underpinned financial globalization
at the beginning of the 20th century are worth another look.
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2.A. Appendix
2.A.1. Non-linear model equations
This section displays the complete set of non-linear model equations used in the simulations.
t + 1 variables indicate expected values. Foreign F region variables are denoted with a star
superscript (?). The home and foreign banks maximize the expected discounted utility stream
of their shareholders subject to three constraints. First, the equity laws of motion





t − c?t + y?.
Second, the balance sheet identities
(2.A.3)kt + dht + d
f


















Third, the VaR constraints
(2.A.5)VaRt+1 ≤ kt
(2.A.6)VaR?t+1 ≤ k?t .
The home and foreign banks’ value at risk (VaR) is defined as their low profit-realization state,
where profits are defined as
(2.A.7)



































Accordingly, the home and foreign banks’ VaR is defined as
(2.A.9)
VaRt+1 = qˆh,lowbht + qˆ
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The home bank’s first order conditions with respect to consumption (c), the safe home and
foreign liabilities, the risky home and foreign assets and bank equity (k) are:
(2.A.11)c−σt = µt
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where ψ is the inverse demand elasticity for the risky assets.
The model is closed through the foreign exchange market equation
(2.A.25)
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Finally, several auxiliary equations have been made use of, such as total bank assets:














+ q ft b
f ,?
t






















Table 2.9: Risk premiums calculated with base country safe rates
Safe rates Risk premia
∆iST ∆iLT ∆ρMort ∆ρBank ∆ρCorp
β1 0.013** 0.038** 0.358*** 0.763*** 0.571***
(0.006) (0.017) (0.092) (0.037) (0.104)
N 271204 15252 7763 8104 1514
R2 0.04 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.17
Notes: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags of autocorrela-
tion). All specifications include country-pair fixed effects. Periods: Pre-1914 (1874-1913),
Interwar (1919-1938), Bretton Woods (1950-1972), Post-Bretton Woods (1973-2007). Sample
excludes WW1 (1914-1918) and WW2 (1939-1945) periods, as well as outliers, defined as
absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2.10: Good quality data
Safe rates Risky rates
∆iST ∆iLT ∆rMort ∆rBank ∆rCorp
β1 0.10** 0.59*** 0.27*** 0.38*** 0.47***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
β2 ( f loat) -0.09* -0.57*** -0.21*** -0.07 0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11)
DCP -88% -96% -79% -19% 11%
(7.87) (3.15) (15.20) (18.55) (25.88)
N 15257 5854 3997 2430 1067
R2 0.42 0.31 0.32 0.28 0.40
Notes: The sample excludes Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, CÃt’te dâA˘Z´Ivoire,
Djibouti, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, The Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lao Peo-
pleâA˘Z´s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Syria, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia. Driscoll-Kraay
standard errors in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags of autocorrelation). All specifications include
country-pair-period fixed effects. Periods: Pre-1914 (1874-1913), Interwar (1919-1938), Bretton Woods
(1950-1972), Post-Bretton Woods (1973-2007). Sample excludes WW1 (1914-1918) and WW2 (1939-1945)
periods, as well as outliers, defined as absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts. Standard
errors in parentheses. Sample excludes outliers, defined as absolute interest rate movements in excess
of 50 ppts. Independent variables: ∆rj same rate as dependent variable. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.11: Advanced economies
Safe rates Risky rates
∆iST ∆iLT ∆rMort ∆rBank ∆rCorp
β1 0.22*** 0.60*** 0.24*** 0.34*** 0.48***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11)
β2 ( f loat) -0.12*** -0.56*** -0.03 -0.00 0.07
(0.04) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11)
DCP -57% -94% -11% -1% 15%
(8.34) (6.75) (30.38) (24.51) (26.51)
N 6461 5130 3437 1901 1021
R2 0.22 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.42
Notes: The advanced economies subsample consists of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Denkmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Latvia, Luxembourg, Macao, Malta, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Puerto Rico, Portugal, Singapore, San Marino, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South
Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the U.K. and the U.S.A.. DCP – decoupling power of
floating exchange rates. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags of au-
tocorrelation). All specifications include country-pair fixed effects. Periods: Post-Bretton Woods
(1973-2008, excludes zero lower bound period among advaced economies). Sample excludes outliers,
defined as absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2.12: Emerging markets
Safe rates Risky rates
∆iST ∆iLT ∆rMort ∆rBank
β1 0.11** 0.27* 0.08 0.09
(0.05) (0.15) (0.19) (0.23)
β2 ( f loat) -0.10** -0.17 -0.07 -0.05
(0.05) (0.10) (0.18) (0.23)
DCP -97% -63% -90% -53%
(10.04) (5.93) (24.60) (127.72)
N 10552 970 748 667
R2 0.32 0.76 0.29 0.28
Notes: The emerging markets subsample consists of the full sample (see table 2.16) exclud-
ing the advanced country-sample (see table 2.11) and the low data quality sample (see table
2.10). DCP – decoupling power of floating exchange rates. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors
in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags of autocorrelation). All specifications include country-
pair fixed effects. Periods: Post-Bretton Woods (1973-2015). Sample excludes outliers, de-
fined as absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.13: Post-1973 results for pre-1914 sample
Safe rates Risky rates
∆iST ∆iLT ∆rMort ∆rBank ∆rCorp
β1 0.48*** 0.81*** 0.25 0.32** 0.75***
(0.10) (0.05) (0.22) (0.15) (0.11)
β2 ( f loat) -0.15 -0.33*** 0.12 0.10 -0.15
(0.09) (0.08) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10)
DCP -31% -41% 49% 31% -20%
(14.96) (8.39) (106.89) (46.19) (11.52)
N 618 601 594 594 249
R2 0.26 0.48 0.37 0.31 0.48
Notes: The countries from the pre-1914 sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
U.K. and the U.S.. DCP – decoupling power of floating exchange rates. Driscoll-Kraay standard
errors in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags of autocorrelation). All specifications include country-
pair fixed effects. Sample period: Post-Bretton Woods (1973-2007). Sample excludes outliers, de-
fined as absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts. Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2.14: 2-year changes
Safe rates Risky rates
∆iST ∆iLT ∆rMort ∆rBank ∆rCorp
β1 0.18*** 0.62*** 0.44*** 0.36*** 0.51***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
β2 ( f loat) -0.17*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.02 -0.03
(0.04) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
DCP -91% -41% -55% -6% -5%
(5.07) (15.09) (15.15) (18.90) (18.24)
N 14347 5080 3361 1990 952
R2 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.34 0.45
Notes: Regressions are based on 2-year interest rate changes. DCP – decoupling power of
floating exchange rates. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors in parentheses (accounting for 3 lags
of autocorrelation). All specifications include country-pair fixed effects. Periods: Pre-1914
(1874-1913), Interwar (1925-1938), Bretton Woods (1950-1969), Post-Bretton Woods (1974-2015).
Sample excludes WW1 (1914-1918) and WW2 (1939-1945) periods, as well as outliers, defined
as absolute interest rate movements in excess of 50 ppts. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Notes: The advanced economies subsample consists of Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bahamas, Bel-
gium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau,
Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, San Marino, Singa-
pore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, U.K. and the U.S..
Solid black line – response of pegs; dashed blue line – response of floats; Blue circles indi-
cate the rejection of the null hypothesis that the peg response equals the float response at the
90% significance level, according to a two-sided Wald test. Confidence bands calculated on
the basis of Driscoll-Kraay standard errors (accounting for 36 monthly lags of autocorrelation).
All specifications include country fixed effects. Post-Bretton Woods sample: 1973:1 to 2010:12.
Figure 2.8: Pegs’ and floats’ response to a +1 ppt U.S. policy rate shock, no exchange rate valuation effect
Notes: Solid black line – response of pegs; dashed blue line – response of floats with fundamental safe
rate co-movement; dotted blue line – response of floats without fundamental safe rate co-movement.
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2.A.3. Data
Table 2.15: Annual pre-1945 sample
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, USA,
Table 2.16: Annual post-1945 sample
Afghanistan, Angola, Albania, Netherlands Antilles, United Arab Emirates, Argentina, Armenia, Antigua and Barbuda,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Burundi, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Bahamas, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Bhutan, Botswana, Central African Republic,
Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Cote D’Ivoire, Cameroon, DR Congo, Congo, Colombia, Comoros, Cape Verde, Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Djibouti, Dominica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Algeria, Egypt, Spain, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Finland, Fiji, France, Micronesia, Gabon, UK, Georgia, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea,
Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Hong Kong, Honduras, Croatia, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iran, Iraq,
Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Korea, Kuwait, Lao,
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Saint Lucia, Sri Lanka, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Morocco, Moldova, Madagaskar,
Maldives, Mexico, Macedonia, Mali, Malta, Myanmar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Mauritania, Mauritius, Malawi, Malaysia,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Netherlands, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philip-
pines, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Portugal, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore,
Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Sweden, Swaziland, Seychelles, Chad, Togo, Thailand, Tajikistan, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tanzania,
Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, USA, Vanuatu, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Venezuela, Vietnam, Samoa, Yemen, South Africa,
Zambia, Zimbabwe,
Table 2.17: Monthly pre-1914 sample
Denmark, Spain, Japan, Portugal, Sweden,
Table 2.18: Monthly post-1973 sample
United Arab Emirates, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bahrain, Bahamas, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland,
Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Greece, Hong
Kong, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Latvia, Macao, Mex-
ico, Malta, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Portugal, Roma-
nia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, San Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine,
Venezuela, Vietnam, South Africa,
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Chapter 3
Global financial cycles and risk
premiums
Joint with Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor
3.1. Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis highlighted the need for an evolution in macroeconomic thinking.
In the past 40 years, the advanced world has become exponentially more leveraged. This
“financial hockey stick” had profound implications for the business cycle. Òscar Jordà, Moritz
Schularick and Alan M Taylor (2016) showed that business cycle correlations are far from
universal cosmological constants. Rather, their evolution appears to be tightly linked with
the growth of credit relative to GDP. Added to the urgency to integrate finance into the basic
architecture of business cycle models, one could add that there is a more fundamental need to
understand the financial cycle and its interplay with the business cycle.
The first goal of this paper is to fill some of these gaps by analyzing global financial cycles
over the past 150 years across a sample of 17 advanced economies. While the comovement of
real variables has been extensively studied in the literature, financial cycles have received less
attention. This is partly due to the fact that long-run data for credit growth, house prices and
equity prices have only recently become available (Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick and Alan M
Taylor, 2016; Òscar Jordà, Katharina Knoll, Dmitry Kuvshinov, Moritz Schularick and Alan M.
Taylor, 2017a).
Our analysis reveals that synchronization of financial cycles across countries has become
increasingly prevalent. We can now speak of a global financial cycle whose effects are felt
widely and more vividly over the past few decades than ever before. For the most part,
financial synchronization has increased hand in hand with international synchronization of
real variables, such as GDP, consumption and investment. Equity price synchronization follows
a different pattern, however. We find a much more rapid increase in global synchronicity
since the 1990s. Moreover, we find that this rise in equity price synchronicity exceeds that of
dividends, whose international comovement is more in line with the comovement of cycles
in real variables. The explanation for this divergence is the striking rise in the volatility and
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global covariation of equity return premiums, or risk premiums. Our analysis thus lends
support to accounts that put asset prices and risk premiums at center stage in explaining
the synchronization of the global economy (Dumas, Harvey and Ruiz, 2003; Fostel and
Geanakoplos, 2008; Devereux and Yetman, 2010; Dedola and Lombardo, 2012; Ward, 2018).1
The second goal of this paper is to analyze the role that monetary policy plays in explaining
the increased synchronization of global risk appetite. In particular, we find that U.S. monetary
policy is a powerful driver of global risk appetite and thus binds together global equity prices.
Moreover, we show that this synchronization of international risk taking is a new phenomenon.
In the first era of globalization, before 1914, we do not find evidence linking risk appetite
internationally. Possible explanations include current monetary practice and a more prominent
role of leveraged financial intermediaries in the world economy today.
Links between our findings and the existing literature are numerous. First, we add a
longer-run cross-country perspective to the existing financial cycle literature, such as Claessens,
Kose and Terrones (2011), Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012) as well as Aikman, Haldane
and Nelson (2014) and Schüler, Hiebert and Peltonen (2015). Second, we confirm recent
research regarding the increase in global financial synchronization over the past two decades
(e.g. Bruno and Shin, 2013; Cerutti, Claessens and Ratnovski, 2014; Obstfeld, 2014). Our
data provide evidence in support of this trend towards increased financial synchronization.
Third, we extend the literature that studies the relation between financial– and real–cycle
comovements (see Metiu and Meller, 2015). Fourth, our work builds on an emerging literature
that investigates the nexus between monetary policy and risk taking, asset prices, and global
financial synchronization (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly introduces our
data and documents common long-run trend towards higher real and financial cycle syn-
chronization. Section 3.3 digs deeper into the source of synchronization in equity markets
and shows that the sharp increase in the comovement of the global equity return premium
explains most of the comovement in international stock returns. Section 3.4 contains the core
empirical part of the paper. It addresses the question of whether financial center monetary
policy is a common driver of global equity return premiums. More specifically, we study how
global equity markets react to changes in U.S. interest rates since WW2, and compare the
results to previous periods. In Section 3.5 we evaluate the robustness of our results by using
instrumental variable methods on the unexpected component of rate changes, as proxied by
Gertler and Karadi (2015) high frequency shocks.
A natural international transmission channel is via exchange rates and hence we evaluate
whether our findings on synchronicity are stronger for countries with fixed exchange regimes
relative to countries that allow their exchange rate to float freely (see section 3.4.4). We find
some evidence that the transmission effects are stronger for fixed exchange rate regimes, but
they are still sizable for floaters. This finding adds an important new dimension to the debate
1Dumas, Harvey and Ruiz (2003) explain the excessive correlation of equity prices over fundamentals
through the excessive volatility of a common stochastic discount factor.
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about the degree to which international financial integration undermines monetary policy
autonomy. In the case of equity markets, there is suggestive evidence that monetary policy in
the center country triggers swings in risk appetite that appear to be independent of domestic
monetary conditions.
The paper concludes by first providing an extensive discussion of our results in the context
of recent literature in Section 3.6, followed by the conclusion. Numerous other robustness
checks are included in an extensive appendix.
3.2. Financial and real cycle synchronization, 1870-2013
3.2.1. Data
The data that we use in this paper come from a number of sources. GDP, consumption
and investment data come from the latest vintage of the Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2016)
Macrohistory Database (available at www.macrohistory.net/data). The dataset comprises
annual data from 1870 to 2013, for 17 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, U.K. and the U.S.. Combined, these 17 countries make up more than 50% of
world GDP throughout the period we are looking at.
Financial cycles are associated with the synchronized ebb and flow in credit aggregates,
house prices and equity prices across countries (see Claessens, Kose and Terrones, 2011;
Drehmann, Borio and Tsatsaronis, 2012; Aikman, Haldane and Nelson, 2014). The credit series
cover loans of all monetary financial institutions—including savings banks, postal banks, credit
unions, mortgage associations and building associations—to the non-financial private sector.
To study equity- and house-price comovements we rely on the newly collected dividend
and rental yield series introduced by Jordà et al. (2017a). The equity premium is defined as the
excess total return of equity over long-term government bonds. Detailed explanation on how
these data were constructed are available in that paper.
3.2.2. Methods
In order to analyze the international comovement of real and financial cycles we calculate
15-year rolling-window Spearman rank correlation coefficients. One reason to use this measure
of correlation instead of the more traditional Pearson correlation is to capture monotone but not
necessarily linear relationships. The appendix reports results based on rolling-window Pearson
correlation coefficients, which turn our to be qualitatively similar. The 15-year rolling-windows
that we use are backward-looking, that is, the correlation coefficient reported for 2000 is based
on data from 1986 to 2000. Hence, we denote the Spearman correlation coefficient between
countries i and j calculated over the 15-year window ending at time t as si,jt for i, j = 1, . . . n, n
being the cross-sectional sample size. A global measure of association can then be constructed
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In terms of notation, t is the rolling-window time index defined earlier, s¯t is the average
bilateral correlation coefficient at t and si,jt is the bilateral correlation coefficient for country-
pair i, j. The number of distinct correlations excluding the correlation of one country with
itself is given by the usual formula n(n− 1)/2 where n is the total number of countries in the
sample. In order to account for the cross-sectional and temporal dependencies, all confidence
intervals are constructed using a cross-sectional block-bootstrap procedure (see Kapetanios,
2008).
As a robustness check, we also construct a GDP-weighted average version of expression
(3.1). In particular, we use the relative purchasing power-adjusted real GDP of the bilateral










∑i ∑j<i(GDPi,t + GDPj,t)
;
where GDPi,t denotes country i’s GDP at time t. Results based on this GDP-weighted measure
are generally very similar to those based on the unweighted measure described in expression
(3.1) and are therefore reported in the appendix.
Next, note that to isolate the cyclical component in the series of our database we rely on
the Baxter-King band-pass filter.2 Financial cycles are typically characterized by relatively low
frequency movements, with one cycle lasting between 8 to 16 years according to Drehmann,
Borio and Tsatsaronis (2012), while Schüler, Hiebert and Peltonen (2015) find important
variation in credit cycles well above the 20 year periodicity. Results by Cagliarini and Price
(2017) in contrast suggest that financial cycles are not necessarily longer than business cycles.
Also, equity prices, which we are also of interest here, exhibit important short-term variation.
As a way to accommodate these divergent views, we take a conservative approach and therefore
focus on a broad cycle-band ranging from 2 to 32 years. Before detrending, we CPI-deflate
each series and take its logarithm.
As a robustness check, we also report results based on an alternative nonparametric
detrending method recently suggested by Hamilton (2016). This approach relies on the
observation that, unlike short-lived cyclical fluctuations, trend components are the only feature
of the data that can be forecasted at longer horizons. Yet another approach is to put more
weight on high-frequency annual changes. This has the advantage of not having to rely on a
pre-processing filtering step. Hence, we study annual growth rates (total loans, house prices,
2In the subsequent correlation analysis we detrend all series with the exception of interest rates and
equity return premiums, which are stationary in the long run.
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Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
credit prices, GDP, consumption, investment, dividends) and first differences (real short-term
rates, equity return premiums). Finally, we calculate concordance indices as proposed by
Harding and Pagan (2002) in order to address concerns about heteroskedasticity bias in
correlation coefficients (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The concordance measure indicates
the fraction of years in which two series move into the same direction. It abstracts from the
size of such movements, rendering it immune to heteroskedasticity bias. Importantly, the core
findings of the paper do not depend on the filtering method used. The appendix contains
results using these alternative approaches for completeness.
3.2.3. Financial and real synchronization
This section presents the 15-year rolling window correlation results for the financial and real
variables that have been introduced in data section 3.2.1. All variables have been detrended as
described in section 3.2.2. Figure 1 displays the average bilateral correlation of three financial
variables – real credit, real house prices and real equity prices—for the 17 country sample.
Comovement in credit- and equity price-cycles has risen substantially over time. In particular,
the comovement of credit and equity markets is at a historical peak today, with Spearman
correlation coefficients of about 0.4 and 0.8 respectively. Abstracting from the bouts of house
price comovement associated with WW1 and WW2 housing busts, international house prices
are also more correlated today than before, but the divergence in global house prices since
the financial crisis has dampened synchronization in recent years. The rise in equity price
correlation to near unity since the 1990s is particularly striking as it exceeds even the correlation
in asset prices during the declines associated with the Great Depression. The comovement
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Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period
Baxter-King detrended series Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
in credit, house prices and equity prices is higher in the past few decades than in previous
periods. But how does this compare to the long-run synchronization of real cycles in GDP,
consumption and investment?
Figure 2 shows that the comovement of cycles in real variables also exhibits an upward
trend since the start of the sample. The cyclical behavior GDP across countries is a good
example—even accounting for the blip up due to the Great Depression (see Bordo and Helbling,
2003). GDP today exhibits an average bilateral correlation of somewhat above 0.5, its highest
value since 1870. Similarly consumption correlation has trended upward nearly on a par with
GDP, although today it is slightly lower than the correlation for GDP (see Backus, Kehoe and
Kydland, 1992). The international comovement of investment had already been relatively
high in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but by the 2000s the comovement in investment
reached a new peak.
International synchronization of the financial and real sectors of economies have increased
in tandem. At some level this is to be expected. Globalization forces would tend to increase
integration in the real economy and with it, the financial sector. However, as Figures 3.1 and
3.2 illustrate, it looks as if the comovement in equity prices has outstripped the comovement
in other variables. This finding is robust to different detrending methods, as well as other
synchronization measures (see figures 3.24 to 3.51 in the appendix).
Within our sample, some geographical regions exhibit more real and financial synchroniza-
tion than others (see Figures 3.52 to 3.55 in the appendix). Within the euro area and within
Scandinavia for example, GDP, consumption and investment have reached average bilateral
correlation levels close to 0.8 over the past decades. In the case of Scandinavia, dividend
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comovement can explain more of the late 20th century increase in equity price correlation
than it can in other regions. Finally, even within the Pacific region (Australia, Canada, Japan
and the U.S.) equity price correlation has increased to around 0.7 since the late 20th century,
despite virtually zero correlation in dividends.
Summing up, we document a substantial increase in the comovement of equity prices that
is only partly matched by increasing real sector linkages. In the following sections, we will
take a closer look at the drivers of the rising comovement in international equity markets.
3.3. Understanding equity market comovements
3.3.1. Correlation in dividends, risk-free rates and return premiums
How can the recent and dramatic increase in the comovement of international equity prices be
understood? To get a first impression of the sources the lie behind the recent and dramatic
increase in the comovement of international equity prices this section describes the international
comovement of dividends, risk-free rates and equity return premiums. Figures 3.3 and 3.4
display the results. These figures show, first in Figure 3.3, the short-term and long-term risk-
free rates, R. Figure 3.4 instead displays the average bilateral correlation between dividends,
D, and the equity return premium, ERP.
Figure 3.3 shows that the average bilateral correlation in short- and long-term interest rates
follow a similar time path. Interest rate correlation has been high in the 1980s and 2000s, and
relatively low in the 1990s. Interest rate correlation was also high in the 1920s and 1930s. With
the exception of the 1970s and 1980s, phases of high interest rate comovement thus tend to
accompany phases of high equity price comovement. However, in contrast to equity price
comovement after 1990, interest rate comovement has not reached historically unprecedented
levels.
Figure 3.4 shows that the increases in equity price comovement in the 1920s and the 2000s
were also accompanied by a significant increase in the comovement of dividends and equity
return premiums. The comovement of dividends has peaked around 0.3 in the 2000s, coming
close to its 1930s peak. The international correlation of equity return premiums, however, has
reached historically unprecedented levels, rising from around 0.3 to 0.8.
These results suggest that the rising comovement of equity return premiums, ERP, seems to
hold the key to understanding today’s strong equity price synchronization. Various robustness
checks, shown in the appendix, suggest that the finding that the comovement in equity return
premiums has reached a historically unprecedented high is robust to different detrending
methods (see figures 3.26 to 3.51 in the appendix).
3.3.2. Equity price comovement and risk appetite
Next, we go one step further, in trying to understand to which extend co-movement in
dividends and risk-free rates can explain comovement in equity prices. According to standard
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ST rates LT rates
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Based on real interest
rates, calculated as nominal rates minus CPI-inflation. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped
confidence bands. ST refers to real short-term and LT to real long-term rates respectively.















Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Dividends: 2 to 32-year
period Baxter-King detrended series. Equity return premium: total equity returns minus short-term
risk-free rate. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
asset pricing theory equity prices are a function of future dividend streams, discounted by
a discount factor. Let QRN be the asset price as counterfactually valued by a risk-neutral
investor who prices an asset according to the present value of future dividends D discounted
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Furthermore, denote the remaining spread between actual asset prices Qt and the counter-
factual risk-neutral investor’s price QRN as ρ:
Qt = QRNt ρt. (3.2)
In the following analysis, we will call the term ρ “risk appetite”. Of course “risk appetite”
thus defined is a summary term, that encompasses all factors that drive a spread between
discounted dividends QRN and actual equity prices Q. As such, the term “risk appetite” as we
use it in the following embodies a diverse range of forces, such as consumption habits, the
ability of intermediaries to supply loans as well as investor sentiment.
Using this basic asset pricing machinery, we can then ask: How much comovement in
equity prices is due to comovement in the risk-neutral investor price? And how much is
due to the remainder – “risk appetite”? For this we calculate QRN on the basis of future
realized dividends and risk-free rates, assuming a terminal value at the sample end of 11−∆D¯/R¯ ,
where ∆D¯ indicates the sample median growth rate of CPI-deflated dividends, and R¯ is the
sample average of gross short-term safe rates. Given the terminal value we then calculate QRN
recursively through QRNt−1 = Dt/Rt + Q
RN
t /Rt (see Shiller, 1981a,b).
3
Note that the asset pricing equation 3.1 is formulated in expectations. Here we follow
Shiller (1981a,b) in equalizing ex ante expected values for dividends and risk-free rates with
their ex post realized values. In the following, an important caveat to be aware of is that the
ex post realized values cease to be good indicators of their ex ante expected counterparts
whenever expectation errors become large. However, even if expectation errors play a role,
seeing how much equity price comovement would have been justified by ex post realized
fundamentals is nevertheless interesting. A more elaborate decomposition that attempts to
model expectations through a vector autoregressive (VAR) system is presented in Appendix
C (the decomposition is based on the methodology laid out in Campbell and Shiller, 1988;
Campbell, 1991; Ammer and Mei, 1996). The results of this VAR decomposition are in line
with the results of the simpler analysis discussed in the remainder of this section.
How much of total equity price comovement can be attributed to ex post realized dividends
and risk-free rates? Figure 3.5 provides the answer. Until the late 20th century the comovement
in actual equity prices is mostly accounted for by the comovement in the risk-neutral investor
prices QRN , i.e. dividends and risk-free rates. Beginning in the late 20th century, however,
equity price comovement starts to transcend its fundamentals. After 1990, QRN turns out to
justify only a small amount of equity price comovement. In fact, as a result of the realized
3While the terminal value influences the level of QRN at the end of the sample, the comovement
results, which are based on the detrended QRN , look very similar for a broad range of terminal value
assumptions.
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Equity prices Risk neutral price
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands. ST
refers to real short-term and LT to real long-term rates respectively.
covariance between dividends and risk-free rates, QRN turns out to justify a smaller amount
of equity price comovement than what might have been guessed from the comovement in
risk-free rates and dividends.
We are not the first to document that international equity price comovement in the late
20th century has become increasingly dominated by factors other than dividends and risk-free
rates. Ammer and Mei (1996) and Engsted and Tanggaard (2004) report related findings for the
U.S. and U.K. stock markets and Jordà et al. (2017a) report similar results for the economies in
our sample. More recently, Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2015) have shown that a substantial
part of global asset returns since the 1990s can be explained by one global factor that is closely
and inversely related to measures of market volatility and risk aversion. With this paper, we
are the first to show that this is a novel development in the history of international financial
integration that was not present in the first era of global finance.
3.4. Monetary policy and synchronization of risk taking
What might explain that risk appetite in global equity markets is increasingly synchronized? A
popular view, often embraced by practitioners in financial markets, is that monetary policy in
global financial centers, in particular the Federal Reserve, plays an important role in explaining
risk-taking in international financial markets.
Such effects can occur through different channels as existing studies argue (Bekaert, Ho-
erova and Duca, 2013; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015). Fed policy may internationally
synchronize the balance sheet capacity of financial intermediaries through its effect on asset
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prices (Ward, 2018). U.S. monetary policy may also directly act as a focal point that synchro-
nizes risk perceptions of international investors (see Bacchetta and van Wincoop, 2013). The
U.S. dollar is also an important vehicle currency that underpins today’s global financial system
(Shin, 2012). U.S. monetary policy decisions may thus have global reach (Kim, 2001; Canova,
2005). Ehrmann, Fratzscher and Rigobon (2011) show that about 30% of the fluctuations in euro
area financial markets can be attributed to U.S. financial market fluctuations. Theoretically,
Bruno and Shin (2013) propose a model in which global banks, with access to the financial
center’s wholesale money markets, transmit the financial center’s financing conditions to
regional banks around the world. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) present related econometric
evidence on how global banks contribute to the international transmission of liquidity shocks
through the lending conducted by their foreign affiliates.
3.4.1. Methods
To investigate whether monetary policy in financial centers is a driver of risk appetite, we
estimate a set of cumulative impulse response functions using local projections (Jorda, 2005).4
We begin with the following specification:














δhk Xi,t−k + ui,t+h, h = 1, ..., H (3.6)
where αi are country-fixed effects, ∆hyi,t+h = yi,t+h − yi,t−1 is, by our convention, the h-year
cumulative growth rate of y, ∆Rc is the first difference in the center country’s short-term
rate, Xi is vector of control variables and ui,t+h are error terms. The parameters {γh0}h=1,...,H in
expression (3.6) allow us to sketch out the behavior of equity prices, dividends and risk-free
rates over the H years following a center country interest rate change ∆Rct . Note that this
specification allows for a contemporaneous effect of the controls and center rate changes on
the outcome variable.
Our impulse variable is the change in policy in the financial center, Rc. Later, we will cor-
roborate the results with monetary policy “shock” measures, thus capturing the unanticipated
part of policy changes in recent decades. The idea is to account for potential cross-country
endogeneity contamination.
The U.S. was not always the world’s financial center country. In the 19th century the U.K.’s
financial system and currency played a similarly central role. The measure Rc is therefore the
U.K. short-term rate prior to 1914 and the U.S. short-term rate after 1947. During the interwar
4It is reasonable to expect a certain degree of cross-sectional dependence in an international macroeco-
nomic dataset, because countries are likely to be influenced by common disturbances. Also typical
of macroeconomic data, these disturbances are likely to exhibit temporal persistence. In order to
account for such cross-sectional and temporal dependencies in our data we calculate confidence bands
based on Driscoll-Kraay standard errors with five autocorrelation lags (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998).
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are a nonparametric technique that is robust to very general forms
of dependencies across time and space. The technique is well suited to our macroeconomic dataset,
because it relies on large T asymptotics, without placing any restrictions on the limiting behavior of
the number of countries.
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years, the U.S. became the world’s most important financial center according to some metrics,
while the U.K. retained this title until WW2 according to others (see Chit¸u, Eichengreen and
Mehl, 2014b). Hence, we construct Rc as the average of U.S. and U.K. short-term rates for the
interwar years.
The control variables are five lags of the log differences of GDP, CPI, equity prices, house
prices, total loans, as well as housing return premiums, equity return premiums and short-term
rates. We additionally control for five lags of the center country’s growth rates in per capita
GDP and inflation. Finally, we also include the center country’s equity prices into the vector
of controls as Rigobon and Sack (2004) document that the Fed is more likely to raise rates
when the stock market has gone up and vice versa (also see Chadha, Sarno and Valente, 2004;
Bjørnland and Leitemo, 2009; Castelnuovo and Nisticò, 2010; Furlanetto, 2011).
Moreover, in order to test whether financial center monetary policy explains the increase
in the comovement of equity return premiums and risk appetite we separate the equity price
impulse responses into two parts. Log-linearizing equation (3.1) around a balanced growth
path yields an expression that can be used to calculate that part of the equity price response















where small letters denote the logarithms of the original variables, D is the gross dividend
growth rate along the balanced growth path, R is the respective interest rate, D/R := C < 1
and k denotes a linearization constant (see Cochrane, 2009, p.395). In the following we set C to
0.96. On the basis of expression (3.7) we can calculate the equity price (cumulative) response



























The difference between the cumulative response in actual equity prices Q and the cumulative
response implied by dividends and risk-free rates QRN reflects the excess response of equity
prices due to time-varying risk appetite ρ. For the practical calculation of the cumulative
risk-neutral price response the infinite sums for the dividend and risk-free rate responses have
to be replaced by a finite sum. We opted for seven-year cumulative responses because the
dividend and risk-free rate responses are statistically indistinguishable from zero at higher
time horizons.
Note that, as in section 3.3, we equalize ex ante expected dividends and risk-free rates with
their ex post realized counterparts. We challenge this assumption in a robustness check in
appendix 3.A.3, where we evaluate the international effect of financial center monetary policy
within a VAR decomposition framework along the lines suggested by Bernanke and Kuttner
(2005).
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3.4.2. The response of global equity markets
Figure 3.6 shows the response of equity prices (Q) and risk-neutral equity prices (QRN), as
well as the dividend- (D) and interest rate (R) responses from which the QRN-response was
derived from. The risk-neutral response is the response that shows how a risk-neutral investor
would value equity on the basis of future dividends that are discounted with the risk-free
rate. The risk-neutral price response is labelled ’Risk-neutral’ in the figure. The left column
in Figure 3.6 shows the full sample results, while the right column focuses on the post 1980
subsample in order to focus on the period of rising comovement in global risk appetite.
Our first key result is that the response of equity prices has become stronger over time.
The international response to a +1 ppt center interest rate hike has almost doubled from the
full sample average of about −4% to the post-1980 trough of −8%. Furthermore, the negative
response has grown more persistent.
Partly this is due to international dividends and real short-term rates having become more
sensitive to changes in U.S. monetary policy. In the full sample dividends fell on average by
about 2.5% and interest rates peaked at 0.5 ppt. Since 1980 the respective numbers have gone
up to 5% and 0.75 ppt respectively. Stronger global dividend and real rate reactions to U.S.
monetary policy, however, are insufficient to explain the stronger equity price responses.
The implied risk-neutral equity price QRN , calculated according to equation (3.8) from the
dividend and interest rate responses alone, suggests that dividend and safe rate responses
explain only about 25% of the post-1980 equity price response over 4 years. Fluctuations in risk
appetite are by far the most important driver, accounting for three quarters of the response.
Moreover, Figure 3.7 shows how much stronger the response has become from one global-
ization era to the next. Before 1914, equity markets reacted to rate changes much as would be
expected from a risk-neutral investor. Equity prices declined in response to a 100 bp increase
of the policy rate of the Bank of England, but there is no major impact above and beyond the
risk neutral path. In the post-1980 globalization, this effect is magnified by the effect on risk
appetite.
3.4.3. Expected equity return premium responses
So far we have looked at the reaction of global risk appetite to center-country policy shocks only
indirectly, by separating the fundamental component QRN from the actually realized equity
price response Q. The resulting difference between the two responses indicates changes in risk
appetite. Alternatively, we can look at the direct response of the equity return premium, ERP.
The difficulty here is that we are interested in the ex-ante expected equity return premium as
a measure of global risk appetite. However, we only observe the ex-post realized equity return
premium.
In order to get a sense of the response of the ex-ante expected equity return premium to
center-country monetary policy changes we propose a strategy that allows us to derive a lower
bound estimate of the response of ex-ante expected equity return premiums from their ex-post
realized counterparts. Specifically, the expected equity return premium Et(ERPt+1) can be
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Notes: Cumulative impulse response functions to +1ppt increase in financial center interest rates. Risk-
neutral – risk neutral price (QRN). Center rate – financial center (U.K. and/or U.S.) short-term risk-free
rate own response. Confidence bands calculated on the basis of Driscoll-Kray standard errors. Risk
neutral price (QRN) calculated according to equation (3.8).
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Notes: Cumulative impulse response functions to +1ppt increase in financial center interest rates. Risk-
neutral – risk neutral price (QRN). Center rate – financial center (U.K. and/or U.S.) short-term risk-free
rate own response. Confidence bands calculated on the basis of Driscoll-Kray standard errors. Risk
neutral price (QRN) calculated according to equation (3.8).




= ERPt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ex-post realized ERP
− ηt. (3.9)
Recall the ex-post realized equity return premium ERPt+1 =
Qt+1+Dt+1
Qt − Rt+1. In order to
determine how the ex-ante expected equity return premium reacts to center-country monetary
policy changes, we need to know how the expectation error η reacts.
Under rational expectations, the expectation error ηt is fully explained by exogenous
innovations to the shock process and is restricted to the period in which the shock occurs—the
contemporaneous period. Thus, we only need an estimate for the expectation error in the
contemporaneous period, η0, in order to translate the ex post realized ERP response into the
ex ante expected ERP response.
An estimate for η0 can be obtained by assuming that the contemporary response of the
ex-ante expected ERP is 0—a conservative estimate as will be discussed in a moment:
∂E0(ERP1)
∂Rc0
∆Rc0 = 0 (3.10)
This implies that, the estimated contemporaneous response of the ex post realized ERP











5This is assuming that innovations to center-country rates are not correlated with other shocks. For
correlated shocks the contemporaneous response reflects expectation errors related to different shocks.
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Notes: Cumulative impulse response functions to +1ppt increase in financial center interest rates. Confi-
dence bands calculated on the basis of Driscoll-Kray standard errors.
On the basis of this estimate for η0, the cumulative response of the ex ante expected ERP


















Note that the resulting impulse response function estimate constitutes a lower bound
estimate, in the sense that most empirical studies on the effects of monetary policy on risk
premiums and risk taking suggest that within the first 12 months after a contractionary
monetary policy shock risk premiums are up and risk appetite is down (see Bernanke and
Kuttner, 2005; Bekaert, Hoerova and Duca, 2013; Bruno and Shin, 2015; Gertler and Karadi,
2015). Thus, assuming a 0 contemporary response in the ex-ante expected ERP (see equation
3.10) is conservative.
Figure 3.8 depicts the resulting impulse response function estimates for the ex ante exp-
tected ERPs (solid black line), ex post realized ERPs (dashed blue line), as well as equity prices
for various subsamples. The figure shows that the global impact of financial center-country
monetary policy on global equity prices is mostly a post-WW2, and in particular a post-1980
phenomenon. Within the post-WW2 sample, the global response of the ERP grows stronger
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over time, with equity prices decreasing by about 10% from trend value after a 1ppt FED rate
hike. The expected ERP that investors require to hold equity increases by 5 to 10 ppts. In light
of these results, U.S. monetary policy is indeed a powerful driver of return premiums in global
equity markets.
Table 3.1: Exchange rate regime and equity price responses, full sample
(a) Impulse response functions: Table and test for equality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Pegs -0.88 -2.91∗∗∗ -2.22 -0.46 0.16
(0.69) (1.08) (1.52) (1.80) (2.01)
Floats 0.46 -0.50 0.00 -0.74 -0.52
(0.40) (0.62) (0.88) (1.04) (1.16)
Peg=Float (p-value) 0.05∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.14 0.87 0.73
Observations 810 810 810 810 810
R2 0.57 0.57 0.44 0.37 0.31
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Wald test for equality of peg and float responses.






















3.4.4. Exchange rate regimes
Risk-appetite spillovers of US monetary policy are substantial. Do floating exchange rates
help countries avoid such spillovers? Floating exchange rates are thought to insulate domestic
interest rates from foreign interest rates. But it is unclear whether this insulation generalizes
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to risk premiums and risk appetite more generally. It is natural to ask the extent to which
floating exchange rates effectively decouple domestic financial conditions from substantial
comovements in risk appetite. To address this question we condition our previous analysis on
a country’s exchange rate regime.
The classification of the exchange rate regime has occupied international economists for
a long time (Klein and Shambaugh, 2015). Before WW2 our peg dummy follows Obstfeld,
Shambaugh and Taylor (2004) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005); thereafter we rely
on the exchange rate regime classification scheme of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) for
1940-1959, and the Shambaugh exchange rate classification dataset for 1960-2014 (Shambaugh,
2004; Klein and Shambaugh, 2008; Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2010).
Table 3.2: Exchange rate regime and equity price responses, post-1945
(a) Impulse response functions: Table and test for equality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Pegs -1.46 -8.36∗∗ -6.94 3.05 6.63
(2.23) (3.79) (5.55) (6.46) (7.17)
Floats 0.94∗ -3.10∗∗∗ -1.17 0.12 -0.06
(0.57) (0.97) (1.43) (1.66) (1.85)
Peg=Float (p-value) 0.27 0.15 0.29 0.64 0.34
Observations 577 577 577 577 577
R2 0.74 0.70 0.55 0.52 0.48
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Wald test for equality of peg and float responses.





















Our peg dummy takes the value of 1 if a country was on the gold standard before 1940.
From 1940 onwards, it takes the value of 1 for economies whose exchange rate stays within
a +/- 2% band, and 0 otherwise. We follow Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2005) in not
considering one-off realignements as breaks in the peg regime. Similarly, single-year pegs are
recoded as floats, as they quite likely simply reflect a lack of variation in the exchange rate.
Table 3.3: Exchange rate regime and equity return premium responses, full sample
(a) Impulse response functions: Table and test for equality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Pegs 0.00 3.56∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗ 3.19∗∗ 0.84
(1.23) (1.28) (1.28) (1.26) (1.31)
Floats 0.00 1.90∗∗ -0.28 2.74∗∗∗ 2.39∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.74) (0.74) (0.73) (0.75)
Peg=Float (p-value) 1.00 0.56 0.07∗ 0.71 0.06
Observations 810 810 810 810 810
R2 0.43 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.43
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Wald test for equality of peg and float responses (based on realized ERP).
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Using this exchange rate indicator, we estimate local projections according to the following
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specification:



















ηhk Xi,t−k + ui,t−1+h, h = 1, ..., H (3.13)
where αi are country-fixed effects, ∆hyi,t+h are h-year changes the dependent variable and ui,t+h
are error terms.
Table 3.4: Exchange rate regime and equity return premium responses, post-1945
(a) Impulse response functions: Table and test for equality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Pegs 0.00 12.73∗∗ 19.38∗∗∗ 12.85∗∗ 4.84
(4.96) (5.03) (5.06) (4.93) (4.87)
Floats 0.00 7.64∗∗∗ 4.83∗∗∗ 3.36∗∗∗ 3.29∗∗∗
(1.28) (1.30) (1.30) (1.27) (1.25)
Peg=Float (p-value) 1.00 0.72 0.12 0.58 0.26
Observations 577 577 577 577 577
R2 0.52 0.56 0.54 0.59 0.59
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Wald test for equality of peg and float responses (based on realized ERP).
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The {γh0}h=1,...,H in expression (3.13) allows us to sketch out the average behavior of
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international risky and safe interest rates over the H years following a center-country policy
rate shock ∆Rc. The {δh0}h=1,...,H allow us to investigate the difference in the response between
pegs and floaters. f loati,t is a dummy variable that is 1 in periods when the exchange rate
with respect to the center-country floats, has been floating for the previous 3 years, and will be
floating for the following 4 years (i.e. the entire projection horizon). Analogously the dummy
is 0 in years when the exchange rate is fixed in the current year, was fixed throughout the
previous 3 years and continuous to be fixed in the 4 years to come. This definition ensures that
estimated impulse response functions clearly distinguish between pegs and floats. In all cases
we make use of the bilateral peg dummy describing the exchange rate regime status between
any country and the center-country. In addition to the control variables used previously (see
equation (3.6)) X now also includes a binary indicator for the existence of capital controls. The
capital control dummy is described in detail in Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2015).
Figures 3.1b and 3.3b show the international responses of equity prices and ERP for the full
sample. The equity price- and ERP responses tend to be stronger for countries whose exchange
rate is pegged to the USD. Over the full sample, equity prices are down by 3% in year 1, while
there is no significant response among floats. On average pegs’ risk appetite still tends to be
more affected than floaters’ risk appetite although the effects are weak. Tables 3.1a and 3.3a
show the impulse responses for pegs and floats and the p-value for a Wald-test for equality
of the impulse responses. The tests confirm that historically the response to center-country
monetary policy changes has been significantly more pronounced for pegs.
We now turn to the post-WW2 subsample, as our previous results show that this is
the period when risk premium spillovers were strongest. Figures 3.2b and 3.4b show the
differential equity price- and ERP responses of pegs and floats to a +1ppt change in the U.S.
rate. We find that for the post-WW2 sample the peg-float dichotomy is somewhat less clear.
Floaters’ equity prices and ERP now also show a pronounced response to center-country
interest rate changes. Pegs on average still exhibit a stronger response. However, tables 3.2a
and 3.2a show that Wald-test for equality of responses can no longer reject the null of equality
at conventional confidence levels.
3.5. Monetary policy shocks
Although arguably exogenous from the perspective of a small economy, policy changes in the
financial center might not be unanticipated. In order to address such anticipation concerns,
this section corroborates the previously reported results using the instruments for monetary
policy changes used by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) and Gertler and Karadi (2015) in
a local projection instrumental variable (LPIV) framework (see Òscar Jordà, Moritz Schularick
and Alan M Taylor, 2017). These instruments capture changes in futures markets in a short
time window around FOMC rate decisions and thereby measures the “surprise” component of
rate changes.
The local projection instrumental variable approach to estimating impulse responses using
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high frequency monetary policy instruments can be laid out as follows:














δhk Xi,t−k + ui,t+h, h = 1, ..., H, (3.14)
where Rˆct is the prediction from a first stage regression of the effective federal funds rate R
c on
the high frequency instruments used by Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005) and Gertler and
Karadi (2015):
Rct = ζ + θFF1t + ωFF3t + τED6t + νED9 + χED12 + et, (3.15)
where FF1, FF3, ED6, ED9 and ED12 are the high frequency instruments (HFI). In the order
specified, they are the unexpected changes in the Federal Funds futures of the current month,
the 3-month ahead monthly Fed Funds futures and the 6-, 9- and 12-month ahead futures
on 3-month Eurodollar deposits. We aggregate the monthly first stage predictions up to the
annual level by taking the total sum of the predicted values over the twelve months within
each year. Due to the shorter time span for which the HFIs are available this setup only allows
us to compare the post-1990 impulse response functions.
The first stage results are displayed in table 3.5. The HFIs are clearly relevant with R2’s
ranging from 0.17 to 0.38, depending on which instruments are included. The following results
are based on the specification including all HFIs (depicted in column 5).
The impulse responses we obtain for our baseline approach and the HFI approach are
reassuringly similar in direction and magnitude, indicating that center-country interest rate
changes can indeed be treated as largely exogenous for the rest of the world. Also note that
the post-1990 responses are stronger than the post-1980 ones, indicating that the impact of
U.S. monetary policy on the rest of the world has grown over time—similar to the results we
presented above.
3.6. Discussion
What explains the late 20th century rise in international risk premium synchronization? The
post-Bretton Woods synchronization of risk-premiums coincides with a rollback of capital
controls and financial liberalization. These changes may lead to an increase in the international
synchronization of risk premiums via the balance sheets of financial intermediaries (Ueda,
2012). Cross-country market integration of safe and risky assets should, by arbitrage, lead
to an international equalization of the return on assets within the same risk-class, and hence
an international equalization of risk premiums (Dedola and Lombardo, 2012). Kollmann,
Enders and Müller (2011) and Alpanda and Aysun (2014) present theoretical accounts where
the equalization of global returns springs from the optimization problem of a global bank
that aims to equalize its returns across regions. The observation that the post-Bretton Woods
synchronization of risk premiums coincides with a period of capital account liberalization
is consistent with such models. However, explanations based on financial openness beg the
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Notes: Cumulative impulse response functions to +1ppt increase in financial center interest rates. Risk-
neutral – risk neutral price (QRN). Center rate – U.S. short-term risk-free rate own response. Confidence
bands calculated on the basis of Driscoll-Kray standard errors. Risk neutral price (QRN) calculated
according to equation 3.8.
question of why extensive risk premium comovement did not occur already during the first
era of financial globalization before 1914 (Quinn and Voth, 2008).6
6The extent of international financial market integration in the late 19th and late 20th centuries
differs in several respects. While (net) cross-border capital flows and (net) foreign asset positions are
comparable across both globalizations (Obstfeld and Taylor, 2004), financial globalization in the late
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Table 3.5: First stage regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FF1 1.88∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.26) (0.28)








R2 0.35 0.31 0.36 0.17 0.38
Observations 284 270 270 342 270
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Dependent variable: federal funds target rate change in ppts.
All variables in ppts changes; monthly observations.
Behavioral theories of financial market behavior also offer explanations for investor overreac-
tion. Behavioral theories attribute excess variation in asset prices to systematic mis-judgements
in human psychology (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shiller, 2000; Akerlof and Shiller, 2010)
and to collective manias and panics (Kindleberger, 1978). The wedge that such ”animal spirits”
drive between fundamentals and asset valuations can help understand observed asset pricing
puzzles (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010; Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2012). If globally
synchronized, behavioral forces could explain the excess international comovement of equity
prices that we observe. For example, in a globalized world economy with global news flows,
investors’ sentiment can be synchronized by their exposure to a similar set of information.
Our empirical investigation does not provide conclusive evidence, but we note that the
temporal pattern of international risk premium comovement again begs the question why
behavioral forces did not induce excessive comovement in risk appetite in earlier periods
of financial globalization when international investors presumably were subject to the same
cognitive constraints and similar information flows.
A key difference between late 19th and late 20th century financial globalization concerns
the international monetary system. Prior to 1914, global money aggregates were linked to
global gold supply, which was fixed in the short run. As a consequence, global liquidity supply
was inelastic in the short-run. On a regional level, this meant that gold inflows and credit
20th century encompassed a wider range of financial assets than did its late 19th century precursor
(Bordo, Eichengreen and Kim, 1998). In particular late 19th century financial globalization was focused
in industries with high tangible capital that were less plagued by information asymetries, such as
railways, public bonds, mining and public utilities. Put differently, measured risk premiums might not
be comparable across time.
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expansions in one region tended to be offset by gold outflows and credit contractions in other
regions, as David Hume famously analyzed (Hume, 1752). The pre-1914 gold standard thus
introduced a desynchronizing force into global finance that may have impeded the emergence
of globally synchronized risk premiums. In contrast, in the post-Bretton Woods period, global
finance is built on a fiat money system that allows for a more elastic supply of liquidity. By
and large, such a system is more likely to accommodate a globally synchronized expansion
of liquidity supply and comovement in risk premiums. Such different elasticities of global
liquidity in the pre-1914 and post-1970 financial globalizations could help to explain the
temporal pattern of risk premium comovement we observe.
Another strain of the theoretical literature on global financial spillovers that could account
for the observed temporal pattern of risk premium comovement relates to the form of interna-
tional financial intermediation. What is new in the late 20th century financial globalization
is that international banks play a central role (Cassis, Grossman and Schenk, 2016, ch.11).
The earlier financial globalization was not dominated by leveraged financial intermediaries.
Instead, wealthy private individuals and mutual funds were the main vehicles for international
capital flows (see Michie, 1986; Feis, 1964).
If banks hold foreign assets on their balance sheets and mark them to market, price changes
can synchronize the risk appetite and the trading behavior of banks around the world (Adrian
and Shin, 2009; Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2015; Bruno and Shin, 2015; Ward, 2018). For
instance, if Federal Reserve policy affects U.S. equity prices, falling asset prices in the U.S.
decrease (risk-weighted)-asset-capital ratios of U.S. as well as international banks which start to
cut down their risk-taking in sync with U.S. banks. If no large risk-neutral player steps in to
compensate for the lower risk taking of the leverage-constrained intermediaries, risk-spreads
will increase.7
Schularick and Taylor (2012) show that late 20th century banking is characterized by an
explosion in bank credit and total bank assets, giving rise to a ”financial hockey stick” pattern in
the global credit-to-GDP ratio, that is reminiscient of the temporal pattern in international risk
premium correlations. That this ‘’financial hockey stick” pattern is closely related to important
international business cycle moments has already been established by Jordà, Schularick and
Taylor (2016). For instance, investment and credit growth comovement increases in the bank
credit-to-GDP ratio. The broad picture here is consistent with an important role of intermediary
balance sheets for the amplification of international financial spillovers (Devereux and Yetman,
2010; Kollmann, Enders and Müller, 2011; Dedola and Lombardo, 2012; Alpanda and Aysun,
2014).
3.7. Conclusions
This paper documents the international synchronization of risk taking in recent decades. Our
findings have important implications for economic policymaking around the world. The
7For open economy models where international spillovers become stronger in the level of intermediary
leverage see Devereux and Yetman (2010) and Ueda (2012).
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emergence of a U.S. led global financial cycle indicates that for policymakers in other countries,
the world economy has become a considerably more demanding environment to operate in.
Risk appetite spillovers, largely decoupled from domestic inflation, output or unemployment
drive a wedge between conventional targets of monetary policy and financial stability targets.
The divergence of real and financial policy targets may worsen the trade-offs involved in the
application of existing policy instruments.
On a global level, the synchronization of financial conditions also raises the question
about the scope for international economic policy coordination. The case for global policy
cooperation rests on the existence of an inefficiency that cooperation could improve upon. The
documented global synchronization of risk appetite, driven by U.S. monetary policy certainly
warrants further investigations as to the possibilities of improving policy responses.
Small open economies that find themselves at the mercy of the ebb and flow of global
risk appetite may consider broadening their range of policy tools in order to regain control
of domestic policy targets. A broader range of national policy instruments enables national
policymakers to counter inefficient spillovers even in the absence of international policy
cooperation (see Korinek, 2016). What international or national economic institutions are best
situated for monitoring and, if warranted, intervening into the international spillovers of risk






















































Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the 2 to
32-year period range. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical
exposition.























































Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the 2 to
32-year period range. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical
exposition.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Global means. The dividend series was detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the
2 to 32-year period range. The equity return premium series is depicted in levels. Outliers have been
dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical exposition.
Figure 3.13: Interest rates, global average
pp
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ST rates LT rates
Notes: Global means. All series in levels. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to
simplify the graphical exposition.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the 2 to
32-year period range. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical
exposition.
Figure 3.15: Interest rates, global average (2-32 year cycles)
pp
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ST rates LT rates
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the 2 to
32-year period range. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical
exposition.
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Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the 2 to
8-year period range. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical
exposition.





















































Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the 2 to
8-year period range. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical
exposition.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the 2 to
8-year period range. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical
exposition.
























ST rates LT rates
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with a Baxter-King filter isolating cycles in the 2 to
8-year period range. Outliers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical
exposition.
82


















































Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with the Hamilton filter, using lags five to eight. Out-
liers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical exposition.






















































Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with the Hamilton filter, using lags five to eight. Out-
liers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical exposition.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with the Hamilton filter, using lags five to eight. Out-
liers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical exposition.




















ST rates LT rates
Notes: Global means. All series were detrended with the Hamilton filter, using lags five to eight. Out-
liers have been dropped from the graph in order to simplify the graphical exposition.
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3.A.2. Average bilateral correlations















Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 8-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
















Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 8-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 8-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.















ST rates LT rates
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 8-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
















Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Dividends: 2 to 32-
year period Baxter-King detrended series. Equity return premium: Levels. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally
block-bootstrapped confidence bands.















ST rates LT rates
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Interest rates in levels.
Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Hamilton filter de-
trended series (using lags five to eight). Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence
bands.
















Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Hamilton filter de-
trended series (using lags five to eight). Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence
bands.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Hamilton filter de-
trended series (using lags five to eight). Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence
bands.















ST rates LT rates
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Hamilton filter de-
trended series (using lags five to eight). Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence
bands.
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Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. First differences
(for rates) and growth rates for all other variables. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped
confidence bands.
















Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. First differences
(for rates) and growth rates for all other variables. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped
confidence bands.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. First differences
(for rates) and growth rates for all other variables. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped
confidence bands.















ST rates LT rates
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. First differences
(for rates) and growth rates for all other variables. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped
confidence bands.
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Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period Baxter-
King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
















Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period Baxter-
King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Dividends: 2 to 32-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Equity return premium: Levels. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-
bootstrapped confidence bands.















ST rates LT rates
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Interest rates in levels. Bars –
95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.


















Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. 2 to 32-year period
Baxter-King detrended series. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Dividends: 2 to 32-
year period Baxter-King detrended series. Equity return premium: Levels. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally
block-bootstrapped confidence bands.















ST rates LT rates
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Interest rates in levels.
Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Total loans House prices Equity prices
Notes: Concordance based on 15-year rolling windows. Peaks defined as highest values in +/-2 year
window. Minimum phase length 2 years. Minimum cycle length 4 years. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally
block-bootstrapped confidence bands.















Notes: Concordance based on 15-year rolling windows. Peaks defined as highest values in +/-2 year
window. Minimum phase length 2 years. Minimum cycle length 4 years. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally
block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Dividends Equity return premium
Notes: Concordance based on 15-year rolling windows. Peaks defined as highest values in +/-2 year
window. Minimum phase length 2 years. Minimum cycle length 4 years. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally
block-bootstrapped confidence bands.














ST rates LT rates
Notes: Concordance based on 15-year rolling windows. Peaks defined as highest values in +/-2 year
window. Minimum phase length 2 years. Minimum cycle length 4 years. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally
block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Equity prices Risk neutral price
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Equity prices Risk neutral price
Notes: Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Bars – 95% cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Equity prices Risk neutral price
Notes: Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Bars – 95%
cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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Equity prices Risk neutral price
Notes: Pacific region: Australia, Canada, Japan, and U.S.A. Spearman rank correlation coefficients based on 15-year rolling windows. Bars – 95%
cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence bands.
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3.A.3. Equity return premium covariance decomposition
This section decomposes equity return premiums through a vector autoregression (VAR)
decomposition in the spirit of Campbell (1991). The advantage of such decompositions over
the comovement analyses presented so far is that they explicitly model investor expectations,
and thus do not require the equalization of ex ante expected values with ex post realized ones.
A recent example for such a decomposition based on the long-run data we use is Kuvshinov
(n.d.). In particular, we build on the two-country decomposition suggested by Ammer and Mei
(1996). This approach attributes unexpected fluctuations in the current equity return premium
of country i (e˜it+1) to news about future discounted dividends, risk-free rates and equity return
premiums.
The return premium model
Starting from the log gross equity return definition
ht+1 = log(Pt+1 + Dt+1)− log(Pt), (3.A.1)
where P denotes the equity price and D the dividend paid. A first order Taylor approximation
yields
ht+1 ≈ δt − ρδt+1 +∆dt+1 + k, (3.A.2)
where ∆d denotes the first difference of the log of the dividend payment D, δ is the dividend-
price ratio, ρ is a (discount) factor smaller than 1 and k is a linearization constant (see Campbell
and Shiller, 1988). Solving 3.A.2 forward8, taking expectations and plugging the resulting
expectation equations for δt and δt+1 back into 3.A.2 results in the following expression for the
unexpected change in the log real return on equity:












where Et is an expectation operator denoting expectations formed on the basis of information
available through t. Put in terms of equity return premiums et+1 := ht+1 − rt+1, where r denotes
the log real interest rate, equation 3.A.3 can be rewritten as
















or more compactly, for any country i
e˜it+1 = e˜
i
d,t+1 − e˜ir,t+1 − e˜ie,t+1. (3.A.5)
The general intuition behind equation 3.A.5 is that innovations in the equity return premium
8Note the assumption of the transversality condition limk→∞ρkδt+k = 0, as well as Etδt = δt.
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of country i can be decomposed into news about the discounted sum of future dividend
streams, news about the discounted sum of future risk-free real interest rates, and news about
the discounted sum of future equity return premiums. Thus, if the equity return premium
increases, this is either due to news about higher future dividends, lower future risk-free rates
or lower future return premiums.
Consider the same decomposition for another country j. In order to render real equity
returns in j comparable to those in i it is necessary to introduce a real exchange rate term e˜q,t+1:
e˜jt+1 = e˜
j
d,t+1 − e˜jr,t+1 − e˜je,t+1 − e˜jq,t+1, (3.A.6)
where e˜q,t+1 = (Et+1 − Et)∑∞k=0 ρkqt+1+k denotes news about the sum of future discounted log
real exchange rates.9
We are interested in characterizing the comovement of return premiums in countries i and
j, e˜it+1 and e˜
j
t+1. From equations 3.A.5 and 3.A.6 it follows that the covariance in equity return
premiums Cov(e˜i, e˜j) can be decomposed as follows:
Cov(e˜i, e˜j) = Cov(e˜id, e˜
j
d)− Cov(e˜id, e˜jr)− Cov(e˜id, e˜je)− Cov(e˜id, e˜jq)
− Cov(e˜ir, e˜jd) + Cov(e˜ir, e˜jr) + Cov(e˜ir, e˜je) + Cov(e˜ir, e˜jq)
− Cov(e˜ie, e˜jd) + Cov(e˜ie, e˜jr) + Cov(e˜ie, e˜je) + Cov(e˜ie, e˜jq). (3.A.7)
This decomposition allows us to analyze whether the rise in equity return premium comove-
ment was due to a rise in the comovement of dividend news Cov(e˜id, e˜
j
d), risk-free rate news
Cov(e˜ir e˜
j
r), or return premium news Cov(e˜ie, e˜
j
e).
Note, that in contrast to the comovement analyses presented in the main text, which
have looked at equity prices, the covariance analysis presented here directly looks at the
comovement in equity return premiums. The results of the two approaches are comparable
in that they both indicate the extent to which international comovement in equities can be
accounted for by fundamentals – dividends and risk-free rates – and how much must be
attributed to other factors – risk appetite, or news about future return premiums.
The VAR model
In order to compute the variance decomposition 3.A.7 we need estimates of the various news
terms in equations 3.A.5 and 3.A.6. A VAR model serves this purpose. The assumption is that
changes in expectations due to new information arriving between t and t + 1 can be isolated
through the VAR model. We estimate bilateral VARs on the basis of the following variables:
log equity return premiums ei,t, ej,t, log real interest rates ri,t, rj,t, dividend-price ratios δi,t, δj,t
9Note that while the general setup follows Ammer and Mei (1996), the term e˜r,t+1 refers to foreign
log real interest rates here, instead of domestic log real rates as in Ammer and Mei (1996). This
change allows us to investigate the relative importance of monetary policy synchronization in the
synchronicity of equity return premiums.
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and the first differences of the log bilateral real exchange rate ∆qt. Collecting these variables in
















the VAR model for zt+1 in companion form is
zt+1 = Azt + et+1, (3.A.8)
where A is the VAR parameter matrix and e contains the error terms. The inclusion of variables
from countries i and j enables us to study the linkage between both countries.
The equity return premium model summarized by equations 3.A.5 and 3.A.6 imposes a
tight set of cross-equation restrictions on the VAR. On the basis of these and the estimated
VAR we compute each of the news components in equations 3.A.5 and 3.A.6 for each bilateral
country-pair i, j. For this purpose we define picking vectors gk that select the relevant rows
from the VAR system.
e˜mt+1 = g
m
1 et+1, m = i, j (3.A.9)
e˜me,t+1 = g
m
1 ρmA(I−ρmA)−1et+1, m = i, j (3.A.10)
e˜mr,t+1 = g
m




















We set ρ to 0.96.10 We can use the thus calculated news components in order to determine
whether correlated dividend news (e˜d), monetary policy news (e˜r) or news about future equity
return premiums (e˜e) have historically been most important in driving the comovement in
international equity return premiums.11
Covariance decomposition
Table 3.6 shows the covariance decomposition for the full sample, a pre-WW2 sample, a
post-WW2 sample, as well as a post-1980 sample zooming in on the period of high equity
price synchronization. The top row states the equity return premium covariance in our sample,
and all following rows state the median bilateral component-covariances.
Clearly equity return premium covariance has increased over time, from 1.61 in the pre-
WW2 sample to 1.99 in the post-WW2 sample, and 3.48 in the post-1980 sample. Among
its components, dividend news covariance is the largest. However, dividend covariance has
neither increased, nor decreased substantially over time. One covariance component that
10This value is directly gleaned from the data according to ρi = (1 + exp(δi)), with δi denoting the mean
of country i’s log dividend-price ratio. For our annual data the values for ρ concentrate around 0.96.
11All bilateral VARs have been estimated with one lag, which is our preferred lag order given the
relatively short time span covered by the subsamples we are interested in.
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Table 3.6: Decomposition of the covariance in equity return premiums
Full sample Pre-WW2 Post-WW2 Post-1980
Cov(equity return premiums) 1.47 1.61 1.99 3.48
Cov(dividends) 1.58 1.42 1.36 1.56
-Cov(dividends, risk-free rate) -0.69 -0.36 -0.27 0.1
-Cov(dividends, future return) 0.18 -0.44 0.41 0.1
-Cov(dividends, real exchange rate) 0.05 0.16 0.03 0.03
-Cov(risk-free rate, dividends) -0.52 -0.46 -0.2 0.13
Cov(risk-free rates) 0.9 0.54 0.34 0.27
Cov(risk-free rate, future return) -0.01 -0.07 -0.02 -0.28
Cov(risk-free rate, real exchange rate) 0 0.14 -0.03 -0.01
Cov(future return, risk-free rate) -0.21 0.32 -0.29 0.01
-Cov(future return, dividends) -0.01 0.01 0.1 0.4
Cov(future returns) 0.28 0.52 0.6 1.23
Cov(future return, real exchange rate) -0.08 -0.16 -0.04 -0.06
Notes: Bold type – 95% significance-level based on cross-sectionally block-bootstrapped confidence
bands. All covariances have been rescaled by a factor of 100. Median of bilateral covariances.
clearly increases over time is the covariance in news about future return premiums, which
roughly doubles in size in the post-1980 sample.
Covariance in risk-free rate news exhibits a downward trend over time. This is consistent
with many countries moving towards a floating exchange rate regime after the end of the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. As a consequence international risk-free
rate covariance explains little of the covariance in return premiums after 1980. Finally, an
important reason for the overall increase in equity return premiums is the decrease in various
cross-variance terms, such as the covariance between dividends and risk-free rates.
Overall, the VAR decomposition confirms our earlier result, that neither dividends, nor
risk-free rates can explain the late 20th century surge in equity comovement. Instead it is risk
appetite or, put in terms of the terminology used here, revisions to expected future return
premiums, that are the primary explanation for the increasing comovement of equities.
International response to U.S. risk-free rate changes
By extending the VAR framework introduced above it becomes possible to trace the effects of
U.S. monetary policy on return premiums, dividend-price ratios and risk-free rates, within a
framework that acknowledges that ex post realized variables can deviate from their ex ante
expected counterparts. This is achieved by incorporating U.S. interest rate policy innovations
∆RUSt into the VAR system (see Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005):
zt+1 = Azt +φ∆RUSt + et+1. (3.A.15)
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Risk−free rate and U.S. rate
Notes: Median bilateral impulse response functions to +1ppt increase in U.S. interest rates. Dashed gray
– U.S. short-term real risk-free rate own response. 95% interval based on cross-sectional block-bootstrap
procedure over bilateral country-pairs.
As our indicator for U.S. short-term rate innovations we use the residuals from a Taylor rule
regression of U.S. real short-term rate changes on changes in U.S. real per capita GDP, U.S.
CPI inflation and U.S. real stock prices, as well as one lag of each regressor. The responses
of international equity return premiums, dividend-price ratios, and real short-term rates can
then be calculated as Akφ.
Figure 3.56 displays the resulting impulse response functions for the full sample, as
well as the post-1980 sample of high equity return premium co-movement. For the full
sample dividends and risk-free rates react to U.S. monetary policy innovations, but not equity
return premiums. In contrast, after 1980, equity return premiums exhibit a marked response.
International risk-free rates respond less after 1980, than before, while the dividend-price ratio
responds similarly in the full- and the post-1980 samples.
In sum, these findings support the evidence presented earlier, which suggests that the
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effect of U.S. monetary policy on international equity return premiums has gained strength in
the past few decades.
3.A.4. Explaining the reaction to U.S. risk-free rate changes
We can also decompose the effect of U.S. rate innovations on equity return premiums in order
to determine whether U.S. monetary policy affects international return premiums through
revisions in expectations about future return premiums, dividends or risk-free rates. This
can be achieved by multiplying equations 3.A.9 to 3.A.11 with φ, the vector describing the
contemporaneous response of all variables in z to U.S. risk-free rate innovations. Accordingly,
the response of the return premium news of country i is
gi1ρiA(I−ρiA)−1φ, (3.A.16)
and the response of real risk-free interest rate news is
gi2(I−ρiA)−1φ. (3.A.17)




1ρiA(I−ρiA)−1φ + gi2(I−ρiA)−1φ. (3.A.18)
Table 3.7 displays the median response over all 16 country-pairs for the full sample, and
the post-1980 sample. The post-1980 results indicate that revisions in the expectation about
future return premiums explains most of the current return premium response. News about
dividends and risk-free rates play smaller roles. In contrast, over the full sample revisions in
the expectation about future dividends explains most of the current return premium response,
while news about future returns and risk-free rates play a smaller role.
This confirms our earlier finding based on another methodology. The post-1980 increase
in international equity comovement was driven by factors other than dividends and risk-free
rates.
Table 3.7: The impact of U.S. monetary policy on dividends, interest rates and future premiums
Full sample Post-1980
Current return premium 0.76 1.99
-Future return premiums -0.54 1.97
-Risk-free rate -0.48 -0.98
Dividends 1.78 1.00




When do fixed exchange rates work?
Evidence from the Gold Standard
Joint with Yao Chen
4.1. Introduction
The pre-1914 Gold Standard was a global fixed exchange rate regime of colossal extent: By
1913 economies responsible for 67% of world GDP and 70% of world trade had relinquished
flexible exchange rates as a means to unwind external imbalances. Yet external adjustments
were associated with few, if any, output costs (see Meissner and Taylor, 2006; Adalet and
Eichengreen, 2007). How did the Gold Standard (GS) equilibrate so smoothly despite inflexible
exchange rates? There exist various competing, though not mutually exclusive explanations.
First, prices were relatively flexible, allowing for a faster absorption of shocks (Backus and
Kehoe, 1992; Basu and Taylor, 1999; Chernyshoff, Jacks and Taylor, 2009). Second, cyclical
international migration helped to turn around the current account and took the pressure off of
wages in depressed regions (e.g. Hatton, 1995; Khoudour-Castéras, 2005). Finally, central banks
could smooth out temporary disturbances by running down their reserves (see Bazot, Bordo
and Monnet, 2014; Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2014) or by making use of the considerable
monetary policy independence that the Gold Standard, as a target zone regime, afforded in
the short run (Krugman, 1991; Svensson, 1994; Bordo and MacDonald, 2005). The purpose of
this paper is to provide a quantitative assessment of the relative importance of each of these
channels. Can we determine which one reduced output volatility the most? Were they equally
important – or were they most effective in combination?
In order to quantitatively assess the relative importance of flexible prices, international
migration and monetary policy we built the first open-economy model of the Gold Standard
that features international migration, various degrees of price flexibility and an elaborate
monetary structure. We estimated the model with Bayesian methods and then studied the
estimated model’s behavior through counterfactual simulations: How would output volatility
have looked had prices been less flexible? What if there had been no release through migration?
How important was countercyclical monetary policy? The first main finding of this paper
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is that price flexibility was paramount for the benign adjustment experience under the Gold
Standard. Neither restrictions on migration, nor the elimination of countercyclical monetary
policy would have given rise to substantially higher output-volatility.
The second main finding of this paper is that price flexibility and benign external adjust-
ment was predicated on production and trade concentrating in the primary sector: Agricultural
products generally exhibit significantly more flexible prices than industrial or service goods.
Prior to 1913 agricultural products still made up the majority of all merchandise exports, even
among early industrializers. This fortunate coincidence of the nominally most flexible sector
also being the most important tradable sector is the main explanation for the ease of external
adjustment under the pre-1913 Gold Standard. On the basis of newly collected disaggregate
export, price and production data we show that Gold Standard economies experienced a pro-
nounced shift in sectoral structure in the face of a current account reversal. That is a shift, away
from the production of non-tradables (primarily services) towards the production of tradable
agricultural goods. This sectoral shift was brought about by quickly falling agricultural prices
that directly translated into a boom in agricultural exports.
A study of external adjustment under the Gold Standard is particularly interesting in
light of the often painful adjustment experiences in fixed exchange rate regimes today. Figure
4.1, for example, contrasts external adjustment under the Gold Standard with that in the
euro area:1 Under the Gold Standard as well as in the euro area the current account-to-GDP
(CA/GDP) ratio on average decreased by about 5 percentage points in the 10 years prior to
reversing sharply. However, while reversals were associated with major recessions in the euro
area, under the Gold Standard output continued to grow on trend. The Gold Standard thus
also provides an auspicious historical contrast to more recent external adjustments where
exchange rates are fixed. Additionally, the pre-1913 Gold Standard lasted longer than most
international fixed exchange rate regimes and thus provides a unique opportunity to analyze
external adjustment under fixed exchange rates for an unaltered set of countries over more
than three decades.
The paper is structured as follows: The following section introduces the data. After that,
Section 4.3 gives an empirical outline of the behavior of prices, migration and monetary policy
during major external adjustment episodes under the Gold Standard. Here we show that: (i) a
strong price-decline in regions facing a current account-reversal quickly increased their price-
competitiveness, (ii) migration flows redistributed labor supply from deficit regions to surplus
regions, and (iii) central banks made use of the short-run independence they enjoyed under the
Gold Standard. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 presents the Gold Standard-model and its estimation. The
relative importance of prices, migration and monetary policy are then analyzed on the basis of
counterfactual model simulations in Section 4.6. Section 4.7 substantiates our findings from the
1CA/GDP troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm (see Bry and Boschan, 1971).
CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. For the EZ a
±8-year window was chosen and border conditions were weakened because of the shorter sample
length.
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Notes: The averages are based on a sample of 14 GS countries and 12 EZ countries respectively. Major
adjustment periods are defined as the periods lasting from one CA/GDP trough to the next. CA/GDP
troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm à la Bry and Boschan (1971): CA/GDP-
troughs are defined as the lowest CA/Y-value in a ±10-year window. For the EZ a ±8-year window
was chosen and border conditions were weakened because of the shorter sample length. GS: 9 CA/GDP
troughs. EZ: 7 CA/GDP troughs.
model simulations with evidence from disaggregate price- and export data that suggests large
primary sector shares and the dominance of primary products in international trade played a
crucial role for external adjustment under the Gold Standard. Section 4.8 then concludes our
analysis.
4.2. Data
The empirical foundation of our analysis is a new annual dataset for 14 countries that were
members of the Gold Standard throughout the 1880-1913 period, namely Australia, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S (http://dx.doi.org/10.17632/wch3rbkxp7.2). By focusing
on a sample of 14 Gold Standard members whose commitment to gold was never seriously
questioned in the period under consideration we exclude the topic of peg-credibility from our
analysis. This allows us to squarely focus on the issue of external adjustment under inflexible
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exchange rates.
In many cases we were able to draw extensively from previous historical data collections
by economic historians. In other cases new data had to be compiled from the historical
publications of contemporary statistical offices, central banks and trade agencies. Particular
effort went into the construction of a novel set of effective exchange rates, gold cover ratios
and sectoral export- and price level data. The construction of these series is described in more
detail in the following section.
All in all, our dataset covers the following annual time series: nominal GDP, real per
capita GDP, consumer prices, the current account, imports and exports, the nominal exchange
rate, immigration and emigration, population, discount rates, note circulation, nominal and
real effective exchange rates, gold cover ratios, sectoral production shares, sectoral exports,
sectoral price level data, terms of trade, and export prices. A detailed listing of all the sources
is provided in Online Appendix 4.A.3. Further data descriptions, as well as reliability and
validation checks for the sectoral data and migration series can be found in Appendices 4.A.3,
4.A.3 and 4.A.3.
4.2.1. Effective exchange rates
The real effective exchange rate of country i is calculated as the trade-weighted geometric









where wi,j,t is the bilateral trade weight. The real exchange rate is the product of the nominal
exchange rate2 and the ratio of consumer prices, RERi,j,t = NERi,j,t
CPIi,t
CPIj,t
.3 Our baseline REER
estimate uses the bilateral trade flow data provided by López-Córdova and Meissner (2008)
and Mitchell (2013) as trade weights.4 Trade weights wi,j,t equal the ratio of total bilateral trade
to GDP, (importsi,j,t + exportsi,j,t)/GDPi,t. In accordance with modern-day REER estimates, as
provided for example by the ECB, we updated the bilateral trade-weights every three years.
Note that we exclusively consider GS-member economies for the REER calculation. We do
this in order to focus on competitiveness within the GS.5 Along the same lines we constructed
2Here the nominal exchange rate is written in quantity notation, i.e. foreign currency per domestic
currency.
3 This method of data aggregation into a foreign composite flows from a setup in which preferences are
characterized by a unit-elasticity of substitution between foreign goods varieties. Another advantage
of using the weighted geometric average is that the REER that is calculated on the basis of exchange
rates quoted in price-notation is exactly the inverese of the REER calculated on the basis of exchange
rates quoted in quantity notation.
4We linearly intrapolate the trade-weights and use the first and last observation of each country-pair to
fill in missing values at the beginning and end of the sample.
5This differentiates our REER series from those introduced by Catão and Solomou (2005), whose REER
series are affected by fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate with respect to non-Gold Standard
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nominal effective exchange rates (NEER) and foreign effective consumer price indices as
trade-weighted geometric averages. The final REER series are displayed in Figure 4.8 in Online
Appendix 4.A.3.
4.2.2. Gold cover ratios
Another crucial variable for our attempt to characterize external adjustment under the GS
are gold cover ratios. In its simplest form a legally defined gold cover ratio required the
central bank to back a certain fraction of its note issue with gold. In more general terms, cover
ratios required central banks to back their liquid liabilities with liquid assets. The exact legal
definition of cover ratios however differed across countries and time.6 In order to capture this
definitional ambiguity we decided to construct two different measures of the gold cover ratio –
one narrow and one broad. The narrow cover ratio is the ratio of metal reserves (gold and
silver) to notes in circulation. The broad cover ratio adds foreign exchange reserves to the
numerator and central bank deposits to the denominator. This allowed us to select the cover
ratio that comes closest to the legally defined one for each country. For example since 1877
the numerator of the cover ratio targeted by the National Bank of Belgium included foreign
exchange reserves. Thus in our model estimation for Belgium we used the broad cover ratio
series. The narrow and broad cover ratio series are displayed in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 in Online
Appendix 4.A.3.
4.2.3. Sectoral shares, prices and exports
In order to see which sector drove external adjustment during the GS we collected disag-
gregated price- and export data, as well as primary sector shares. The export data are
disaggregated into agricultural-, raw material- and industrial exports. The sectoral price data
features the same three categories as well as service prices. While some sources provide data
at this level of aggregation, in many cases we had to aggregate up from more readily available
product-level data. The sectoral data are described in more detail in Online Appendices 4.A.3
and 4.A.3. The sectoral value-added share data come from Buera and Kaboski (2012).
4.3. Stylized facts
In order to get a first impression of how prices, migration and monetary policy behaved during
major external adjustments under the Gold Standard (GS) this section introduces a set of
stylized facts. To this end we identify troughs in the current account to GDP ratio (CA/GDP)
members. For our 14 country sample of long-term Gold Standard adherents an average of 75% of
imports came from other countries in the sample and an average of 84% of exports went to other
countries in the sample. Although there is some variation across countries and time in these within-GS
trade shares, even the minimum intra-GS import share of 53% and the minimum intra-GS export share
of 66% are sizeable.
6Bloomfield (1959) provides a summary of the main types of legal cover ratios.
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through a Bry and Boschan (1971)-style algorithm: CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest
CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. For the period between 1880-1913 we thus identify 9
CA/GDP troughs (see Figure 4.14 in Online Appendix 4.A.3).7
We then look at how the average behavior of prices, migration and monetary policy (xi,t)
after such major CA/GDP-reversals differs from their average behavior after non-reversal
years. More formally we look at the sequence of differences
Dh(xi,t+h, Ai,t) = Ei,t(xi,t+h|Ai,t = 1)− Ei,t(xi,t+h|Ai,t = 0), h = 1, ..., H (4.1)
where Ai,t equals 1 if the economy i enters a major adjustment phase at time t, and 0
otherwise. h indicates the temporal distance from the start of the adjustment phase. Thus
Dh(xi,t+h, Ai,t), h = 1, ..., H stands for the different behavior of xi after major CA/GDP-
reversals relative to non-reversals.
Practically, we estimate the sequence of differences Dh(xi,t+h, Ai,t) through the following
sequence of fixed effects models:
xi,t+h − xi,t
xi,t
= αi,h + βh Ai,t + ui,t+h, h = 1, ..., H (4.2)
where αi are country-fixed effects and ui,t is an error term. The {βh}h=1,...,H in expression 4.2
allow us to sketch out the average behavior of macroeconomic aggregates over the H years
following a major CA/GDP-trough. This will provide us with a set of stylized facts on how
GS-member economies typically behaved during major adjustment phases in contrast to their
behavior during “normal” times.8
The first row of Figure 4.2 shows that the typical adjustment during the GS featured a
sharp increase in exports that led to a quick turn-around in the current account. Lower import
levels also temporarily contribute to the reversal. In general, however, external adjustments
under the GS were export-driven. How did prices, migration and monetary policy behave
during these episodes? The second row in Figure 4.2 shows that domestic prices fell strongly
and swiftly during adjustment phases. The brunt of the adjustment is furthermore born by
domestic prices, with foreign prices remaining stable. As a consequence, the fall in domestic
prices translates almost one-to-one to a gain in relative price competitiveness of around 6%.
How about migration? The third row of Figure 4.2 shows that about 5 years into the
adjustment, the average GS economy’s population was about 0.5% smaller due to the reduction
in immigration and an increase in emigration.9 This indicates that in the typical external
7As a robustness check we have also considered an alternative set of CA/GDP-troughs. In particular we
extended the selection to include any visually salient trough in the CA/GDP-ratio that was followed
by a prolonged period of increasing CA/GDP-ratios. Results are generally robust to this alternative
selection (see Online Appendix 4.A.3).
8This approach is more familiar as the local projection framework for estimating impulse response
functions (Jorda, 2005) . Here however the {βh}h=1,...,H are used for the depiction of historical averages
and should not be interpreted as impulse response functions.
9Note that due to sample difference arising from the fact that there are several countries for which
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adjustment under the GS migration played only a minor, albeit systematic role. However, for
some economies migration flows could be more sizeable. Consider the case of Sweden in
the 1880s, which for the best part of the decade lost close to 1% of its population per year.
Assuming that at the end of such a decade the population level is only 5% lower than what
it would have been without migration, a back-of-the-envelope calculation places the direct
CA/GDP effect, stemming from emigrants lowering origin-country imports, in the +1 to +2
ppt range.10 This constitutes a considerable contribution to external adjustment.
The same 5% population decline furthermore increases origin-country wages, and thus
stabilizes incomes. For a Cobb-Douglas production function, that is parametrized to a labor
share of income of around 66%, a 5% decrease in the labor supply thus implies a non-negligible
wage increase in the range of 1-2%.11 Thus for Sweden, migration might have been more
central to external adjustment than for other countries at the time.
Note, however, that the effect of migration on output is not unambiguously stabilizing.
Destabilizing effects arise in the short-run when recessionary origin economies lose internal
demand to already expanding host economies (see Farhi and Werning, 2014). When this
channel is taken into account migration is less likely to have a stabilizing influence, because it
now exerts opposing forces that can cancel each other out.12
Turning to the monetary side of external adjustment under the Gold Standard, the last row
in Figure 4.2 displays the behavior of the central bank discount rate, gold cover ratio and the
nominal effective exchange rate. In general, monetary policy turned accommodative during
major external adjustments. Central bankers used their freedom to conduct independent
discount rate policy within the target zone and, on average, lowered discount rates by 100
basis points. Some central banks made more extensive use of their freedom than others. To
get an idea of how much discount rate independence a ±1% target zone regime allowed for,
consider that a 1% depreciation of the exchange rate - that is expected to disappear within one
quarter - allows a central bank to temporarily set its policy rate 4 ppts below world levels.13
This can explain how in some years the discount rates set by several Scandinavian central
only immigration or emigration exists, but not both, the Immigration/Population and the Emigra-
tion/Population graphs do not necessarily add up to the Net Immigration/Population graph.
10This assumes that Swedish households consume around 75% Swedish-produced goods and 25%
foreign-produced goods, which corresponds to Sweden’s actual average import to GDP ratio for
the period 1880 to 1913. Also note that the assumed 5% population decline can be considered
conservative.
11Note that such wage effects will slightly dampen the direct CA/GDP effect of migration.
12In the model, migration’s net effect on output stability will thus hinge upon the interaction of various
parameters, such as home bias in consumption, the curvature of the production function with respect
to labor input as well as all of the rigidities that influence the two regions’ response to short-run
changes in aggregate demand.
13This example is taken from Bordo and MacDonald (2005). Note that, to the extent that the cen-
tral bank’s countercyclical policy rule is known and expected by agents, this influences ex ante
inflation expectations and thus real rates even before the central bank has taken any action. Thus
observed differences in nominal rates are imperfect indicators of the effectiveness of monetary policy
independence during the GS.
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Figure 4.2: Prices, migration and monetary policy after major reversals in the CA/GDP-ratio
































































































































Notes: Black solid – Gold Standard. Shaded areas – 90% confidence bands based on robust Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors (small sample corrected, autocorrelation lag order = 2 years). CA/GDP-troughs
are defined according to a turning-point algorithm à la Bry and Boschan (1971): CA/GDP-troughs are
defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. The number of CA/GDP-troughs thus
identified is nine.
banks deviated by up to 3 percentage points from those set by the Bank of England.14 In the
short-run the GS left central bankers with considerable flexibility for setting their discount
rates with a “concern for home trade” (Sayers (1976) vol I, p.44, Bordo and MacDonald (2005)).
14Due to the absence of large inflation differentials this translated into almost identical real rate
differentials.
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Beyond the limited monetary policy independence they enjoyed within the target zone, central
bankers were furthermore willing to round the corners of the policy trilemma through active
intervention in foreign exchange markets or through the passive accommodation of gold
outflows. Figure 4.2 shows that during major external adjustments such policies resulted in a
5 ppt drop in gold cover ratios. The National Bank of Belgium and the Banque de France were
particularly willing to let their gold cover ratios fluctuate in order to insulate the domestic
economy from movements in world interest rates (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2014; Bazot,
Bordo and Monnet, 2014). Thus, the pre-1913 GS was in possession of several safety valves on
the monetary side that could ease external adjustment.15
To sum up, a typical external adjustment under the GS was accompanied by a strong
and swift gain in price-competitiveness. Migration- and monetary policy also reacted. For
individual countries activity along the latter two channels could become pronounced enough
to exert a non-negligible stabilizing force on per capita incomes– e.g. Sweden in the case
of migration, and Belgium in the case of monetary policy. Against the backdrop of these
empirical regularities we now introduce a structural model in order to quantitatively assess
the relative importance of price flexibility, migration and monetary policy in explaining the
stability of incomes during external adjustments under the GS.
4.4. A model of the Gold Standard
To quantitatively analyze the relative importance of prices, migration and monetary policy for
the ease of external adjustment under the Gold Standard we need to be able to disentangle
their individual impact. To this end, we introduce a two-region open economy model that
features international migration flows, various degrees of price flexibility and a GS-specific
monetary structure.16
In the following section, we will first shortly outline the model and thereby focus mainly
on decision problems in one of the two regions – the H-region. The economy in the F-region is
symmetric and we provide a more detailed description of the complete equation system that
characterizes its state of equilibrium in Appendix 4.A.1.
4.4.1. Households
There is a continuum of households i ∈ [0, 1], with households [0, nt) living in H and [nt, 1] in
F. Household i’s period utility follows the Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman (1988) (GHH)
15The outlined relationship of prices, migration, and monetary policy with movements in the CA/GDP
ratio is a robust characteristic of the GS data. It also shows up in within year correlations (see Table
4.14 in Online Appendix 4.A.4), as well as an alternative definition of CA/GDP troughs (see Figure
4.15 in Online Appendix 4.A.3).
16The 2-region model abstracts from those countries that were not part of the Gold Standard. As a
robustness check we therefore also estimated a version of the model in which we treat one of the
regions as a hybrid that includes all other gold, as well as non-gold countries. The presented results
are robust to this alteration (see Online Appendix 4.A.3).
117
















where β is the discount factor, lt is hours worked and ct is consumption, which is made up
of H- and F-produced goods: ct =
[








. The elasticity of substitution
between these goods is e and the openness parameter α reflects a home-bias in taste as well
as trade frictions. The H and F goods themselves are CES bundles of differentiated goods






















, where j is the firm index and µ is the elasticity of
substitution between goods produced in the same region. The price indices for the H- and F-



















The H consumer price index is then given by Pt =
[
(1− α)P1−eH,t + αP1−eF,t
] 1
1−e
. We assume that
the law of one price applies at the individual goods level so that PF,t(j) et = P∗F,t(j), where
F-variables are marked by an asterisk and et denotes the nominal exchange rate (domestic per
foreign currency).18 Note, however, that due to the existence of home bias in consumption
LOP does not imply purchasing power parity (PPP).19







t−1/et + TRt + Ptwt l
i
t + Γt + I
τ
t
= BiH,t + B
i










where F-variables are marked by an asterisk. Ptwt is the nominal wage households receive for
supplying their labor to local firms on competitive labor markets. Γt are local firms’ nominal
lump-sum dividends that are payed out to local households. BiH,t and B
i
F,t are household i’s
holdings of two internationally traded one-period risk-free bonds, denominated in H- and
F currency respectively. Ret is the effective return, which is determined by the risk-free rate




t ). The adjustment of foreign real asset
17Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), Mendoza (1991) and Mendoza and Yue (2012) point out that open
economy models with GHH utility functions are better at replicating business cycle statistics than
models with utility functions where labor supply is subject to wealth effects.
18While the law of one price (LOP) assumption is an exaggeration (see Persson, 2004), price differentials
were generally declining over the 19th century, so that by the end of the century they had become a
fraction of what they used to be at its beginning (see Klovland, 2005; Jacks, 2005).
19See Diebold, Husted and Rush (1991) and Taylor (2002) for analyses of purchasing power parity (PPP)
in the 19th and 20th centuries. While PPP held in the long-run, there could be considerable deviations
from PPP over short and medium horizons.
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holdings is subject to a quadratic adjustment cost, which is the last term of the budget constraint
equation.20 When households in F adjust their portfolio holding of H bonds, the associated cost













adjustment costs and risk premium shocks allow for deviations from strict uncovered interest
parity (UIP). Because of migrations, the model has four different household types - denoted
by τ: H- and F-households that either stay or migrate τ ∈ {H→ H, H→ F, F→ H, F→ F},
where→ shows the direction of migration. The type-specific and possibly negative payment
Iτt ensures that nominal asset holdings after migration are equalized across households within
the region.
4.4.1.1 Endogenous migration
In our model households are free to migrate back and forth between the H and F regions.21
At the beginning of each period, exogenous shocks realize and households choose whether
to migrate (δit = 1) or to stay (δ
i
t = 0). The decision to migrate is based on comparing the
lifetime utilities of continuing to live in H (Vit ) to that of moving to F. The utility of moving to F
includes the utility of living there (Vit
∗) minus the costs of moving. There exist two short-term
costs of moving: One is a time-invariant, region specific migration cost κd, which reflects the
various hindrances migrants have to overcome (e.g. travel costs). The other is a stochastic
utility shock υit that captures the cross-population idiosyncrasy and cross-time variation in a
household’s preference for leaving its current location.22 The household i’s migration decision
is
δit = arg max
δit∈{0,1}
{Vit , Vit ∗ − υit − κd}.
We assume that the i.i.d. utility shock υit follows a logistic distribution with a mean of zero




∗ − κd > Vit
)
.
After migrations have taken place, the type-specific transfers Iτt ensure that nominal asset
holdings at the beginning of the period are the same across households within a region. They
thus can be treated as identical and we drop the household index i.23 As a consequence the
20We assume the same functional form as Benigno (2009). The adjustment cost also pins down the
steady state gross foreign asset position. The model’s steady state for net foreign assets is determined
even without the adjustment costs due to migration (see Appendix 4.A.1).
21Kennan and Walker (2011) also develop an econometric and dynamic model of migration that features
optimal location decisions over many alternative locations. They model individual decisions to
migrate as a job search problem and focus on the partial equilibrium response of labor supply to
wage differentials.
22This ensures that not all households migrate at the same time.
23Type changing, or in our case migration, causes difficulties in tracking a household’s asset position.
Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) construct an insurance scheme for households that change types with an
exogenous probability. The insurance equalizes the marginal utility of income for households of the
119
population fraction that emigrates, d˜t, equals the emigration probability, dt.24 The aggregate
population in H, therefore, evolves according to25
nt = (1− d˜t) nt−1 + d˜∗t n∗t−1. (4.3)
4.4.2. Firms
The model’s production side consists of a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms
j ∈ [0, 1] that maximize expected discounted profits. The n home firms and 1− n foreign
firms produce with labor from H and F households respectively. The production technology is
yt(j) = exp(At)Lt(j)γ, where yt(j) is output, Lt(j) is labor and At is the exogenous region-specific
productivity level. γ parameterizes the curvature of the production function with respect to
labor and thus determines the de- and reflationary effects of migration on wages in receiving
and sending regions. As in Calvo (1983), firms face a nominal rigidity, where in each period
only a random fraction (1− θ) of firms can reset their prices.26 θ, together with γ and µ




In equilibrium the following market clearing conditions for financial-, goods- and labor markets
hold:
0 = ntBH,t + n∗t B∗H,t
0 = ntBF,t + n∗t B∗F,t
yt(j) = nt cH,t(j) + n∗t c∗H,t(j), j ∈ [0, n)








L∗t (j) dj, j ∈ [n, 1]
same type. In our model, such an insurance scheme is, however, infeasible, due to the endogeneity
of the migration decision. Here, we resort to the pooling assumption in order to keep the model
tractable. A similar pooling assumption has been used in Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014).
24While migration often lags behind business cycle conditions, Jerome (1926, p.241) states that the
“most common lag in migration fluctuations is from one to five months”. Migration thus does not
feature any intrinsic persistence in our annual model.
25Note that population levels in the model are stationary, although deviations from the steady state can
be very persistent.
26In accordance with the GS results reported by Benati et al. (2008) our model does not feature price
(backward-) indexation.
27 See Beckworth (2007) for evidence that nominal rigidities in late 19th century-economies were
important enough to affect real economic activity.
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4.4.4. Monetary policy and gold flows
Different strands of the literature have characterized monetary policy under the classical GS as
either a money-quantity rule or a discount rate rule. According to the money-quantity view
central banks were supposed to expand and contract the money supply in proportion to gold
in- and outflows, such as to keep the ratio of gold-to-money - the gold cover ratio - stable.
Another part of the literature, however, focuses on the importance of central bank discount
rates in stabilizing the exchange rate. Here we model monetary policy as a discount rate rule
that targets the gold cover ratio γt. This formulation integrates the money quantity view and
the discount rate view in that discount rate policy Rt contributes to a stable money-to-gold
ratio in the long-run. At the same time in the short-run, within the target zone, the central
bank is free to let the gold cover ratio fluctuate in order to stabilize the domestic output gap.
In contrast to strict money-quantity rules, this depiction of monetary policy under the
GS is in line with the observed fluctuation in gold cover ratios (see Online Appendix 4.A.3).
Finally, we also allow central banks to directly target the nominal exchange rate et in order
to accommodate the heterogeneity of discount rate policies that could be observed under the















where we allow for persistence in the discount rate, and Φy, Φγ and Φe denote the sensitivity
of the discount rate reaction with respect to the output gap, the gold cover ratio and the
exchange rate.29
Adherence to this discount rate rule implies deviations from a strict money-quantity rule.
Money Mt varies with money demand according to a money demand function as in much of
the earlier GS literature.30 Money demand is assumed to be a fraction of the nominal value of
28For instance, Morys (2013) presents evidence that the core economies’ discount rate policies were
directly targeted at keeping the nominal exchange rate within the gold points, while in the periphery
central banks put more weight on their gold cover ratios.
29Here the output gap is defined as the deviation of real output yt from its steady state y¯. We prefer
defining the output gap in terms of deviations of real aggregate output from its steady state over
definitions based on deviation from the efficient level of output or per capita output levels, because
we consider the former to cohere more with contemporary central banks’ targets and information
sets. While the use of retrospectively constructed GDP series harbors an element of anachronicity we
consider them to be a reasonable proxy for the more general business climate that central banks were
reactive to.
30Here, we consider Mt to be narrowly defined as central bank notes in circulation. The holding of
notes does not appear in the budget constraint. This is the case because we implicitly assume a
cash-in-advanced constraint for central bank notes where asset markets are opened before goods
trading. Households will convert all notes into bond holdings at the end of the period, because
note-holding means the foregoing of interest revenues.
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total production n PH,t yt and depends on the discount rate Rt:




where χt is an exogenous money demand shock. Central bank gold stocks evolve according to
Gt = Gt−1 + F(et) exp(emt ), (4.4)




where gold moves between H and F according to deviations of the nominal exchange rate from
the ratio of the two currencies’ underlying gold parities – i.e. their mint ratio (Officer, 1985;
Giovannini, 1993; Canjels, Prakash-Canjels and Taylor, 2004; Coleman, 2007). When H and F
central banks commit to convert local currency into gold at a fixed parity, deviations of the
nominal exchange rate from the mint parity makes shipping gold between regions profitable.
emt indicates an exogenous gold shock.
31 Given money Mt and gold Gt the gold cover ratio γt





where Pg is the legal gold parity.
Finally, note that in this setup the long-run credibility and sustainability of the peg is never
doubted. This allows us to focus on external adjustment when exchange rates are inflexible.
4.5. Bayesian Estimation
We loglinearize the model around its non-stochastic steady state (see Appendix 4.A.1) and
estimate it with Bayesian techniques for the U.K., Sweden and Belgium.32 For each estimation,
we chose the country in focus – the U.K., Sweden or Belgium – to be the H region, while all
other GS members were aggregated into the F region.
We selected Sweden and Belgium with an eye on obtaining upper bound estimates for the
effectiveness of the migration- and monetary policy-channels respectively. In the late 19th
century, Sweden was one of the countries with the highest emigration rate, losing between
0.3% and 1.1% of its population per year through emigration. Previous research has already
pointed out that Swedish net immigration followed a pronounced countercyclical pattern that
31We also considered a version of the model in which gold flows are influenced by net immigration and
the trade balance. However, our estimations showed neither of them to be an important determinant
of gold flows. Gold coins carried by migrants constituted only a minute fraction of total gold flows,
and in contrast to the 18th century price-specie flow model (Hume, 1752) by the late 19th century
trade deficits and surpluses were no longer primarily settled through gold flows.
32The large number of parameters and the relative shortness of macroeconomic time series usually
renders maximum likelihood estimation of medium-scale DSGE models infeasible.
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might have aided external adjustment (see Khoudour-Castéras, 2005): Whenever the domestic
economy went badly a sizeable fraction of the Swedish population headed for the New World,
particularly the U.S.33 For these reasons we expect Sweden to give us an upper bound estimate
of how effective cyclical migration could be in easing external adjustment under the GS.
We select Belgium, because the National Bank of Belgium was renown for its willingness to
let its gold cover ratio fluctuate in order to insulate the domestic economy from movements in
world interest rates (Ugolini, 2012; Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2014). In fact, by the late 19th
century Belgium was considered the prime example in this regard, due to the scale and scope
of its foreign exchange market interventions (see Conant, 1910). The success of its policies
in achieving a non-negligible degree of monetary autonomy within the GS did not escape
international notice and even led to calls for emulation (see Palgrave, 1903; Schiltz, 2006). We
thus expect that Belgium provides us with an upper bound estimate for the effectiveness of
the monetary policy channel under the GS.34
Finally, we also estimate the model for the U.K. The U.K. was one of the earliest countries
to abandon silver and switch to a purely gold-based monetary system already in the 18th
century. As the first industrializer and subsequently the world’s pre-eminent free-trader it
motivated many trading partners to follow suit. The U.K. was in many ways the centerpiece
of the Gold Standard (GS) – home to the world’s largest financial center and hosting the most
influential central bank of its time.
4.5.1. Observables
We estimate each model on the basis of 11 observables: domestic and foreign time series of per
capita GDP; central bank discount rates and CPI-inflation; domestic time series for the ratio of
net immigration to population35; the trade balance to GDP ratio; changes in the central bank
notes in circulation; the gold cover ratio and the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER). The
foreign time series are constructed as trade-weighted geometric averages, analogously to the
previously discussed REER series (see Section 4.3). The ratio of net immigration to population
and the trade balance to GDP ratio are directly detrended by a one-sided HP-filter (λ = 100).
All other variables are first logged before being detrended by the same one-sided HP-filter.
33At that time, only Norway had a comparably high emigration rate with a similarly countercyclical
pattern. Counterfactual simulation results for Norway are reported in Online Appendix 4.A.3. The
results are in line with the conclusions drawn on the basis of the other three countries’ estimation
results.
34The Banque de France is another central bank that pioneered an activist approach to reserve and
portfolio management. Counterfactual simulation results for France are reported in Online Appendix
4.A.3. These results lead to conclusions very similar to those we draw from the Belgian case.
35Most migration flows within our sample originate and end in one of the sample countries. Little of
the large-scale migration to South America originated from within our sample. Instead it originated
from non-persistent Gold Standard member countries, such as Italy, Spain and Portugal, that are also
outside of our sample.
123
4.5.2. Calibration
Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters
Description Value/Target
β Discount factor 0.962
µ
µ−1 Markup 1.1
γ∗ Production function F 0.792
α Openness parameter H SST H import-to-GDP ratio
α∗ Openness parameter F SST H export-to-GDP ratio
United Kingdom
γ Production function H 0.726
n SST population H 0.160
d¯ SST emigration H 0.0064
o¯ Foreign portfolio H SST H GFA-to-GDP ratio = 1.33
Sweden
γ Production function H 0.792
n SST population H 0.020
d¯ SST emigration H 0.0059
o¯∗ Foreign portfolio F SST F GFA-to-GDP ratio = 0.001
Belgium
γ Production function H 0.792
n SST population H 0.027
d¯ SST emigration H 0.0036
o¯∗ Foreign portfolio F SST F GFA-to-GDP ratio = 0.001
Notes: GFA gross foreign assets. SST steady state.
Some parameters are calibrated, either because they are difficult to estimate (e.g. markups)
or because their identification from observables is straightforward (e.g. discount factors)
(see Table 4.1). We follow standard calibration strategies for the time discount factor β, the
within-country intra-temporal elasticity of substitution µ, the curvature of the production
function γ, the trade-openness parameters α and α∗, and the steady state gross foreign asset
position o¯. The time discount factor β is set to 0.9615, in order to match a sample average
discount rate of 4%. The elasticity of substitution between the goods within a country µ is
set to 11, implying a steady state price markup of 10%.36 Given µ, we calibrate γ to target
a steady state labor income to GDP ratio of 0.66 for the U.K. and 0.72 for all other countries
(Sweden, Belgium and the F-regions).37 The first value reflects the average labor share in the
U.K. from 1880-1913 and the later is an approximation based on the average labor share in
France and Germany during the same time period.38 The trade openness parameters α and
α∗ are calibrated to target the historical average import to GDP-ratios (U.K.: 30%, Sweden:
36This value is consistent with Jacks, Meissner and Novy (2010), who use an elasticity of substitution
parameter of 11. A value of 11 implies a markup of 10% which nicely corresponds to the late 19th
century markup estimate of 9.8% by Irwin (2003).
37The model’s steady state labor income share is γ(µ− 1)/µ
38According to the datasets provided by Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2015) and Piketty and Zucman
(2014).
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25%, Belgium: 47%) and export to GDP ratios (U.K.: 29%, Sweden: 24%, Belgium: 37%) of
the H region. The U.K.’s gross foreign asset holdings o¯ are set to target a steady state gross
foreign asset to GDP ratio of 1.33, which is consistent with the gross foreign asset estimates
provided by Piketty and Zucman (2014) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2004).39 Calibrating steady
state gross foreign asset (GFA) positions for Sweden and Belgium is less straightforward due to
the lack of historical data. We assume that in the steady state the F-region holds few Swedish
or Belgian assets relative to its GDP, GFA/GDP = 0.001. Together with the steady state net
foreign asset position, this pins down the steady state gross foreign asset holdings of Sweden
and Belgium.40
The introduction of migration to the model necessitates the calibration of steady state values
for population levels n and emigration rates d¯. Fortunately this is relatively straightforward:
The steady state population level of H is chosen to correspond to the average domestic population
to sample population ratio. The steady state emigration probability in H (d¯) is set to the average
emigration to population ratio of the H country (U.K., Sweden or Belgium). This implies the
corresponding steady state value for F according to the equality d¯ n = d¯∗ n∗.
4.5.3. Prior distribution
The prior distribution is selected according to the endogenous prior method introduced by
Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011), who use observables’ moments to adjust an initial
prior choice. The endogenous prior approach is particularly attractive for our analysis because
prior information on the model parameters for the GS era is relatively scarce. In particular,
we use the second moments of the observables to form the endogenous prior. This helps to
improve the model’s fit of the observables’ variances.41
The prior distributions for the estimated parameters are summarized in Table 4.2. We
assume that the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution σc and the inverse Frisch
elasticity σl are identical across regions. Their prior distribution follows the literature standard
(e.g. de Walque and Wouters (2008) and Smets and Wouters (2007)). For the trade elasticities
e and e∗ we choose a comparatively wide prior, reflecting the wide range of modern-day
estimates for these parameters. The migration parameters ψ and ψ∗ determine how sensitive
migration is to differences in the utility level between regions: a small ψ implies a stronger
migration reaction for any given utility difference, whereas a large ψ implies that migration is
largely a random phenomenon.42 In accordance with the previously cited evidence for the
responsiveness of migrants to economic conditions we choose a normal distribution with a
relatively small mean of 2. According to current best-practice estimates for the U.S. (Kennan
39Since they also depend on estimated parameters, o¯ (o¯∗), α and α∗ are re-calibrated during estimation
for each draw from the prior distribution.
40The model’s steady state for net foreign assets is determined due to migration (see Appendix 4.A.1).
41As in Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011), we use the actual sample as our pre-sample.
42Note that while ψ characterizes migration’s sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations, the fixed migration
cost κd determines the level of migration d¯.
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and Walker, 2011) a persistent 1% increase in one state’s wages implies a 0.5% larger state-
population after 5 years. In our model’s framework, a value of 2 for ψ implies a similar
reactivity of migration.
Nominal rigidity is characterized by the Calvo parameter θ, which together with γ, β and µ
determines the slope of the Phillips curve, κ˜, according to κ˜ = (1− βθ)(1− θ)/[1/θ(1− µ+µ/γ)].
Instead of estimating the Calvo parameters we choose to directly estimate the the Phillips curve
slopes. Many modern day quarterly Calvo parameter estimates lie in the range of [0.5, 0.8],
which corresponds to an average price duration of 2 to 5 quarters, or a quarterly Phillips curve
slope between 0.01 and 0.13. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Eggertsson (2008) convert
the quarterly Phillips curve slope to an annual slope by multiplying the former by four. Thus
today’s Calvo parameter estimates in the [0.5, 0.8]-range imply an annualized Phillips curve
slope between 0.04 and 0.52. Where can we expect the corresponding GS parameter to lie?
Aggregate price indices exhibited substantially more flexibility (Gordon, 1990; Basu and Taylor,
1999; Obstfeld, 1993) and output responsiveness than today (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1996;
Bordo, J. and Redish, 2008; Chernyshoff, Jacks and Taylor, 2009).43 We thus expect to find
steeper Phillips curves for the GS era. To be on the safe side however, we chose a conservative
beta-prior for κ˜ and κ˜∗, which gives almost equal prior weight to all but the most extreme
values of the 0-1 range.
On the monetary side, following Benati et al. (2008) and Fagan, Lothian and McNelis (2013)
we assume a prior mean of 0.1 for the interest-rate elasticity of money demand vr (also see Bae
and De Jong, 2007, for similar 1900-1945 estimates for the U.S.). Concerning the sensitivity
of gold flows to the exchange rate ee we remain agnostic except for the sign, by selecting
a wide [0, 15] uniform prior distribution. In our prior choice for the portfolio adjustment
cost parameter K we select an inverse gamma prior with a mean of 0.04 (see Benigno, 2009),
implying an average deviation of H- from F interest rates of 1 ppt. This roughly corresponds
to contemporary textbook estimates of an annualized 75 basis point wedge between London
and New York interest rates (e.g. Haupt, 1894; Margraff, 1908; Escher, 1917).
For the discount rate rule, we use pre-sample data to inform our prior choice. We set the
prior means of the discount rate coefficients close to the pooled regression coefficient estimates
that we obtained for a sample of GS members for the years 1870-1879. We then chose wide
prior standard deviations to reflect our uncertainty about these parameters. Consistent with
historical accounts the regression results also show that the U.K. changed its discount rate
much more frequently than the Swedish and Belgian central banks.44 Accordingly, we estimate
the discount rate rule for the U.K. without a persistence term. Furthermore, although foreign
43Note however that the micro evidence based on product-group level prices indicates that prices
have not become less flexible over time (Kackmeister, 2007; Knotek, 2008). This points towards a
compositional effect: it is well known that pre-1913 price indices contain more flex-price items such
as agricultural produce and raw materials than today’s indices. However, for our macro model
calibration the aggregate price level evidence has more relevance.
44The Bank of England decided upon its discount rate on a weekly basis (see Eichengreen, Watson and
Grossman, 1985).
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countries might have wanted to keep their nominal exchange rates stable vis-à-vis the U.K.
(see Morys, 2010) there is little reason why they should directly target the nominal exchange
rate vis-a-vis Sweden or Belgium. Hence, only for the U.K. model do we include a reaction
term for nominal exchange rate deviations into the F discount rate function.
Exogenous shocks generally follow AR(1) processes.45 Only the discount rate shock is not
allowed to exhibit any persistence beyond that which is intrinsic to the discount rate rule. All
persistence parameters are given a wide beta prior with a mean of 0.3.46 We allow for the
region-specific technology shocks to be correlated. We chose a flat beta prior for the correlation
σaa∗ . The persistence and standard deviation of the gold shocks are assumed to be the same
across regions.
Finally, we allow for measurement error in all trade-weighted observables (all F-aggregates
and the NEER). We also allow for measurement error in the net immigration and trade balance to
GDP ratio. Following Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin (2011) we calibrate the measurement
errors’ variance to 10% of the variance in the observables. As shown in Online Appendix 4.A.5,
the data without measurement error very closely follow the original data.
45Note that in the case of money demand shocks, it is the changes ∆ext ≡ ηxt that follow an AR(1)
process.
46The 0.3 mean for our annual model corresponds to the conventional prior mean from the [0.5, 0.85]
range that is usually applied in quarterly models: 0.3 ≈ 0.754.
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Table 4.2: Prior distribution
Description Distribution Mean S.D. Description Distribution Mean S.D.
Utility parameters Shock parameters
σc Inverse EIS Normal 1.50 0.35 ρa Persistence, technology (H) Beta 0.30 0.15
σl Inverse Frisch elasticity Normal 2.00 0.75 ρa∗ Persistence, technology (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
e Trade elasticity (H) Normal 1.50 1.50 ρg Persistence, markup (H) Beta 0.30 0.15
e∗ Trade elasticity (F) Normal 1.50 1.50 ρg∗ Persistence, markup (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
ρx Persistence, money demand (H) Beta 0.30 0.15
Migration parameters ρx∗ Persistence, money demand (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
ψ Migration sensitivity (H) Normal 2.00 1.00 ρb Persistence, risk premium (H) Beta 0.30 0.15
ψ∗ Migration sensitivity (F) Normal 2.00 1.00 ρb∗ Persistence, risk premium (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
ρm Persistence, gold (H & F) Beta 0.30 0.15
Price parameters ηa S.D., technology (H) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
κ˜ Phillips curve slope (H) Beta 0.50 0.28 ηa∗ S.D., technology (F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
κ˜∗ Phillips curve slope (F) Beta 0.50 0.28 ηg S.D., markup (H) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
ηg∗ S.D., markup (F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
Gold flow parameters ηx S.D., money demand (H) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
ee Gold flow due to exchange rate Uniform [ 0, 15 ] ηx∗ S.D., money demand (F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
G¯
G¯∗ Relative gold stock Inv. gamma
n
1−n 1.00 η
b S.D., risk premium (H) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
ηb∗ S.D., risk premium (F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
Discount rate parameters ηr S.D., monetary policy (H) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00
ρ Discount rate persistence (H) Beta 0.30 0.15 ηr∗ S.D., monetary policy (F) Inv. gamma 0.10 2.00
Φy Output coefficent (H) Beta 1.00 0.56 ηm S.D., gold (H & F) Inv. gamma 0.50 2.00
Φe Exchange rate coefficent (H) Beta 1.00 0.56 σaa∗ Correlation, technology Beta 0.50 0.28
Φg Cover ratio coefficient (H) Beta 1.00 0.56
ρ∗ Discount rate persistence (F) Beta 0.30 0.15
Φy∗ Output coefficent (F) Beta 1.00 0.56
Φe∗ Exchange rate coefficent (F) Beta 1.00 0.56
Φg∗ Cover ratio coefficient (F) Beta 1.00 0.56
Other parameters
K Foreign portfolio adjustment costs Inv. gamma 0.04 2.00
υr Interest rate elasticity of money demand Inv. gamma 0.10 0.03
Notes: EIS – elasticity of intertemporal substitution. S.D. – standard deviation. The prior distributions for ψ,ψ∗ , σl , e and e∗ are truncated at zero. In case of the U.K., ρ is not estimated
but set to zero. In the case of Sweden and Belgium, Φe∗ is not estimated but set to zero.
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4.5.4. Posterior distribution
Table 4.5.5 summarizes the estimation results. Firstly, the posterior distributions for the Phillips
curve parameters indicate that the price level was much more flexible in the time before 1914
than it is today. Annual Phillips curve (PC) slope estimates for the U.K., Sweden and Belgium
are 0.34, 0.53 and 0.90 respectively, implying average price durations in the 1.5 to 2 quarter
range. For comparison, estimates for the U.S. and the euro area today generally hint towards
a much flatter Phillips curve. The Calvo parameter estimates obtained by de Walque and
Wouters (2008) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) for instance, imply annualized Phillips
curve slopes in the [0.01-0.15]-range.
Secondly, consider the parameters ψ and ψ∗ that pin down the sensitivity of migration
to the business cycle. As expected, the comparatively small estimate for Sweden reflects
that Swedish migrants were very responsive to economic fundamentals. Though less than in
Sweden, U.K. migrants still responded strongly to cyclical differences in consumption and
labor income. Given the U.K.’s ψ-estimate, a persistent 1% decrease in consumption in the U.K.
relative to the F-region would result in a 4% decrease in the U.K.’s population after 5 years. By
contrast, the comparatively high ψ-estimate for Belgium implies that Belgian migration flows
were considerably less sensitive.47
Finally, the monetary side is characterized by the following parameter estimates: The
discount rate policy in all three countries stabilized gold cover ratios (φg > 0) and the nominal
exchange rate (φe > 0), whereas our evidence for output stabilization (φy > 0) is restricted
to the British and Swedish central banks. In both cases, the policy reaction to output is
much less than what a modern-day Taylor rule would suggest (ΦyTaylor = 0.5). These results
reflect that the primary monetary policy targets at the time were stable gold cover ratios and
nominal exchange rates. The autocorrelation of Swedish and Belgian discount rates is 0.42
and 0.44 respectively, implying that some interest rate smoothing took place. Furthermore
Belgian discount rates reacted less to deviations of the exchange rate from its mint parity
((1− ρ) ·Φe = 0.34) and fluctuations in the gold cover ratio ((1− ρ) ·Φg = 0.07). In this sense
the National Bank of Belgium made more use of the monetary policy independence that the
Gold Standard allowed. Note, however, that it does not appear to have targeted the domestic
output gap.
4.5.5. Model evaluation
To see whether the estimated models give a good description of the data, we conducted
marginal likelihood comparisons between different model versions and extensive moment
47Between 1880 and 1913 Belgium itself was a destination for many political refugees, which did
not migrate primarily for economic reasons. Furthermore, unlike many other European countries
Belgium did not encourage the emigration of its citizens to relieve domestic crises. Finally, overall net
immigration relative to the general population level in Belgium was small in the period covered by
our sample, 1880-1913.
129
comparisons of real and simulated data. Note that our baseline model specification does
not feature external consumption habits, which is a common feature of DSGEs estimated
with modern data. A marginal likelihood comparison of the models with and without habit
formation, however, shows that the latter is favored by our 1880-1913 data. Similarly we
have also estimated a version of the model with a more elaborate law of motion for central
bank gold stocks (see equation 4.4). Strictly speaking gold stocks do not only depend on
exchange rate deviations, but also on net immigration (migrants carrying gold coins) and the
trade balance (trade deficits being settled through gold transfers). The estimated parameters
however, confirm back-of-the-envelope calculations as well as historical narratives in that by
the late 19th century these two gold flow determinants were of negligible importance. We thus
opted for the more parsimonious version of the model.
Next, we compared the (auto-)correlations of the simulated data to that of the observed
data. We did this for the six variables that we are most interested in – a total of 216 moments.48
To obtain the simulated data we run the model with all parameters set to their posterior
mean.49 Figures 4.22 to 4.24 in Online Appendix 4.A.3 show the correlations, including the
90% coverage percentiles for the stochastic simulations. The model fairly accurately represents
the data’s correlation structure.
48Per capita GDP, inflation, the discount rate, the nominal exchange rate, changes in the net immigra-
tion/population ratio and changes in the trade-balance/GDP ratio.
49We conducted 2000 simulations. Each simulation has 34 periods, corresponding to the length of our
sample. To limit the results’ dependence on initial conditions, we ran simulations for 134 periods and
discarded the first 100 observations.
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Table 4.3: Posterior distribution
U.K. Sweden Belgium
Description Mean 90% HPDI Mean 90% HPDI Mean 90% HPDI
Utility parameters
σc Inverse EIS 1.57 1.11 2.03 2.50 2.07 2.93 2.10 1.77 2.41
σl Inverse Frisch elasticity 2.65 1.67 3.60 2.85 1.94 3.79 3.36 2.57 4.13
e Trade elasticity (H) 2.81 0.71 4.72 1.44 0.09 2.60 0.64 0.03 1.17
e∗ Trade elasticity (F) 3.20 1.57 4.80 1.26 0.26 2.27 0.47 0.00 0.84
Migration parameters
φ Migration sensitivity (H) 0.27 0.06 0.47 0.07 0.05 0.08 3.77 2.76 4.81
φ∗ Migration sensitivity (F) 1.98 0.33 3.39 2.03 0.44 3.52 3.44 2.42 4.40
Price parameters
κ˜ Phillips curve slope (H) 0.34 0.16 0.54 0.53 0.33 0.75 0.90 0.79 1.00
κ˜∗ Phillips curve slope (F) 0.35 0.14 0.58 0.64 0.39 0.93 0.36 0.18 0.54
Gold flow parameters
ee Gold flow due to nom. exchange rate 2.33 3.29 1.35 1.85 2.90 0.78 0.54 0.75 0.31
G¯
G¯∗ Relative gold stock 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03
Discount rate parameters
ρ Discount rate persistence (H) – – – 0.42 0.18 0.65 0.44 0.28 0.59
Φy Output coefficent (H) 0.14 0.09 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.34 0.02 0.00 0.04
Φe Exchange rate coefficent (H) 0.72 0.13 1.27 1.68 1.29 2.00 0.61 0.14 1.07
Φg Cover ratio coefficient (H) 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.14 0.07 0.22 0.12 0.08 0.15
ρ∗ Discount rate persistence (F) 0.25 0.06 0.42 0.42 0.17 0.66 0.13 0.02 0.24
Φy∗ Output coefficent (F) 0.04 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.00 0.33 0.06 0.00 0.13
Φe∗ Exchange rate coefficent (F) 1.63 1.23 2.00 – – – – – –
Φg∗ Cover ratio coefficient (F) 0.39 0.21 0.54 0.49 0.17 0.83 0.18 0.10 0.27
Other parameters
K Foreign portfolio adjustment costs 0.24 0.01 0.45 0.09 0.02 0.17 0.53 0.34 0.72
υr Interest rate elasticity of money demand 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.06 0.14
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Table 4.4: Posterior distribution (continued)
U.K. Sweden Belgium
Description Mean 90% HPDI Mean 90% HPDI Mean 90% HPDI
Shock parameters
ρa Persistence, technology (H) 0.18 0.06 0.29 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.49 0.39 0.59
ρa∗ Persistence, technology (F) 0.93 0.90 0.96 0.86 0.82 0.90 0.46 0.29 0.64
ρg Persistence, markup (H) 0.31 0.10 0.51 0.38 0.24 0.53 0.24 0.08 0.38
ρg∗ Persistence, markup (F) 0.52 0.32 0.73 0.23 0.07 0.38 0.35 0.17 0.52
ρx Persistence, money demand (H) 0.19 0.05 0.33 0.20 0.05 0.34 0.07 0.01 0.13
ρx∗ Persistence, money demand (F) 0.54 0.39 0.69 0.36 0.16 0.56 0.55 0.35 0.74
ρb Persistence, risk premium (H) 0.30 0.07 0.50 0.52 0.29 0.75 0.33 0.12 0.51
ρb∗ Persistence, risk premium (F) 0.24 0.04 0.43 0.34 0.09 0.57 0.30 0.07 0.52
ρm Persistence, gold (H & F) 0.21 0.04 0.38 0.30 0.12 0.49 0.14 0.03 0.26
ηa S.D., technology (H) 1.52 1.26 1.77 2.05 1.77 2.32 1.62 1.43 1.82
ηa∗ S.D., technology (F) 0.34 0.25 0.43 0.32 0.26 0.39 0.49 0.37 0.60
ηg S.D., markup (H) 2.46 1.63 3.25 4.60 3.39 5.80 6.71 5.34 8.03
ηg∗ S.D., markup (F) 1.34 0.77 1.91 2.11 1.32 2.85 1.51 0.75 2.24
ηx S.D., money demand (H) 2.76 2.38 3.15 7.35 6.37 8.36 2.09 1.93 2.24
ηx∗ S.D., money demand (F) 0.75 0.52 0.98 0.93 0.56 1.30 0.33 0.20 0.44
ηb S.D., risk premium (H) 0.26 0.18 0.34 0.25 0.17 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.31
ηb∗ S.D., risk premium (F) 0.20 0.13 0.27 0.21 0.13 0.28 0.19 0.13 0.26
ηr S.D., monetary policy (H) 0.39 0.29 0.49 0.69 0.39 0.97 0.19 0.15 0.23
ηr∗ S.D., monetary policy (F) 0.38 0.27 0.49 0.31 0.22 0.40 0.28 0.22 0.34
ηm S.D., gold (H & F) 0.48 0.34 0.62 0.38 0.16 0.60 0.18 0.12 0.23
σaa∗ Correlation, technology 0.28 0.03 0.49 0.44 0.26 0.61 0.07 0.00 0.15
Notes: HPDI – highest posterior density interval. For the U.K. ρ is not estimated but set to zero. For Sweden and Belgium Φe∗ is not estimated but set to zero.
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4.6. Counterfactual Analysis
In this section we conduct the horse-race between the price-, migration- and monetary policy-
channels to explain why external adjustment under the Gold Standard (GS) was associated
with few output costs. In order to quantitatively assess the channels’ relative importance
we present counterfactual output volatilities. The counterfactual volatilities are obtained
from model simulations in which either the price-, the migration- or the monetary policy
parameters are set to a counterfactual value of interest. Table 4.5 displays the results of this
exercise. The first column shows the standard deviations of the observables under the baseline
model. We simulated the model on the basis of the posterior mean of the estimated structural
parameters and shock processes. More particularly, we ran 2000 simulations, each 34 periods
long (corresponding to the length of our sample).50 Columns 2 to 4 display the counterfactual
standard deviations that result from conducting the same simulation with the respective
counterfactual structural parameters.
First, for the price rigidity counterfactual we lower all Phillips curve slope parameters from
our high GS estimates to a value which is representative of today’s economies. In particular
we set the average duration of price contracts to three quarters, implying annualized Phillips
curve slopes of 0.13 for the U.K. and 0.17 for Sweden and Belgium. This comes close to what
most price rigidity estimates for current advanced economies look like today (see Smets and
Wouters, 2007; Schorfheide, 2008). In this scenario the counterfactual standard deviations for
per capita output are substantially higher, increasing between 81.5% (for the U.K.) and 145.2%
(for Belgium). According to these model simulations flexible prices were a major reason for
the resilience of per capita incomes during the GS.
In the second counterfactual, we shut down the migration channel. This had little effect on
output volatility. The exception is Belgium, where the standard deviation of output increases by
a notable 3.8%. The counterfactual “no migration”-simulations for the U.K. and Belgium even
resulted in slightly less volatile per capita incomes. This acts as a reminder that the stabilizing
effects of migration on regional output do not necessarily outweigh the destabilizing effects
that arise from the redistribution of aggregate demand away from the already recessionary
origin-region.
For the monetary policy counterfactual we eliminated the freedom central banks enjoyed
in setting their discount rates by assuming that H has to adjust its interest rate to ensure an
absolutely fixed exchange rate, while F – a much larger region than H – sets its discount rate
as estimated.51 Column (4) in Table 4.5 shows that this “no independence” counterfactual has
the most impact for the U.K. Here, the monetary policy independence that the GS allowed
enabled the Bank of England to achieve a 3.2% lower per capita income volatility. A look
at the counterfactual impulse response functions furthermore shows that particularly in the
50To limit the result’s dependence on the initial conditions, we ran each simulation for 134 periods and
discarded the first 100 observations.
51See Appendix 4.A.1 for details.
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short-run monetary policy could exert a non-negligible stabilizing influence (see 4.28 in the
Online Appendix). Such short-run dynamics get played down in Table 4.5, which focuses on
overall output volatility.52 We find, however, no evidence that monetary policy substantially
helped the adjustment experience of either Sweden or Belgium.















(1) (2) (3) (4) (3|2) (4|2)
United Kingdom 1.76 3.20 1.75 1.82 3.19 3.42
(81.50%) (-0.89%) (3.19%) (-0.16%) (7.03%)
Sweden 1.88 4.26 1.87 1.90 4.28 4.38
(126.77%) (-0.20%) (0.91%) (0.46%) (2.82%)
Belgium 0.94 2.29 0.97 0.93 2.29 2.29
(145.15%) (3.77%) (-0.19%) (-0.01%) (-0.16%)
Notes: In parenthesis – percentage change in counterfactual S.D. relative to baseline S.D. for (2), (3) and (4), and relative to
rigid price counterfactual in columns (3|2) and (4|2).
In the context of today’s fixed exchange rate regimes an interesting question arises as
to whether international migration can alleviate the external adjustment problem given that
prices are rigid. To see if migration would be substantially more effective in reducing output
and inflation volatility in a rigid price economy, we ran the corresponding counterfactual
GS model simulation. The result displayed in column (3|2) of Table 4.5 does not support
this supposition. Shutting down the migration channel in a rigid price economy does not
substantially impact output volatilities relative to the rigid price-only counterfactual. Rigid
prices somewhat heighten the stabilizing effect that monetary policy has on output (see column
(4|2)), but the total effects still pale in comparison to the direct effects of price flexibility on
output volatility .
In summary, our findings put nominal flexibility at the center of the explanation for why
external adjustments under the GS were rather benign. The role of migration- and monetary
policy in stabilizing per capita output was comparatively small and, in the case of migration,
even ambiguous.
4.7. Sectoral structure, price level flexibility and external adjustment
This section provides an in-depth analysis of price flexibility and external adjustment under the
GS. Newly compiled disaggregate sectoral data allows us to address the following questions:
Why was the aggregate price level so flexible under the GS? Which prices exactly adjusted by
52See Angell (1926) for an early publication that points out that the efficacy of discount rate policy for
external adjustment is restricted to the short-run.
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how much during external adjustments? Was it really an increase in the export of flex-price
goods that turned around the current account?
4.7.1. Sectoral structure and price level flexibility
A notable feature of the Gold Standard-economies is their large primary sector shares, even
among early industrializers. Primary sector products in turn generally exhibit much more
flexible prices than industrial goods or services (Bordo, 1980; Han, Penson and Jansen, 1990;
Jacks, O’Rourke and Williamson, 2011). Thus, the Gold Standard economies’ sectoral structure
is a likely reason for the flexibility of the overall price level.53 Sectoral inflation variances
within our 14-country sample line up accordingly: Table 4.6 shows that the growth rates of
prices for agricultural goods (variance = 0.51) and raw materials (variance = 0.64) exhibit
about twice the volatility of industrial price-growth rates (variance = 0.27) and more than
five times the volatility of service prices (variance = 0.10).54 To get an idea of the relative
importance of primary sectors in the period from 1880 to 1913, consider that in our 14-country
sample an average of 47% of employment is concentrated in primary sectors, and 30% of value
added is generated in them (see Table 4.6). Even the U.K., the most industrialized country
of its time, still employed between 10 and 20% of its labor force in agriculture and mining.
Among internationally traded goods, agricultural products and raw materials made up an even
larger fraction: Within our 14-country sample 67% of all merchandise exports were primary
products.55 Even among early industrializing North Western European countries, primary
product exports equalled the amount of manufacture exports (see Lamartine Yates, 1959, pp.
226-32).
A look at disaggregated nominal prices and real (CPI-deflated) exports confirms the crucial
53The compositional explanation of pre-1914 flexibility was already put forth by economists in the 1930s
(see Humphrey (1937), Mason (1938) and Wood (1938)) as a way of reconciling the wide-spread belief
that the general price level had become more rigid (see Means, 1936) with product-level price studies
that showed that neither the frequency nor the size of price changes had changed since the late 18th
century (Mills, 1927; Humphrey, 1937; Mason, 1938; Bezanson, Gray and Hussey, 1936; Tucker, 1938).
The modern literature on price flexibility has extended this aggregation phenomenon into the 21st
century (see Kackmeister (2007) and Knotek (2008) on product-level prices, and Backus and Kehoe
(1992) and Basu and Taylor (1999) on aggregate price indices).
54The high flexibility of agricultural prices has been linked to their supply and demand elasticities,
with short-run supply being highly inelastic (Cairnes, 1873). Perishability and storability play a role
in this, with less durable products generally exhibiting more flexible prices (Mills, 1927; Telser, 1975;
Reagan and Weitzman, 1982). Blanchard (1983) and Basu (1995) link the high number of production
stages and roundaboutness of industrial production to the lower flexibility of industrial goods’ prices
(see Means, 1935, for a related empirical analysis of prices closer to our sample period). Market
structure also becomes a factor in that most agricultural goods are traded on auction markets, while
industrial goods are more likely to be sold in customer markets where long-term fixed contracts are
more common (see Bordo, 1980; Sachs, 1980; Gordon, 1982).
55This comes very close to figures by Aparicio, Pinilla and Serrano (2009), according to which 63% of
international trade between 1880 and 1939 consisted of primary products. Furthermore, the fraction
of primary products in total trade remains surprisingly stable at around two thirds in the period from
1870 to 1913 (see Lewis, 1952).
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Table 4.6: Sectoral structure, export composition and price volatilities
Mean N.obs
Agriculture, value-added share (%) 30 428
Agriculture, employment share (%) 47 238
Agricultural exports, share of total merchandize exports (%) 36 551
Primary exports, share of total merchandize exports (%) 67 517
Variance N.obs
Agricultural prices, year-on-year change (%) 0.51 601
Raw material prices, year-on-year change (%) 0.64 578
Industrial prices, year-on-year change (%) 0.27 509
Service prices, year-on-year change (%) 0.10 436
Notes: The number of observations differs due to data availability and frequency. Agricultural employ-
ment share figures are commonly decennial data.
role agriculture played for external adjustment under the GS (see Figure 4.3). Agricultural
goods dominated the quick fall in domestic prices, and primary products generally dominated
the export booms during major CA-reversals.56 Four years into the adjustment agricultural and
raw material exports were both up by 30%. At the same time industrial exports had increased
by only 10%.57 Agricultural exports in particular, dominated the early years of CA-reversals,
with exports up by 20% after only two years.58
Increasing primary good exports also left their mark on the adjusting economy’s sectoral
structure. Figure 4.4 depicts the sectoral adjustment that accompanied the export-led external
adjustments of the GS economies. The value added (VA) share of the primary sector (predomi-
nantly tradable goods producing) increased by close to 2 ppts; so did the agricultural sector
labor share (LS). At the same time, the VA shares of the tertiary sector (mostly non-tradable
goods producing) tended to decrease by around 1 ppt. The VA share of the secondary sector,
which here combines non-tradables (e.g. construction works) as well as tradables (e.g. raw
materials and machines), falls by around 0.5 ppts. In terms of absolute real output, tertiary
sector production fell up to 15% below trend during major CA-adjustments, while real primary
sector production rose up to 10% above its trend level. Secondary sector production tends to
closely follow the tertiary sector’s path.59
56In contrast to industrial and raw material prices the relative decline in agricultural prices is persistent.
Note however that h = 0 is unlikely to represent a steady state in this case.
57Note that while the sharp increase in agricultural exports is accompanied by an equally sharp fall
in agricultural prices, this is not the case for raw materials. This possibly hints at differential price
elasticities in the international demand for agricultural goods and raw materials.
58This relationship between sectoral prices, sectoral exports and the CA/GDP ratio is not restricted to
phases of major external adjustment. It also is present in within-year correlations (see Table 4.15 in
Online Appendix 4.A.4).
59This relationship is robust to an alternative definition of major CA/GDP troughs (see Figure 4.18 in
Online Appendix 4.A.3). It also is present outside of major adjustment periods, in the contemporane-
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Figure 4.3: Sectoral prices and sectoral exports after major CA/GDP-reversals relative to non-reversals




























Notes: CA/GDP-troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm à la Bry and Boschan
(1971): CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. The number
of CA/GDP-troughs thus identified is nine. The disaggregate export data are CPI-deflated.
In sum, the fortunate coincidence of the nominally most flexible sector – agriculture – also
being the most important tradable sector is the main explanation for the ease of external
adjustment under the pre-1913 Gold Standard.60 When hit by a shock that necessitated the
reversal of the current account the agricultural sector produced more of its tradable output,
which was readily absorbed by world markets.61
4.7.2. Terms of trade vs. local prices
While the local price level fell markedly, the terms of trade – the ratio of export prices to import
prices as measured at the port – remained stable (Figure 4.5, left graph).62 This generalizes
the observations made by Viner (1924) and Angell (1926) for Canada, and by Wilson (1931)
and Pope (1986, 1990) for Australia. They noted that the terms of trade moved little during
external adjustments under the GS. How can this well known observation be reconciled with a
price flexibility based explanation of external adjustment?
ous correlations of changes in the CA/GDP ratio with changes in the sectoral shares (see Table 4.17 in
Online Appendix 4.A.4).
60Note that large primary sector shares today are far less associated with benign external adjustments
among developing economies (see Labys and Maizels, 1993; Kinda, Mlachila and Ouedraogo, 2016).
One explanation may lie in the importance of primary product exports for fiscal revenue. Prior to 1913
government spending only made up a small fraction of GDP and revenue losses from lower-priced
agricultural products would primarily be borne by private individuals.
61The sectoral adjustment, away from services and towards tradable primary goods, can be easier to
accomplish against the backdrop of rapid industrialization. Instead of requiring a costly re-allocation
of labor and capital away from the production of non-tradables towards the production of tradables,
external adjustments under the GS simply required a temporary slow-down in the secular transition
from agriculture (primarily tradable) to industry and services (primarily non-tradable).
62The same relationship between the terms of trade, the CPI, and the CA/GDP ratio extends to non-
adjustment periods (see the within-year correlations in Table 4.16 in Online Appendix 4.A.4). It also
is robust to using all visually salient CA/GDP troughs, instead of the lowest CA/GDP-value in a
±10-year window (see Figure 4.17 in Online Appendix 4.A.3).
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Figure 4.4: Sectoral adjustment after major reversals in the CA/GDP-ratio






























Notes: CA/GDP-troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm à la Bry and Boschan
(1971): CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. The number
of CA/GDP-troughs thus identified is nine. VA – value added share. LS – labor share.
To better understand how a stable terms of trade, together with domestic price deflation,
can bring about external adjustment it is worth taking a look at the different price components
that are involved. The terms of trade (ToTt) equals export prices (P˜?H,t) minus import prices
(P˜F,t) as measured at the port:
T̂oTt = ˆ˜P?H,t − ˆ˜PF,t,
where hatted variables denote logarithms.
The log CPI can be written as a weighted sum of non-tradable prices (PN,t) and tradable
prices (PT,t). The latter can be further decomposed into the price of home tradables, as
measured at home (P˜H,t), and the price of foreign tradables, as measured at the port (P˜F,t):
Pˆt = (1− γˇ)PˆN,t + γˇPˆT,t (4.5)
= (1− γˇ)PˆN,t + γˇ
[
αˇ ˆ˜PH,t + (1− αˇ) ˆ˜PF,t
]
,
where γˇ denotes the weight of non-tradables in the overall consumption basket, and αˇ denotes
the share of home tradables among all tradables. In this way, the ToT and CPI can be
decomposed into four price components: P˜?H,t, P˜F,t, PN,t and P˜H,t.
Table 4.7 summarizes the direction of movement of the four price components during
major external adjustments. The table also shows the substitution effect associated with each
of these price movements. These substitution effects have been derived from a straightforward
extension of our GS model by a tradable and non-tradable sector (the full model description is
provided in Appendix 4.A.2).
The export price of H tradable goods (P˜?H,t) and the import price of F tradable goods (P˜F,t)
both fall around 4% two years into the adjustment, resulting in a stable ToT (see Figure 4.5).
Despite falling by an equal amount, however, the fall in export prices is likely to increase
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Figure 4.5: Terms of trade vs. local prices after major reversals in the CA/GDP-ratio
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Notes: CA/GDP-troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm à la Bry and Boschan
(1971): CA/GDP-troughs are defined as the lowest CA/GDP-value in a ±10-year window. The number
of CA/GDP-troughs thus identified is nine.
exports by more than the equivalent fall in import prices increases imports. This is because
the rest of the world is large compared to the local economy.
Next, the local price of H tradable goods (P˜H,t), as indicated by local agricultural prices,
falls by a large amount – around 8% two years into the adjustment (see Figure 4.3). This
is likely to induce a sizeable fall in imports, as domestic consumers substitute towards the
cheaper domestic tradable good.
Also note that the local price of H non-tradable goods (PN,t), as indicated by local service
prices, falls around 4% (see Figure 4.3). This puts pressure on the CPI, and to the extent that
non-tradable inputs enter tradable goods it is part of the explanation for why P˜H,t and P˜?H,t fall.
One loose end remains. Why does the local price of H tradables (P˜H,t) fall by around
twice as much as the export price of the very same tradables (P˜?H,t)? This is consistent with
distributional services driving a wedge between local prices and port prices. Consider that
selling one ton of grain overseas is associated with more distribution costs (e.g. transportation,
warehousing and finding overseas buyers) than selling the same ton of grain locally.63 If the
price for such distribution services is less flexible than the local price for grain, then the port
price for grain – an aggregate of distribution service prices and local grain prices – will display
fewer fluctuations than the local price for grain.
In sum, falling export prices induce a large increase in exports, while falling import prices
and falling local prices have contravening effects on imports. The net result is a stable terms of
trade, a sizeable decrease in the domestic price level and a sizeable increase in exports.
4.7.3. Engel decomposition
Engel (1993) finds that most variation in the real exchange rate today is due to variation in
63Although by the late 19th century important trading centers and coastal cities were internationally
well-integrated there was considerable market segmentation further inland (Uebele, 2011).
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Table 4.7: Local prices, terms of trade and the trade balance
Price Price change Substitution effect
P?H,t (port price of H tradable good) ↓ exports ↑↑
PF,t (port price of F tradable good) ↓ imports ↑
PH,t (local price of H tradable good) ↓↓ imports ↓
Net effects ToT stable, CPI ↓↓ exports ↑↑
tradable goods prices, as opposed to variation in non-tradable goods prices. How does this
compare to the GS era? Engel (1993) decomposes the logarithm of the real exchange rate into
a tradable price component (qT), and a non-tradable price component (qN):
R̂EERt = ĈPIt + N̂EERt − ĈPI?t
= N̂EERt + PˆT,t − Pˆ?T,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡qT
+ (1− γˇ) [(PˆN,t − PˆT,t)− (Pˆ?N,t − Pˆ?T,t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡qN
,
where we have used equation 4.5 to substitute for the CPI terms. PT,t denotes the price of
locally consumed tradables, and PN,t denotes the price of local non-tradables. The F region’s
equivalents are denoted with an asterisk. NEERt denotes the nominal effective exchange
rate and γˇ denotes the weight of non-tradables in the overall consumption basket. All prices
are in logs.64 Table 4.8 shows how the two components qT and qN correlate with the REER.
When port prices are used for PT,t and P?T,t (as suggested by Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo,
2005), the non-tradable price component, qN , is positively correlated with the REER, while the
tradable price component, qT, is not. This is consistent with the earlier finding that external
adjustment under the GS was based on local price deflation.65 When local prices, instead of
port prices, are used to calculate qT and qN (see Engel, 1999), the tradable price component qT
starts to exhibit a significantly positive correlation with the REER. However, the correlation
coefficient for the non-tradable price component, qN , remains significantly positive.
In sum, the data indicate that variation in non-tradable prices played an important role
in overall REER variation under the GS. This stands in contrast to the findings for floating
exchange rate economies today, where most variation in the real exchange rate can be attributed
64We use local service prices as an indicator for local non-tradable prices PˆN,t. The F region’s equivalent,
Pˆ?N,t, is a trade-weighted average of the service prices of all other countries in the sample. With
respect to the tradable price PˆT,t two indicators have been used in the literature. First, port prices,
as suggested by Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005). In this case, export prices are used as an
indicator for the local tradable price PˆT,t, while import prices are used for N̂EERt − Pˆ?T,t. Second, we
use local tradable prices (see Engel, 1999). In this case we use a weighted average of local agricultural
prices and local raw material prices (weighted by value-added sector shares) as our indicator for PˆT,t,
whereas the F equivalent, Pˆ?T,t, is a trade-weighted average of the corresponding prices in all other
countries.
65This finding is also consistent with the finding by Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005) that during
several large devaluations in the 1990s and 2000s, variation in qN accounted for most of the variation
in real exchange rates, if port prices are used as the traded goods price.
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Table 4.8: Engel decomposition
Port prices: Local prices:
∆ REER ∆ REER
ρ p N ρ p N
∆qT 0.019 0.68 456 ∆qT 0.170*** 0.00 287
∆qN 0.162*** 0.00 399 ∆qN 0.107* 0.08 277
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. ρ: Pearson correlation coefficients. p: p-values. N: number of observations.
to variation in tradable prices qT, instead of non-tradable prices qN Engel (1993, 1999).
There exist several plausible explanations for this shift in the composition of real exchange
rate movements: First, non-tradable price variation might be more important for economies
whose exchange rate is fixed. This conforms with recent findings by Berka, Devereux and
Engel (forthcoming), who show that among euro area members, variation in non-tradable
prices plays a more important role for overall REER variation. Second, the finding that
tradable price variation was less important under the GS than today is also consistent with
the fact that tradable goods under the GS (i.e. primary goods) were more homogeneous than
tradable goods today. This would be consistent with the finding by Engel (1993), that for very
homogeneous tradable goods (e.g. bananas) qT explains less real exchange rate variation than
qN . In this way, the 20th century shift away from primary goods production may have changed
the nature of real exchange rate adjustments. Finally, to the extent that services are labor
intensive and wages were less rigid in the late 19th century than they are today, the larger role
of non-tradable prices in adjusting the real exchange rate under the GS can be partly attributed
to more flexible wages.
4.8. Conclusion
How international adjustment worked so smoothly during the 19th century Gold Standard, a
colossus defying most tenets of optimum currency area, has continually fascinated scholars of
international economics. The contribution of the present paper towards a better understanding
of this benign adjustment experience is twofold. First, we built and estimated a structural
model of the Gold Standard. On the basis of the estimated model we quantitatively assessed
the relative importance of three prominent adjustment channels: flexible prices, international
migration, and monetary policy. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the ease of external
adjustment under the Gold Standard was primarily due to flexible prices allowing for speedy
expenditure switching.
Second, we find that price flexibility, and thus benign external adjustments, were predicated
on a historical contingency: large agricultural sectors and the dominance of primary products
among merchandise exports. As still is the case today, agricultural products and raw materials
exhibited much more flexible prices than industrial or service goods. At the same time
agricultural products made up a large part of all merchandise exports, even among early
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industrializers. This fortunate coincidence of the nominally most flexible sector simultaneously
being the most important tradable sector is the main explanation for the ease of external
adjustment under the pre-1913 Gold Standard.
Our findings raise an interesting question with respect to the malfunctioning of the Gold
Standard after World War 1 and its fall in the 1930s, which is often attributed to the rise of
rigid wages (see Bordo, Erceg and Evans, 2000). A sectoral composition-based explanation for
why the 19th century Gold Standard worked well, however, suggests that staying on gold was
becoming increasingly difficult as primary sector shares continued their decline. According
to this line of reasoning the classical Gold Standard had been approaching its date of expiry
independently of the rise of wage rigidity and the unfolding of the tumultuous events after
1913 (see Means, 1936).
Our result also touches upon current problems in the euro area. The pre-1914 Gold
Standard is a prime historical example for a functioning fixed exchange rate regime among
fiscally independent nation states. In this regard the Gold Standard served as a historical
precedent that could be alluded to when the design of the euro area was questioned in
principle. To the extent that our findings attribute its functioning to a fortunate historical





In this section, we present the nonlinear model. In order to save space, we will focus on the
Home region where possible. Foreign equations are analogs to the home ones and foreign
variables are denoted by an asterisk. Small letters denote real variables defined as x = X/P
and x∗ = X∗/P∗.
We first look at the household decision. The household’s two-stage decision involves (i)
the migration decision, and (ii) the decision on hours worked, consumption and savings.
Households are indexed by i. The migration decision is described by the following equations:
Υit = max
{stay, migrate}
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The budget constraint for a F household is:
Bi∗H,t−1R
e

































where the nominal exchange rate et is expressed in quantity notation, i.e. foreign currency
per domestic currency. As explained in the main text, all households within a region make
the same decision, hence we drop the household index i. Writing the real exchange rate as
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lσlt = wt (4.A.7)
l∗t
σl = w∗t (4.A.8)
The population evolves according to
nt = nt−1 (1− dt) + d∗t n∗t−1 (4.A.9)
n∗t = 1− nt (4.A.10)



























The first order condition leads to



















































Kt = Ft (4.A.16)

































γ dj denotes the price dispersion. The monetary side of the model is
described by the following four equations












PH,t n yt = exp(χt) Mt k(Rt) (4.A.20)
Gt = Gt−1 + F(et) exp(em,t) (4.A.21)
γt Mt = PgGt, (4.A.22)
The market clearing conditions are

















0 = nt BH,t + n∗t B∗H,t (4.A.25)















TBt = n∗t c∗H,tPH,t − ntcF,tPF,t (4.A.30)

























We log-linearize the nonlinear model around a steady state with zero inflation, constant
population and βR = 1 . Steady state values are denoted by a bar symbol. From (4.A.4) and




βR¯d¯ . It is
easy to see that βR¯ = 1, a standard assumption in the literature, is a solution to the equation.
We also have















From (4.A.15), (4.A.16), and (4.A.16) and the corresponding equations for F, we obtain


















The steady state labor supply satisfies
l¯σl = w¯ (4.A.40)
(l¯∗)σl = w¯∗ (4.A.41)
At the steady state, the asset pooling assumption gives us
n¯ b¯ = n (1− d¯) (b¯H R¯ + b¯FR¯/E¯r) + d¯∗ (1− n¯) (b¯∗H R¯ + b¯∗FR¯/E¯r)
(1− n¯) b¯∗ = (1− n¯) (1− d¯∗) (b¯∗FR¯ + b¯∗H R¯E¯r) + d¯ n¯ (b¯FR¯ + b¯H R¯E¯r)
Using the steady state bond market clearing conditions and writing real net foreign assets as
Ω¯ ≡ b¯H + b¯F/E¯r, we have
n¯ b¯ = R¯ (1− d¯− d¯∗) Ω¯n¯
(1− n¯) b¯∗/E¯r = −R¯ (1− d¯− d¯∗) Ω¯n¯













y¯∗/E¯r = n¯ c¯ + (1− n¯) c¯∗/E¯r (4.A.42)
which reflects the resources constraint of the whole economy in terms of H currency. The
goods and labor market clearing conditions imply
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c¯∗ (1− n¯) (4.A.43)










(1− n¯) c¯∗ (4.A.44)
y¯ = A¯ l¯γ (4.A.45)
y¯∗ = A¯∗ (l¯∗)γ (4.A.46)
Prices in the steady state satisfy











Finally, the steady state populations satisfy d¯ n¯ = d¯∗ (1− n¯). We solve for c¯, c¯∗, E¯r, P¯HP¯ ,
P¯∗F
P¯∗ , y¯, y¯
∗,
l¯, l¯∗, λ¯, λ¯∗, w¯, w¯∗ using equations (4.A.35) - (4.A.47).
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Log-linearized Model
In this section, we present the complete log-linearized model equation system that is used in the
Bayesian estimation. Lower-case variables with a hat symbol represent logarithmic deviations





the first difference (∆x̂t = x̂t − x̂t−1). κ˜ denotes the slope of the Phillips curve, which is related
to the structural parameters β, γ, µ and θ according to κ˜ = (1− βθ)(1− θ)/[1/θ(1− µ + µ/γ)].
We introduce also Ωˆ ≡ b¯H bˆH,t + E¯tb¯F bˆF,t.
(4.A.48)λˆt =
(−σc)
c¯ (1− h)− 11+σl (l¯)1+σl
(




(1− h) c¯∗ − 11+σl (l¯∗)1+σl
(
c¯∗ cˆ∗t − (l¯∗)1+σl lˆ∗t
)
(4.A.50)λˆt = R̂et − EtΠ̂t+1 +
(
1− d¯) Etλˆt+1 + d¯ (Etλˆ∗t+1 +EtÊr,t+1)
(4.A.51)λˆ∗t = Rˆe∗t − EtΠ̂∗t+1 + λˆ∗t+1
(
1− d¯∗) + d¯∗ (Etλˆt+1 − EtÊr,t+1)
(4.A.52)Rˆet = Rˆ
e∗
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(4.A.67)Rˆet = Rˆt + e
b
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(4.A.73)γˆt = ∆Ĝt + γˆt−1 − ∆M̂t
(4.A.74)γˆ∗t = ∆Ĝ∗t + γˆ∗t−1 − ∆M̂∗t
(4.A.75)Eˆr,t = Πˆ∗t − eˆt − Eˆrt−1 + eˆt−1 − Πˆt
(4.A.76)tˆbt t¯b =
(








− (cˆt + nˆt) c¯ n
(4.A.77)nˆt − nˆt−1 = d¯
(
dˆ∗t + nˆ∗t−1 − dˆt − nˆt−1
)
(4.A.78)nˆ∗t − nˆ∗t−1 = d¯∗
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(4.A.79)wˆt = σl lˆt




































(4.A.89)emt = ρm e
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x∗ eχ∗t−1 − ηx∗t
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For the monetary policy counterfactual (no independence) we eliminated the freedom central
banks enjoyed in setting their discount rates by assuming that H has to adjust its interest rate
to ensure an absolutely fixed exchange rate, while F – a much larger region than H – sets its
discount rate as estimated. In particular, we substitute the monetary policy equation in the















+ φ˜e eˆt ,
The last term (φ˜e > 0) is necessary to ensure eˆt = 0 (see Benigno and Benigno, 2008). In our
counterfactual, we assume φ˜e = 0.01.
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4.A.2. An extended model with sectoral structure
This section presents an extended GS model that explicitly models a tradable and non-tradable
goods producing sector. The model throws light on two salient features of external adjustment
under the GS: First, external adjustment under the GS was closely intertwined with its sectoral
structure. Second, the terms of trade remained relatively stable during external adjustments
under the GS, while the domestic price level deflated. This section shows how both of these
features are naturally accommodated by a two-sector model with distribution services.66
Finally, counterfactual simulations based on an estimated version of the extended model also
constitute a robustness check for the papers main result (see Online Appendix 4.A.3).
To keep the model description short, it focuses on the H region where possible. F equations
are analogs to the H ones, and foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. Small letters
denote real variables, defined as x = X/P and x∗ = X∗/P∗.
The extension mainly affects the households’ decision regarding the allocation of expenses on
different consumption bundles, as well as the price dynamics and the market clearing conditions. The
H-households’ consumption ct consists of non-tradable goods and retail tradable goods. The retail
tradable goods themselves are composed of wholesale tradable goods and non-tradable services –
e.g. local retail services. Here, for simplicity, we model the final goods directly as a CES composite
















the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods, and γ˜ reflects the households’
relative preference.
















. e˜ denotes the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
foreign goods. If α˜ > n, the household exhibits home bias.
H produced wholesale tradable goods are a combination of H produced tradable inputs IH,t and H















with φ˜ denoting the weight of
tradable inputs, and ψ˜ denoting the elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable inputs.
To illustrate, locally sold agricultural goods are composed of the agricultural product itsself (e.g. grain)
and local services (e.g. utility and financial services).
















with φˇ ≤ φ˜ reflecting that imported goods require more distribution services already in the region of
origin. For example, selling one ton of grain locally involves less services than selling the same ton of
grain overseas, because selling overseas requires finding overseas buyers through export companies, as
well as more transportation services.
The tradable goods and non-tradable goods themselves are bundles of differentiated goods that
















































where j is the firm index and µ is the elasticity of substitution between goods produced in the same
























The H consumer price index is then given by Pt =
[
γ˜P1−λ˜T,t + (1− γ˜)P1−λ˜N,t
] 1
1−λ˜
. PT,t is the local
wholesale price of tradable consumption goods cT,t: PT,t =
[
α˜P˜1−e˜H,t + (1− α˜)P˜1−e˜F,t
] 1
1−e˜
, where P˜H,t and
P˜F,t are the prices for H-produced and imported goods, inclusive of prices for the tradable inputs PH,t,
P∗F,t, as well as the prices for the non-tradable inputs PN,t, P∗N,t.
We have P˜H,t =
[

















































. It is worth pointing out that
the law of one price does not hold due to distribution service costs.
On the production side, firms’ optimization problem is only slightly affected by the extension. It
is assumed that there exist sector-specific technology shocks – At for the tradable sector and AN,t for
the non-tradable sector. Depending on whether the firm is operating in the tradable goods or the
non-tradable goods sector, it has the chance to reset its price with probability (1− θT) or (1− θN). When
it can change prices, it optimizes over PH,t(j) or PN,t(j) while taking into account its demand schedule


























where lT and yT denote H primary sector employment and average output. The resulting first order
conditions and price dynamics are very similar to those of the model without the sectoral structure.
The optimization of a firm in the non-tradable sector is analogous.
















lt = lT,t + lN,t, (4.A.98)
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The goods market clearing conditions take into account tradable and non-tradable goods:
n yT,t(j) = nt IH,t(j) + (1− nt)I∗H,t(j) (4.A.99)
n yN,t(j) = nt cN,t(j) + nt VH,t(j) + (1− nt)V∗H,t(j) (4.A.100)
(1− n) y∗T,t(j) = nt IF,t(j) + (1− nt)I∗F,t(j) (4.A.101)
(1− n) y∗N,t(j) = (1− nt) c∗N,t(j) + (1− nt)V∗F,t(j) + nt VF,t(j) (4.A.102)





Pt yN,t. This average output enters the monetary policy reaction functions, as well as the
money demand equations.
Terms of trade and local prices
Section 4.7.2 in the main text describes the price movements that accompanied external adjustment
under the GS. The following uses the extended model to discuss the substitution effects that each of
these price movements gives rise to. The terms of trade in the extended model measures the ratio of
export prices to import prices at the port. The log-linearized terms of trade is
T̂oTt = ˆ˜P?H,t − ˆ˜PF,t.
The CPI in the extended model can also be written as follows (see equation 4.5 in the main text):
Pˆt = (1− γˇ)PˆN,t + γˇ
[
αˇ ˆ˜PH,t + (1− αˇ) ˆ˜PF,t
]
,











How do the different price components that define the terms of trade and the CPI affect real imports
and real exports? From the model, we have the following demand schedules that describe how prices
affect H-households’ and F-households’ demand for imported goods:











Using these demand schedules, we can write the log-linearized real imports to H (IMt = cF,tnt) as
















)1−e˜ ˆ˜PH,t + (1− α˜) ( P˜FPT )1−e˜ ˆ˜PF,t, as well as
the steady state definition of PT . The equation demonstrates that a unit drop in the import price ( ˆ˜PF,t)





. Furthermore, a unit increase in the local price
of tradable goods ( ˆ˜PH,t) would have exactly the opposite effect on imports. As discussed in section 7.2,
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during major external adjustments, the local price of tradable goods falls by more than the import price.
This implies a net reduction in H-imports.
Real H-exports (EXt = c?H,tn
?
t ) in log-linearized form can be written as





















)1−e˜? ˆ˜P?F,t + (1− α˜?) ( P˜?HP?T )1−e˜? ˆ˜P?H,t, as well
as the steady state definition of P?T . A one unit decrease in the H-export price (
ˆ˜P?H,t) leads to an increase






For an equal fall in H-import prices ( ˆ˜PF,t) and H-export prices ( ˆ˜P?H,t), the increase in exports will
exceed the increase in imports. The reason for this is that the H-region is smaller than the F-region
(n < 1− n ≡ n?). Absent home bias (i.e. n = α˜ and n? = α˜?), this implies that a fall in export prices
increases exports by more than an equivalent fall in import prices increases imports. This remains the
case for all realistic degrees of home bias.67
Sectoral structure and external adjustment: model vs. data
Here, in order to show that the extended model naturally accommodates features of external adjustment
under the GS, we compare simulated moments to the data. For the most part, the extended model is
calibrated according to the baseline model estimation for the U.K. (see Table 4.1, Table 4.5.5 and Table
4.5.5).
The extended model’s additional parameters are calibrated as follows: The shares of tradable goods
in final consumption (γ˜, γ˜?) are calibrated to target the U.K.’s share of tradable value added relative to
total value added (47%), and the sample average of tradable value added relative to total value added
(40%). For this we rely on the sectoral share data provided by Buera and Kaboski (2012), defining
services as non-tradable and all other sectors as tradable. The weights of domestically produced goods
in tradable goods (α˜, α˜?) are calibrated to target the U.K. import-to-GDP and export-to-GDP ratios, as
in the baseline model calibration. According to input-output tables the share of non-tradable inputs in
tradable goods (1− φ˜) was around 10% during the GS era. More specifically, based on the Swedish
input-output table for 1913 (Bohlin, 2007), non-tradable inputs to the tradable sector amounted to 5.4%
of the total tradable sector’s output. The corresponding number for the U.K., as calculated from the
British input-output table for 1907 (Meyer, 1955), is higher, at 11.3%.68 Thus, a value of 10% for 1− φ˜
is of the right order of magnitude. For export goods, φˇ is chosen to reflect a 40% transportation cost,
which implies that the export good consists of 60% tradable wholesale goods.69
67Only extreme degrees of home bias in the H region, and an extreme preference of the F region for H
goods can overturn this.
68As φ˜ reflects the non-tradable input in a wholesale product, we would ideally distinguish retail
distribution services from other non-tradable inputs. However, the historical input-output tables for
Sweden and the U.K. do not provide this degree of granularity.
69This is in line with origin-destination spreads for agricultural produce (Wilson and Dahl, 2011). For
example, the price spread between corn prices in Minneapolis (the origin region) and corn prices in
Georgia or the Pacific North West (ports for export) lies in the 12 to 25% range (Yu et al., 2006). On
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Concerning the intra-temporal elasticity, we follow Berka, Devereux and Engel (forthcoming)
in assuming an elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and non-tradable goods of 0.7
(λ˜ = λ˜? = 0.7), an elasticity of substitution between tradable goods and services of 0.25 (ψ˜ = ψ˜? = 0.25),
and a trade elasticity of 8 (e˜ = e˜? = 8).70
The introduction of a sectoral structure also results in four Phillips curves, that determine the price
evolution of PH,t, PN,t, P?H,t, and P
?
N,t. To reflect the price rigidity in the non-tradable sector, we set
the Phillips curve slopes for the non-tradable goods κ˜N , and κ˜∗N to 0.05. This value corresponds to an
average price duration of around 4.5 quarters, which is within the range of price rigidity estimates
for advanced economies today. The Phillips curve slopes for the tradable goods are set to target a
weighted average Phillip curve slope (weighted according to value-added sector shares), which equals
the aggregate Phillips curve slope of 0.35 in the baseline estimation. This results in κ˜T = κ˜∗T = 0.65.
The simulation results are presented in Table 4.9. As in the data, increases in the CA/GDP ratio
in the model are associated with an increase in tradable sector size and a decrease in non-tradable
sector size (Table 4.9 panel A). The sectoral prices in the model also behave similarly to the data: the
tradable prices drop during external adjustments while non-tradable prices stay more stable (panel B).
The model is able to generate a relatively stable terms of trade and a larger fall in the CPI when the
CA/GDP ratio increases (panel C). Finally, the model matches the observed correlation between export
and import prices (panel D).
top of this, international overseas transport under the GS drove another 10 to 20% wedge between
origin and destination port prices (see Persson, 2004).
70 The higher elasticity estimates obtained from industry- and product-level data are more relevant for
the two-sector model, whereas the lower trade elasticity estimates obtained from aggregate trade data
are more in line with the single good baseline model (see Bas, Mayer and Thoenig, 2017).
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Table 4.9: Correlation between external adjustments, sectoral size and prices
∆ CA / GDP
Model Data
Panel A: Sectoral sizes




Panel B: Sectoral prices
∆ Tradable prices -0.36 -0.22
∆ Non-tradable prices 0.16 -0.05
Panel C: ToT and CPI
∆ Terms of trade -0.11 0.07
∆ CPI -0.21 -0.15
Panel D: Export and import prices
∆ Export prices
∆ Import prices 0.52 0.59
Notes: The model moments are calculated on the basis of 2000 34-year simulations of the extended
model. For more details on the stochastic simulation, see Section 4.6. Non-tradable sector share was
approximated by tertiary sector share. Tradable sector share was approximated by primary sector share.
Tradable prices were approximated by agricultural and raw material prices. Non-tradable prices were
approximated by service sector prices.
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4.A.3. Data appendix
An annual macrodataset on 14 Gold Standard economies, 1870-1913
Australia: Nominal GDP: Mitchell (2013). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursúa (2010).
CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary gold
flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). nominal USD-exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003). Immigration & emigration: Ferenczi (1929). Population: Mitchell (2013). Narrow and
broad cover ratio: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (gold) and Mitchell (2013) (notes and deposits).
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value
added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Mitchell (2013). Agricultural,
raw material and industrial exports: Coghlan (1901) (1880-1898), Statistical abstract for the
several British colonies, possessions, and protectorates (1899-1900) and Official year book of
the Commonwealth of Australia (1901-1912). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service
prices: Butlin (1962). Terms of trade: Wilson (1931). Export prices: Wilson (1931).
Belgium: Nominal GDP: Smits, Woltjer and Ma (2009). Real per capita GDP: Barro and
Ursúa (2010). CPI: National Bank of Belgium Services Statistiques Financières et Économiques
(2012), Table: Indice des prix à la Consommation en Belgique. Current account: exports -
imports. Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Schneider et al.
(1991) (1870-1880) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1913). Immigration & emigration:
Mitchell (2013). Population: Annuaire statistique de la Belgique. Central bank discount rate:
National Bank of Belgium (1870-1879) and Flandreau and Zumer (2004) (1880-1913). Narrow
and broad cover ratio: Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Geschäftsverkehr
wichtiger europäischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013).
Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012).
Agricultural labor share: Mitchell (2013). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports:
Annuaire statistique de la Belgique. Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices:
Smits, Woltjer and Ma (2009) and Global prices and incomes database (raw materials). Terms
of trade: Horlings (1998).
Canada: Nominal GDP: Jones and Obstfeld (2004). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursúa
(2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary
gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Schneider et al.
(1991) (1870-1899 & 1909-1913) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1900-1908). Immigration &
emigration: Urquhart and Buckley (1965) & Viner (1924). Population: Maddison-Project (2013).
Narrow and broad cover ratio: Leacy, Urquhart and Buckley (1983). Notes in circulation:
Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and
Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Urquhart and Buckley (1965) Historical Statistics of
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Canada (1881) & Mitchell (2013) (1891-1911). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports:
Statistical yearbook of Canada (1870-1904) and Canada yearbook (1905-1913). Agricultural,
raw material, industrial and service prices: Urquhart and Buckley (1965) Historical Statistics of
Canada. Terms of trade: Urquhart and Buckley (1965) Historical Statistics of Canada. Export
prices: Urquhart and Buckley (1965) Historical Statistics of Canada.
Denmark: Nominal GDP: Mitchell (2013). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursúa (2010).
CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary gold
flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Denzel (2010) (1870-
1880), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1912) and Officer (2015) (1913). Emigration: Mitchell
(2013). Population: Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank discount rate: Johansen (1985)
(1870-1874) and Abildgren (2005) (1875-1913) . Narrow and broad cover ratio: Johansen (1985).
Notes in circulation: Johansen (1985). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value
added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Henriksen (2009). Agricultural,
raw material and industrial exports: Henriksen (2009) (1874-1883), Statistical abstract for the
principal and other foreign countries. (1884-1912) and Statistisk årbog (1913). Agricultural,
raw material, industrial and service prices: Hansen (1974). Terms of trade: Johansen (1985).
Export prices: Johansen (1985).
Finland: Nominal GDP: Hjerppe (1989). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursúa (2010).
CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary gold
flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Autio (1992) (1870-
1880) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1913). Immigration & emigration: Ferenczi (1929).
Population: Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank discount rate: Autio (1996). Narrow and
broad cover ratio: Ikonen (1998). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and
tertiary sector shares (value added): Hjerppe (1989). Agricultural labor share: Hjerppe (1989).
Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Hjerppe (1989) (1875-1880) and Statistical
yearbook of Finland (1877 & 1882-1913). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service
prices: Smits, Woltjer and Ma (2009). Terms of trade: Hjerppe (1989). Export prices: Hjerppe
(1989).
France: Nominal GDP: Mitchell (2013). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursúa (2010).
CPI: Piketty and Zucman (2014). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for
monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate:
Denzel (2010) (1870-1880), Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1912) and Officer (2015) (1913).
Emigration: Mitchell (2013) (1870-1890) and Ferenczi (1929) (1891-1913). Population: Maddison-
Project (2013). Central bank discount rate: De Jong (1967) (1870-1879) and Flandreau and
Zumer (2004) (1880-1913). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik:
Organisation und Geschäftsverkehr wichtiger europäischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925).
Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value
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added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Mitchell (2013), CEPII series
longues macroeconomiques. Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Statistical
abstract for the principal and other foreign countries. Agricultural, raw material, industrial
and service prices: Brandau (1936) (agricultural & raw material) and Smits, Woltjer and Ma
(2009) (industrial and service). Terms of trade: White (1933). Export prices: White (1933).
Germany: Nominal GDP: Burhop and Wolff (2005). Real per capita GDP: Barro and
Ursúa (2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for
monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Sensch (2009) (1872-1879) and Mitchell (2013)
(1880-1913). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Denzel (2010) (1870-1886) and Statistisches Jahrbuch
für das Deutsche Reich (various issues). Emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population: Mitchell
(2013). Central bank discount rate: Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und
Geschäftsverkehr wichtiger europäischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925) (1870-1879) and
Flandreau and Zumer (2004) (1880-1913). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Vergleichende
Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Geschäftsverkehr wichtiger europäischer Notenbanken,
1876-1913 (1925). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector
shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Broadberry (2009)
(1871 & 1913) and Mitchell (2013) (1882-1907). Agricultural, raw material and industrial
exports: Sensch (2009). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices: Hoffmann
(1965) and Müssig (1919) (raw material). Terms of trade: Desai (2005). Export prices: Desai
(2005).
Netherlands: Nominal GDP: Smits, Horlings and van Zanden (2000). Real per capita GDP:
Barro and Ursúa (2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Smits, Horlings and van Zanden
(2000). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor
(2003). Immigration & emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population: Bie and Smits (2001). Central
bank discount rate: De Jong (1967) (1870-1875), Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation
und Geschäftsverkehr wichtiger europäischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925) (1876-1879) and
Flandreau and Zumer (2004) (1880-1913). Narrow cover ratio: De Jong (1967) (1870-1875) and
Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation und Geschäftsverkehr wichtiger europäischer
Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925) (1876-1913). Broad cover ratio: De Jong (1967). Notes in
circulation: De Jong (1967). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera
and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Van Zanden, J.L., National Accounts of the
Netherlands, 1800-1913. Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Statistical abstract
for the principal and other foreign countries. Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service
prices: Van Zanden, J.L., National Accounts of the Netherlands, 1800-1913 and Van Riel (2000).
Terms of trade: Bie and Smits (2001). Export prices: Bie and Smits (2001).
New Zealand: Nominal GDP: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). Real per capita GDP: Barro and
Ursúa (2010). CPI: Thorns and Sedgwick (1997). Current account: exports - imports. Exports
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& imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Officer (2015) (GBP-USD exchange
rate). Immigration & emigration: Ferenczi (1929). Population: Maddison-Project (2013). Notes
in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Agricultural labor share: New Zealand Censuses (various issues
1871-1916). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Statistics of the colony of New
Zealand (1875-1907) and The New Zealand official yearbook (1908-1913). Agricultural, raw
material, industrial and service prices: Arnold (1982) (agricultural) and McIlraith (1911) (raw
material). Terms of trade: McIlraith (1911). Export prices: McIlraith (1911).
Norway: Nominal GDP: Grytten (2004). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursúa (2010). CPI:
Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary gold flows).
Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Obstfeld and Taylor (2003).
Emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population: Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank discount
rate: Norges Bank Historical Monetary Statistics. Narrow and broad cover ratio: Norges Bank
Historical Monetary Statistics. Notes in circulation: Norges Bank Historical Monetary Statistics.
Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Grytten (2015). Agricultural labor
share: Statistisk Aarbok (various issues). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports:
Statistical abstract for the principal and other foreign countries. Agricultural, raw material,
industrial and service prices: Klovland (2013) and Grytten (2015). Terms of trade: Klovland
(2013). Export prices: Klovland (2013).
Sweden: Nominal GDP: Edvinsson (2004). Real per capita GDP: Barro and Ursúa (2010).
CPI: Taylor (2002). Current account: Jones and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary gold
flows). Exports & imports: Schön (2015). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Denzel (2010) (1870-
1880) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1913). Immigration & emigration: Mitchell (2013).
Population: Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank discount rate: Edvinsson, Jacobson and
Waldenström (2010). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Swedish Riksbank Historical Monetary
Statistics of Sweden. Notes in circulation: Swedish Riksbank Historical Monetary Statistics
of Sweden. Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski
(2012). Agricultural labor share: Schön, Krantz et al. (2012). Agricultural, raw material and
industrial exports: Schön (2015). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices:
Swedish Historical National Accounts 1560-2010, The 2015 release. Terms of trade: Schön
(2015). Export prices: Schön (2015).
Switzerland: Nominal GDP: Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer (1996). Real per capita GDP: Barro
and Ursúa (2010). CPI: Taylor (2002). Exports & imports: Ritzmann-Blickenstorfer (1996)
(1870-1884) and Mitchell (2013) (1885-1913). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Denzel (2010) (1870-
1880) and Obstfeld and Taylor (2003) (1881-1913). Emigration: Mitchell (2013). Population:
Mitchell (2013). Central bank discount rate: Swiss National Bank (SNB) Historical Time
Series: average of discount rates in Geneva, Basel, Zurich and St Gallen (1870-1893), Flandreau
and Zumer (2004) (1894-1906) and SNB central bank discount rate (1907-1913). Narrow and
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broad cover ratio: SNB Historical Time Series. Notes in circulation: SNB Historical Time
Series. Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012).
Agricultural labor share: Historical Statistics of Switzerland Online (1870-1880) and Mitchell
(2013) (1890-1910). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Statistical abstract for the
principal and other foreign countries. Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices:
Historical Statistics of Switzerland Online. Terms of trade: Historical Statistics of Switzerland
Online. Export prices: Historical Statistics of Switzerland Online.
United Kingdom: Nominal GDP: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2015). Real per capita GDP:
Barro and Ursúa (2010). CPI: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2015). Current account: Jones
and Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Hills, Thomas
and Dimsdale (2015). Nominal USD-exchange rate: Officer (2015). Immigration & emigration:
Mitchell (2013). Population: Maddison-Project (2013). Central bank discount rate: Hills,
Thomas and Dimsdale (2015) (1870-1875), Vergleichende Notenbankstatistik: Organisation
und Geschäftsverkehr wichtiger europäischer Notenbanken, 1876-1913 (1925) (1876-1879) and
Flandreau and Zumer (2004) (1880-1913). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Bank of England
Historical Balance Sheet. Notes in circulation: Bank of England Historical Balance Sheet.
Primary, secondary and tertiary sector shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012).
Agricultural labor share: Mitchell (2013). Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports:
Statistical abstract for the United Kingdom. Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service
prices: Clark (2004) (agricultural), Layton and Crowther (1935) (raw material) and Feinstein
(1972) (industrial and service). Terms of trade: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2015). Export
prices: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2015).
United States: Nominal GDP: Johnston and Williamson (2011). Real per capita GDP: Barro
and Ursúa (2010). CPI: Hills, Thomas and Dimsdale (2015). Current account: Jones and
Obstfeld (2004) (adjusted for monetary gold flows). Exports & imports: Mitchell (2013).
Immigration & emigration: Mitchell (2013) (immigration) and Ferenczi (1929) (emigration).
Population: Maddison-Project (2013). Narrow and broad cover ratio: Jones and Obstfeld
(2004) (gold), Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED (silver and foreign exchange), Mitchell
(2013) (notes). Notes in circulation: Mitchell (2013). Primary, secondary and tertiary sector
shares (value added): Buera and Kaboski (2012). Agricultural labor share: Mitchell (2013).
Agricultural, raw material and industrial exports: Statistical abstract for the principal and
other foreign countries (1870-1906) and Department of Commerce and Labor of Commerce
and of Statistics (1907) (1907-1913). Agricultural, raw material, industrial and service prices:
Historical Statistics of the United States 1789-1945 (agricultural & industrial) and Brandau
(1936) (raw material). Terms of trade: Lipsey (1963). Export prices: Lipsey (1963).
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Sectoral exports
Table 4.10: Export categories
Country Disaggregate export component series:
Agricultural Raw material Industrial
Australia 1880-1898: wool, tallow, butter, live
stock, meat, sugar, wheat and flour,
jams, fruit, potatoes and other
vegetable products.
1899-1900: butter, flour, fodder,
fruit (green), grain (oats and
wheat), hay and chaff, hides, live
stock (horses), cold-preserved meat
(beef), mutton and lamb, rabbits
and hares, meat (preserved in tins),
oil (cocoanut in bulk), skins (sheep
and other), sugar (cane and other),
tallow, wine (fermented), wool (in
the grease and scoured).
1901-1912: animal foodstuffs etc.,
vegetable foodstufs etc., beverages
(non-alcoholic), alcoholic liquors,
tobacco, live animals, animal
substances, vegetable substances.
1880-1898: coal, silver (lead and
ore), tin, copper, hides and skins,
gold, minerals, timber,
sandal-wood, pearl shell, pearls,
guano.
1899-1900: bark (for tanning), coal,
coke, copper (ore, ingots, bars)
gold, lead (pig and matte),
pearlshell, silver and silverware,
silver (lead ), skins (rabbit, hare and
other), tin (ore and ingots), wood
and timber, gold and silver buillion.
1901-1912: oils, stones, metals
(ores), wood.





Belgium 1870-1913: starch, bovine, ovine,
swines, horses, beers, canned
cheese, other canned foods, butter,
flour, bran/food/starch/moutures,
grains, milk and cheese, vegetables
(and potatoes), eggs, bread/sea
biscuit/macaroni etc., fish, rice,
meat, mixed delicacies, fruits,
alcoholic drinks/liquor/brandies,
animal fats, other animal products,
crops and fodder, beets, hop, yeast,
plants and flowers, vegetables
(non-specified), wine
1870-1913: wood (construction and
other), coffee, rubber (raw and
processed), black coal, coke, salt
(raw), linen and hemp rags,
oils/food and other, lime, iron and
steel filings, sulfur, other minerals,
steel (raw and ingots), copper and
nickel, iron (raw and old),
gold/silver and platinum, lead,
zinc, other metals, raw skins, stones
(raw and finished), resin and
bitumen, sugar (raw), tobacco, bark,
seeds (oily), seeds (other), broken
glass and cullet
1870-1913: arms, candles, ropes,
salt refined, drugs, fertilizer, yarn
(cotton, wool, goat hair, linen and
silk), clothing, cars and streetcars,
other machines, textiles (hemp,
cotton, etoupes, jute, wool, linen,
silk, other), haberdashery and
ironmongery, iron (processed),
furniture, watches, art objects,
paper, prepared skin, processed
skin, pottery, chemicals, various
products for industry,
typographical products, soap, sugar
(refined), tinctures and colors,
tissues (cotton, wool, linen, jute,
hemp, silk, not specified), tulles
(lace trimming and satin lace),
glasswares, cars
Canada 1870-1913: products of fisheries,
animals and produts of,
agricultural product
1870-1913: prodcts of mines,
products of forest (raw)
1870-1913: products of the forest
(manufactured and partially
manufactured), manufactures
Denmark 1870-1873: meat and cattle, pork
and pigs, butter, other animal,
cereals, flour, grains and bread,
other vegetable, food, drink.
1874-1883: agricultural exports.
1870-1873: hides and skins.
1884-1912: coal, coffee (raw), coffee
(roasted), oil/petroleum and other,
sugar (raw and refined), tobacco,
wood.
1870-1873: goods of iron and metal
industry, texile and clothing,
articles of stone/clay and glass
industry, other industrial goods.
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1884-1912: horses, cattle, sheep and
goats, swine, beer, butter (in
hermetically sealed boxes), eggs,
fish (except shell fish, fresh), fish
(preserved and salted), barley,
wheat, wheat flour, lard and fat,
meat (incl. hams and sausages),
rice flour, seeds (oleaginous and
other), spirits/brandy and other,
wool (raw).
1913: living animals, animal
products, cereals, fodder, garden
products and fruit, beverages and





minerals (raw or drafted), other
metals
1884-1912: hides and skins
(prepared and manufactured), iron
and steel manufactures, wool
manufactures.
1913: textile materials, yarn, textile






and fertilizers, mineral products,
ships/cars/machines and
instruments.
Finland 1875-1880: agricultural exports.
1882-1891: butter, meat, milk,
cheese, horses, cattle, pigs, other
live animal, corn (grain), corn (flour
and groats), fish, poultry, fruits,
yarn, hay, vegetables and
horticultural products, canned food,
drinks.
1892-1913: living animals, other
animal products (meat etc.), fish,
starch foods, horticultural products
and potatos, fruits and berries,
canned shellfish, drinks, animal
products (bones, horns, hair),
plants/seeds/vegetable materials.
1875-1880: forestry, wood industry.
1882-1891: wood, firewood, iron
and steel, skins, tar pitch, cumin,
willow bark, potash, colonial goods
(spices and tobacco), other animal
products, oils and fats, minerals
(raw and products thereof), metal.
1892-1913: colonial goods, skin and
leather, pelts, wood (raw and
products), resin and tar, oils and
fats, minerals (raw and processed),
metals.
1875-1880: paper, textile industry,
metal and engineering industries,
other manufacturing.
1882-1891: wood pulp, paper and
cardboard, leather, glassworks,
wallpapers, pottery and
earthenware, textiles and tissue,
yarn, woodworks, candles, ships,
drugs, clothes/hats/caps,
cosmetics, chemicals, explosives
and accelerants, colors and
tinctures, machines, instruments,
cars, artistic goods, luxury goods.
1892-1913: paper and carton,
spinning products yarn, tissues,
clothing/hats/caps, cosmetics,
chemical products, explosives and
accelerants, colors and tinctures,
machines, instruments, car, ships,
artistic works, luxury products.
France 1870-1913: horses, other animals,
brandy and other spirits, butter,
margarine, cheese, cotton (raw),
eggs, fruit (fresh and preserved),
grain and flour, oil cake, sardines
(preserved in oil), potatoes, other
sorts of vegetables (fresh or
preserved), wine, wool (raw).
1870-1913: hides (raw), iron/steel
and manufactures of), pig iron,
steel ingots/billets etc., oils (volatile
and essential), rags (wollen), silk
(raw, thronw, waste and cocoons),
sugar (raw and refined), wood
(common).
1870-1913:chemical products, colors
and dyes (prepared), copper wire,
cotton yarn, cotton manufactures
(piece goods, unbleached, bleached,
dyed, printed, mixed), lace and
patent net, hosiery and knitted
wares, trimmings, earthen and
china ware, flax and hemp yarns,
glass and glass wares,
haberdashery/small fancy wares
and toys, hides (tanned or curried),
rails, other partly wrought iron,
constructional iron and steel
(manufactured), enamelled and
tinned wares, all other
manufactures, jewellery, leather
wares (boots and shoes, gloves and
other), machines and machinery
(and parts thereof), metal wares
and tools (except of iron and steel),
medicines (prepared), millinery,
motor cars and vehicles, paper (and
manufactures thereof), perfumery
and toilet soaps, silk (spun), silk
and waste silk (tissues, gauze, lace
and ribbons), soap, wool yarn, wool
manufactures, cloths/casimirs and
similar tissues, dress stuffs of pure
wool, stuffs of wool mixed with
other materials.




Netherlands 1878-1889: animals living (cattle,
sheep and pigs), animals (horses),
bran, butter, cheese, cotton (raw),
fish (fresh, preserved, incl. salmon),
flax (raw), grain and flour, wheat
and wheat flour, ryea and rye flour,
oats and oats flour, margarine and
artificial butter, margarine (oleo),
rice and rice flour, spirits (incl.
liqueurs), tallow and lard,
vegetables (fresh and preserved),
wool (raw), yeast.
1878-1889: articles of food and live
animals.
1878-1889: copper (ore and
unwrought), guano, hair of all sorts
(unmanufactured), hides and skins
(raw), indigo, iron and steel (pig
iron), madder, oil (seeds), palm oil,




1878-1889: candles, cotton (yarn
and manufactures), drugs
(Peruvian bark and other), dye
stuffs, iron bars (rails etc.), iron
wares (incl. nails and wire), steel
and manufactres, machinery of all
kinds, wool (yarn and
manufactures).
1878-1889: manufactured articles
New Zealand 1870-1874: wool, meat, butter, dairy,
grain.
1875-1880: wool, tallow, hides,
sheepskins, rabbitskins, flour, bran
and sharps, wheat, barley, malt,
oats, oatmeal, potatoes, hops,
butter, cheese, bacon and hams, salt
beef and pork, preserved meats,
frozen meat, whalebone, sealskins,
whale oil (black and sperm whales),
1881-1913: the fisheries, animals
and produce, agricultural products.
1870-1874: timber, gum, gold
1875-1880: gold, silver, coal, kauri
gum, timber (sawn and hewn, logs,
spars, laths, palings, posts and shii).
1881-1913: the mine, the forest.
1875-1880: leather, cordage,
phormium (New Zealand hemp),
1881-1913: manufactures.
Norway 1878-1900: horses, beer, fish (fresh),
cod (dried or split), herrings
(salted), other salted fish, anchovies,
lobster, fish roes, grain (oats),
1901-1913: bran, butter, condensed
milk, fish (fresh), cod (dried or
split), herrings (salted), other salted
fish, anchovies, lobster, fish roes
1878-1900: skins (calf), skins (seal),
sulphur, train oil, wood (rough or
planed, hwen, in boards, laths, etc.,
spars, stakes, pit props, beams and
other hewn wood, split wood and
firewood).
1901-1913: copper (crude, refined,
old and scrap), fish guano, hides
and skins, ice, sulphur, train oil,
wood (rough or planed, hewn in
boards, laths, etc., spars, stakes, pit
probs etc., beams and other hewn
wood, staves, pit props, split wood,
firewood etc., zinc (crude).
1878-1900: iron manufactures
(nails), lucifer matches, cotton
manufactures, packing paper, wood
manufactures, wood pulp
(mechanical process), wood pulp
(chemical process).
1901-1913: calcium carbide, iron
nails, lucifer matches, paper
(packing), paper (printing), sailing
and steam vessels, wood pulp
(mechanical and chemical process)
Sweden 1870-1913: agriculture and
subsidiaries, food industries.
1870-1913: mining metal, stone and
clay, wood industries, leather and
rubber
1870-1913: paper industries, textile
and clothing, chemical industries
Switzerland 1885-1913: articles of food 1885-1913: raw materials 1885-1913: manufactured articles
United
Kingdom
1872-1897: animals (horses), beer
and ale, biscuit and bread, butter,
cheese, corn (wheat), wheat flour,
corn (other kinds), fish (herring
and of other sorts), pickles and
vinegar sauces, provisions (not
otherwise described), spirits.
1898-1913: grain and flour, meat
(incl. animals for food), other food
and drink, tobacco.
1872-1897: clay (unmanufactured),
coals (cinders and fuel), grease
(tallow and animal fat), oil (seed),
rags (and other materials for
paper), salt, seeds of all sorts, skins
and furs (British), sones and slates
(slate by tale), wool (sheep and
lambs, nolls, waste).
1898-1913: coal, coke and patent
fuel, iron ore, other metalic ores,
wood and timber, cotton, wool
(sheep and lambs; woll waste, noils)
other textile materials, oil seeds
nuts, oils, fats and gum
1872-1897: alkali, apparel and slops,
arms and ammunition, bags,
bleaching material, books, candels,
caoutchoue manufactures, carriages
and waggons railway, cement,
chemical products and dye stuffs,
clocks and watches, coal products,
cordage and twine, cotton yarn and
twist , cotton manufactures, cycles,
earthen and china ware, electric
lighting apparatus, furniture,
cabinet and upholstery wares, glass
(plate, flint, common bottles, other
sorts), haberdashery and millnery
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, hides and undressed skins,
materials for paper making,
miscellaneous raw materials and
articles mainly unmanufactured.
, hardware and cutlery, hats,
implements of tools of industry,
instruments and apparatus, leather,
linen yarn, jute yarn, linen
manufactures, jute manufactures,
steam engines, other machines,
medicines, metals, musical
instruments, oil and floor cloth,
painters’ colors, paper and
pasteboard, pictures, plate and
plated ware, sewing machines, sild,
thrown, twist and yarn, silk
manufactures, skins and furs, soap,
stationary other than paper,
grindstones, millstones and other
sorts of stones, sugar (refined),
telegraphic wire, umbrella and
parasols, wood and timber
manufactures, wool, wollen and
worsted yarn and manufactures,
yarn, alpaca and mohair and other
sorts unenumerated, other articles.
1898-1913: iron and steel and
manufactures thereof, other metals
and manufactures thereof, cutlery,
hardware implements and
instruments, telegraph cables and
apparaturs, machinery, ships,
manufactures of wood and timber,
yarns and textile fabrics (cotton
yarn and manufactures, wollen
yarn and manufactures, other
materials), apparel, chemicals,
drugs, dyes and colors, leathers
and manufactures thereof,
earhware and glass, papers,
miscellaneous articles wholly or
mainly manfactured
USA 1870-1912: foodstuffs in crude
condition and food animals,
foodstuffs partly or wholly
prepared.
1870-1912: crude materials for use
in manufactures.
1870-1912: manufactures for further
use in manufactures, manufactures
ready for consumption.
How much of international trade does our 14 country gold block sample cover? To answer








where i is the country index and t the time index.71
The average import and export shares are listed in Table 4.11. 75% of imports come from
other GS members in the sample, while 84% of exports go to other GS members in the sample.
There is some variance over time and across countries, but even the smallest import share is
49%, while the smallest export share is 57%.
These numbers point towards the gold block being a fairly self-contained trading block.
While some important trading partners were not members of this gold block (e.g. India, China,
Argentina or Brazil), the data clearly indicate that such trade usually did not amount to more
71We use bilateral trade flow data provided by Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins (2008), Jacks, O’Rourke and
Williamson (2011) and Mitchell (2013).
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Table 4.11: Within Gold Standard trade shares
Mean SD Min Max N
Import share 0.75 0.14 0.49 1.00 440
Export share 0.84 0.11 0.57 1.00 440
Notes: Average within gold-block trade shares (14 countries from the baseline sample). Different de-
nominators for the calculation of the trade share: aggregate trade measure (e.g. ∑j∈gold impij/impi),
sum of bilateral trade measures (e.g. ∑j∈gold impij/∑j impij) and the same measures calculated on the
basis of interpolated trade measures.
than one quarter of trade for the gold block countries.72
Migration data
One important source for migration numbers are port statistics, which have been introduced
in most early developing countries after the Napoleonic wars.73 These port statistics provide
information about departures and arrivals. Another important source are communal registers
that noted changes in place of residence or naturalizations.
Generally, receiving countries tended to focus on collecting immigration data, while
sending countries focused on collecting emigration data. Thus, for sending countries, there
do not always exist immigration data (e.g. Denmark, Germany or Norway). Similarly, for
receiving countries emigration data tends to be less readily available than immigration data.
For example, our emigration series for Canada only starts in 1900.
Immigration data for receiving countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA) is usually
considered to be of high quality. They are also more comparable than emigration statistics from
European countries. Partly this is due to some European passport statistics and communal
registers confounding intentions to emigrate with actual emigration. Partly this is due to port
statistics only covering overseas or intercontinental migration. As long as such cross country
heterogeneity in data collection only affects the migration series’ level, while leaving its cyclical
properties intact, all results discussed in the paper are robust, as we only analyze the series’
cyclical properties.
However, there also exists the concern that the migration data do not cover temporary
emigration and subsequent return migration. If this was the case fluctuations in the labor
migration series would underrepresent the true extent of labor migration. For example, if
good economic prospects lead to an influx of undocumented temporary workers on top of
documented permanent immigrants, the migration time series would systematically under-
represent the true extent of cyclical labor movements. As a consequence, the sensitivity of
72Note that these within Gold Standard trade shares are about twice as large as those reported in the
online appendix to Catão and Solomou (2005). This is due to Catão and Solomou (2005) including
only Germany, France, the U.K. and the U.S. among the gold block countries.
73The following description of the migration data makes ample use of the data descriptions given in
Ferenczi (1929) and Mitchell (2013).
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migration flows might be underestimated, and counterfactual per capita volatilities could give
an erroneous impression of the relevance of migration flows for external adjustment. For
this reason Table 4.A.3 lists information about the degree of return migration where such
information is available.
Table 4.12: Migration data
Country Time Type Source Notes
Australia 1870-1913 arrivals &
departures
Ferenczi (1929) Return migration to U.K. inconsequential in 1870s
( 10%), but grows in importance in the late 1880s
(to about one third).
Belgium 1870-1913 arrivals &
departures
Mitchell (2013) Arrivals and departures, from and to foreign
countries. Recorded in local registers of resident






















Ferenczi (1929) Intercontinental emigration of all citizens. Prior to










French emigration statistics tend to show fewer
emigrants than receiving countries’ statistics show
French immigrants. French emigration statistics
only cover intercontinental migration; up to 1891:
steerage passengers of French citizenship at le
Havre, Bordeaux, Bayonne, and at various times
other French ports. The immigration numbers are
from White (1933), and they are based on
population data and death/birth rates.
Germany emigration:
1870-1913
emigration Mitchell (2013) Litte return migration from the U.S..
Intercontinental emigration of German citizens
through German or major foreign ports. Almost




Mitchell (2013) Intercontinental emigration of Dutch citizens
through Dutch ports.





emigration Mitchell (2013) Intercontinental emigration of citizens; up to 1876
only emigrants to the U.S.. Norway exhibits only
very little discrepancy between U.S. immigration
and local emigration statistics.
Sweden 1870-1913 immigration
& emigration








Mitchell (2013) Emigration statistics include intercontinental
migration of citizens and foreign residents.
Immigration statistics only cover naturalisations of
foreigners. Statistics up to 1889 are known to be
incomplete. Emigration statistics considered to be
of high quality, as Swiss emigration numbers







Mitchell (2013) Up to 1876 intercontinental passengers to and from
U.K. ports (incl. Irish ports). from 1876 onwards
intercontinental passengers to and from U.K. ports
(U.K. citizens only). Somewhat more than one third










Up to 1906: aliens with intent to reside. From 1906:
aliens arriving with intent to settle. Arrivals in
alaska are only irregularly included up to 1903.
Arrivals in Hawaii and Puerto Rico are included
from 1901 and 1902 on, respectively. Land frontier
arrivals only regularly included from 1908 on. 1892
to 1903: First or second-class passengers were
excluded. From 1904 on aliens in transit were
excluded. Aliens returning from visits abroad were
excluded from 1907 on. Emigration statistics only
start in 1908. Before that the emigration series is
based on passenger data. Years ending 30 June.
Scandinavian countries tend to see very little return migration from North America (only 10%).
Similarly, there was little return migration of German emigrants to the U.S. Among British
emigrants to the U.S. however somewhat more than one third returned home. Also about one
third of British migrants to Australia returned by the late 1880s. Fortunately, however, the
migration data for the U.K. are based on port statistics that document arrivals and departures.
They thus cover the extent of return migration to the U.K.
To get an idea about how pre-1914 cyclical fluctuations in overall arrivals were related to
cyclical fluctuations in immigration we looked at the one country in our sample for which
we have immigration as well as arrivals data: Finland. We find that the Pearson correlation
coefficient for immigration and arrivals exceeds 0.8 for first differences and 0.9 for 5-year
differences. This indicates that the cyclical fluctuations in the migration data collected from
different sources was highly correlated.
Note that for the model estimation we exclusively rely on net figures, i.e. net immigration.
In principle, net immigration series possess validity in excess of the underlying gross series in
that net-arrivals equal net immigration, even if the gross figures differ.74
One way of cross-validating the net immigration series obtained from immigration and
emigration data is to see whether it is consistent with the net immigration (netim) implied
by population data and vital statistics (death rate- and birth rate-data). Given the end of
period population level (pop), birth rates (BR) and death rates (DR), net immigration can be
calculated as:
netimt = popt − popt−1 ∗ (1 + BRt − DRt).
74Only if reporting periods were straddled by important holiday or business-traveling seasons would
the two differ. There is no indication that this was the case. Even if it was the case, seasonal tourism
at the time was an elite phenomenon whose effect on overall population movement statistics must
have been very small.
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1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year
UK
Notes: Plus (+) signs – cumulative intercensal netimmigration/population rate, calculated from im-
migration and emigration data. Circles – cumulative intercensal netimmigration/population rate,
calculated from the preceeding census’ population data, death rates and birth rates.
To be sure, the suggested cross-validation exercise jointly tests the quality of immigration
and vital statistics. However, given that for most early developing countries vital statistics by
the late 19th century are of good quality, any resulting discrepancy between the two series is
more likely to be attributable to the migration statistics.75 One period in the following is the
time from one population enumeration to the next. Although annual population estimates
exist for this period, they are of little use for this cross-validation exercise, because they usually
are estimated on the basis of birth rates, death rates and migration data. The suggested cross-
validation attempt would thus become circular.76 Most countries in our sample conducted
decennial censuses in the late 19th and early 20th century, so that in the following we compare
cumulative net immigration rates over ten-year periods.
For all countries for which we have sufficient immigration and emigration data, Figure 4.6
plots the two net immigration/population series – one derived from the migration statistics
75The same argument is provided by primary sources when explaining the discrepancy between
population estimates and population enumerations. See, for example, the population statistics section
of the Official yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia from 1913.
76For the same reason we do not calculate a vital statistics-based net immigration series for France,
because the French immigration series we use was itsself derived from vital statistics, rendering this
exercise circular for the case of France (see White, 1933. The French International Accounts 1880-1913.
p.77. Table 11: Funds brought into France by immigrants, 1880-1913, Immigration).
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(plus symbols), and the other derived from the census population enumerations and vital
statistics (circle symbols).77 In general, the fluctuations of the two series are similar. Note
that the results of all analyses presented in this paper are robust to any level differences, as
our analysis is based on the series’ cyclical properties only. In general, these results make
us confident that the migration series are informative about the medium-term swings in
international population movements, in which we are interested in.78
Sectoral price data
The sectoral price data come from various sources and most commonly are either wholesale
price indices or implicit sectoral deflators. We never use price data from trade statistics. In this
way we ensure that the sectoral price indices reflect the prices of locally produced goods.
Table 4.13: Sectoral price data
Country Time Source Notes
Australia 1870-1913 Butlin (1962) agricultural: average of pastoral, agriculture and
dairying price indeces. Pastoral index contains
wool and livestock prices. Agricultural wholesale
price index based on nine goods. Dairying index is
a weighted average of wholesale prices for butter,
eggs and honey. raw materials: based on price of
gold and coal. Gold’s relative importance declines
substantially after 1911, and the index tends to give
too much weight to it after that year Butlin (see
1962, p.456). industrial: industrial price index
(composed of four industrial goods’ wholesale
price series, and industrial wage-rates). services:
based on prices for private water transport,
government business undertakigs (railway freight
rates and wage incomes), government services,
property and finance, professional and domestic
service, distribution.
Belgium 1870-1913 agricultural, industrial & services:
Smits, Woltjer and Ma (2009).
raw materials: Global prices and
incomes database.
agricultural: implicit agricultural, hunting and
forestry deflator. raw materials: average price of
lampoil, kerosene and coal in Ghent 1816-1925.
industrial: industry deflator. services: index based
on prices for wholesale and retail trade, hotels and
restaurants, transport, storage, communication,
financial intermediation, real estate, renting and









Urquhart and Buckley (1965) agricultural: wholesale prices of 15 foodstuffs (from
Toronto newspapers). raw materials: wholesale price
of raw and partly manufactured goods. industrial:
wholesale price of fully and chiefly manufactured
goods. services: index based on prices for domestic
electric light and hospital charges.
77For Denmark, Germany and Norway there exist no immigration series, so there exist no net immigra-
tion rates from migration data for comparison. France is excluded because its immigration series is
an estimate based on vital statistics. Emigration data for the U.S. allows only for the calculation of a
single net immigration rate observation. This provides no information with respect to the validity of
the cyclical variations in the net immigration series.
78Note that for the model estimation we allow for measurement error in the net immigration series.
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Denmark 1870-1913 Hansen (1974) agricultural: implicit deflator for agricultural
production. raw material: implicit deflator for
forestry, peat- and lignite production. industrial:
implicit deflator for craftsmanship, industry, etc.
services: implicit deflator of trade etc.
Finland 1870-1913 Smits, Woltjer and Ma (2009) agricultural: implicit deflator for agricultural and
fishing production. raw materials: implicit deflators
for forestry production. industrial: implicit deflator
for manufacturing production. services: implicit
deflator for trade, transport, storage and
communications, financial intermediation, real







agricultural & raw material:
Brandau (1936). industrial &
services: Smits, Woltjer and Ma
(2009).
agricultural & raw material: wholesale price indices.
industrial: implicit deflator for total industry
production. services: implicit deflator for trade,
transport, real estate activities, total government,
other community, social and personal service
activities and private households with employed
persons.
Germany 1870-1913 agricultural, industrial & services:
Hoffmann (1965). raw materials:
Müssig (1919).
agricultural: retail- and wholesale prices. raw
materials: price index based on prices for coal, coke,
spar, ore, iron. industrial: price index based on
industrial inventory, industrial supplies, railway
construction, agricultural machinery and
equipment, furniture, household goods, heating,
clothing, textile household goods, leather goods,
health and personal care goods, cleaning
goods.services: price index based on services of
doctors and nursing staff, housing, domestic
services, education, recreation, transport and public
consumption.
Netherlands 1870-1913 agricultural, industrial & services:
Van Zanden, J.L., National
Accounts of the Netherlands,
1800-1913. raw materials:
Van Riel (2000).
agricultural, industrial & services: sectoral deflators.






agricultural: Arnold (1982). raw
materials: McIlraith (1911).
agricultural: total food consumer prices. raw
materials: non-farm commodity price index.
Norway 1870-1913 agricultural, raw materials &
industrial: Klovland (2005).
services: Grytten (2015).
agricultural: based on prices for feeding stuffs,
vegetables, grain, fish, dairy product and meat. raw
materials: based on prices for metals, minerals and
timer and wood. industrial: based on prices for
manufactures of wood and manufactures of textiles.
services: based on prices for commerce, transport
and communication, government services,
community and business services, personal
services, domestic services and misc.
Sweden 1870-1913 Swedish Historical National
Accounts 1560-2010, The 2015
release.
agricultural: based on prices of products from
agriculture, forestry, hunting and fishing,
horticulture sectors. raw materials: based on prices
of products from mining and metals industry.
industrial: based on prices of products from paper
and printing industries, textile and clothing
industry, leather, hair and rubber industries,
chemical industries, building and construction.
services: based on prices for foreign shipping,
domestic shipping, stevedoring, timber floating,
stage-post services, horse-drawn transports,
railways, postal services, telecommunications, trade










agricultural: price index for food and beverage:
animal, vegetable and processed products. raw
materials: price index for fuels, chemicals, metals
and building materials. industrial: price index for
textiles (cotton, silk, wool, linen), skins and leather.







agricultural: Clark (2004). raw
materials: Layton and Crowther
(1935). industrial: Maynard
(1962) Tinbergen (1956)
agricultural: farm index; composite of arable
products, meat, dairy, wool, and pasture products;
index for the price of the net output of products of
the agricultural sector of the economy; products
used as inputs in the farm sector (e.g. animal
fodder) get less weight. raw materials: raw material
price index based on the wholesale price of 44 to 45
commodities. industrial: based on prices for
clothing, durable household goods and other goods.
service: based on prices for transport and






Historical Statistics of the
United States 1789-1945. raw
materials: Brandau (1936).
agricultural: wholesale farm product price index.
raw materials: wholesale prices for industrial raw
materials. industrial: wholesale prices of textile
products, chemicals and drugs, house-furnishing
goods. service: imputed with sectoral share data
and GDP deflator.
In order to assess the validity and reliability of these sectoral price series we built their
weighted average and compared it to GDP deflators. In particular we look at the weighted
arithmetic average, where the weights are the sector shares provided by Buera and Kaboski
(2012). Because the sectoral price data distinguishes between agriculture, raw materials,
industry, and services, whereas the sectoral share data by Buera and Kaboski (2012) only
distinguishes between primary (agriculture), secondary (mining and industry) and tertiary
(services) we aggregate the sectoral price data in the following way:
Pt = primt ∗ Pagrit + secondt ∗ (Pindut + Prawt )/2 + tertt ∗ Pservt .
When there was no service price indicator available ( U.S.), or when service prices are
only available for a short period of time (Canada and U.K.) we drop the third term from this
equation and rebase the primary and secondary sector shares: primt/(primt + secondt) and
secondt/(primt + secondt).
The resulting series for each country are shown as gray dashed lines in Figure 4.7. In
almost all cases the price level estimate derived from the sectoral price data is very similar
to GDP deflator series obtained from different sources. Only in the case of Canada, the U.K.
and the U.S., for which service price indices are either not available, or have been dropped
because they were only available for short time periods, is the match less exact. New Zealand
is missing from this graph owing to a lack of sectoral share data. In general, the consistency
between the sectoral price series and the much more widely used and better vetted GDP
deflator series is reassuring.
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1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year
USA
Notes: Solid black line – GDP deflator. Dashed gray line – weighted average of sectoral prices (weight
= sectoral shares by Buera and Kaboski (2012)).
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Real effective exchange rates
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Year
USA
Notes: Grey – not on Gold Standard.
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Gold cover ratios




















































































































1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year
USA
Notes: The figure depicts narrowly defined gold cover ratios: Gold cover ratio = Gold divided by central bank notes in circulation. In the absence of a
central bank (e.g. Australia, Canada and the U.S.) the gold cover ratio has been calculated as the ratio of gold- and specie reserves in the institution
guarateeing gold convertibility (i.e. the Treasury in the U.S. or the private banks in Australia and Canada) relative to bank notes in circulation and
demand deposits.
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1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year
USA
Notes: The figure depicts broadly defined gold cover ratios: Gold cover ratio = (Metal reserves + foreign exchange reserves)/(central bank notes in
circulation + central bank deposits). In the absence of a central bank (e.g. Australia, Canada and the U.S.) the gold cover ratio has been calculated as the
ratio of gold-, specie and foreign exchange reserves in the institution guarateeing gold convertibility (i.e. the Treasury in the U.S. or the private banks in
Australia and Canada) relative to bank notes in circulation and demand deposits.
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Primary sector shares

















































































































































1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year
USA
Notes: Plus sign – primary sector employment share (i.e. agriculture and raw materials). Circles – agricultural sector value added share. Plus signs and
circles indicate observations. Grey lines are linearly inter- and extrapolated values.
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Adjustment periods

























































































1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year
USA
Notes: Grey – not on Gold Standard. Vertical bar – CA/GDP trough. CA/GDP troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm à la Bry and
Boschan (1971): CA/GDP troughs are defined as the lowest CA/Y-value in a ±10-year window.
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1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Year
Spain
Notes: Grey – not in euro area. Vertical bar – CA/GDP trough. CA/GDP troughs are defined according to a turning-point algorithm à la Bry and










REER -0.137*** 0.00 596
CPI -0.158*** 0.00 596
CPI? -0.057 0.17 596
Migration:
∆ Immigration/Pop -0.293*** 0.00 413
∆ Emigration/Pop 0.040 0.35 554
∆ Net Immigration/Pop -0.311*** 0.00 374
Monetary policy:
∆ Discount rate -0.147*** 0.00 420
∆ Gold cover ratio 0.186*** 0.00 497
NEER 0.038 0.35 596
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The table shows Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients for the CA/GDP ratio (first differences ∆) and prices, migration and
monetary policy (first differences ∆ or growth rates).





Agricultural -0.210*** 0.00 595
Raw material -0.062 0.14 572
Industrial -0.062 0.17 503
Services -0.170*** 0.00 430
Disaggregate exports:
Agricultural 0.184*** 0.00 528
Raw material 0.093** 0.03 518
Industrial 0.120*** 0.01 494
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The table shows the Pearson correlation coef-
ficients for the CA/GDP ratio (first differences ∆) and the growth rates of
sectoral prices and sectoral exports/total exports.
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Table 4.16: Correlation between external adjustment, export prices, import
prices and local prices
∆ CA/GDP
ρ p N
Terms of trade 0.059 0.16 561
CPI -0.158*** 0.00 596
Export prices
ρ p N
Import prices 0.509*** 0.00 522
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The table shows the Pearson correlation coef-
ficients for the CA/GDP ratio (first differences ∆) and the growth rates of
the terms of trade and the domestic CPI.
Table 4.17: Correlation between external adjustment and sectoral adjustment
∆ CA/GDP
ρ p N
∆ Primary sector share 0.107*** 0.01 586
∆ Secondary sector share -0.022 0.61 518
∆ Tertiary sector share -0.082* 0.06 518
Notes: * 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01. The table shows Pearson correlation coeffi-
cients for 2-year changes in the CA/GDP ratio and 2-year changes in the
agricultural, industrial and service sector shares.183
Alternative adjustment periods

























































































1870 1880 1890 1900 1910
Year
USA
Notes: Grey – not on Gold Standard. Vertical bar – CA/GDP trough. CA/GDP troughs are informally defined as all visually salient CA/GDP troughs.
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Figure 4.15: Alternative adjustment periods: Prices, migration and monetary policy







































































































































Notes: Black solid – Gold Standard. Shaded areas – 90% confidence bands based on robust Driscoll-
Kraay standard errors (small sample corrected, autocorrelation lag order = 2 years). CA/GDP troughs
are informally defined as all visually salient CA/GDP troughs (see Figure 4.A.3).
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Figure 4.16: Alternative adjustment periods: sectoral prices and sectoral exports

























Figure 4.17: Alternative adjustment periods: terms of trade vs. local prices
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Export and import prices
Export prices
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Figure 4.18: Alternative adjustment periods: sectoral adjustment





























Notes: CA/GDP troughs are informally defined as all visually salient CA/GDP troughs (see Figure
4.A.3).
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4.A.5. Additional model results
Historical Observations and Smoothed Data
Figure 4.19: U.K. – Observables and smoothed variables
Notes: For variables without measurement error, the smoothed and observed series are identical.
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Figure 4.20: Sweden – Observables and smoothed variables
Notes: For variables without measurement error, the smoothed and observed series are identical.
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Figure 4.21: Belgium – Observables and smoothed variables
Notes: For variables without measurement error, the smoothed and observed series are identical.
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Autocorrelations - Observed vs. Simulated Data
Figure 4.22: (Auto-)correlations – U.K.
Notes: y-axes indicate correlations. x-axes indicate lags of column variables. Rows show reference variables. Black solid
lines – median moment of simulated data. Grey dashed lines – 90 percent coverage percentiles of the simulated data. All
simulated moments are based on 2000 simulation runs conditional on the posterior mean. ypt – Per capita output, Πt
– CPI inflation, Rt – Discount rate, et – Nominal exchange rate, ∆nt – Population change, tbt/yt) – Trade balance/output.
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Figure 4.23: (Auto-)correlations – Sweden
Notes: y-axes indicate correlations. x-axes indicate lags of column variables. Rows show reference variables. Black solid
lines – median moment of simulated data. Grey dashed lines – 90 percent coverage percentiles of the simulated data. All
simulated moments are based on 2000 simulation runs conditional on the posterior mean. ypt – Per capita output, Πt
– CPI inflation, Rt – Discount rate, et – Nominal exchange rate, ∆nt – Population change, tbt/yt) – Trade balance/output.
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Figure 4.24: (Auto-)correlations – Belgium
Notes: y-axes indicate correlations. x-axes indicate lags of column variables. Rows show reference variables. Black solid
lines – median moment of simulated data. Grey dashed lines – 90 percent coverage percentiles of the simulated data. All
simulated moments are based on 2000 simulation runs conditional on the posterior mean. ypt – Per capita output, Πt
– CPI inflation, Rt – Discount rate, et – Nominal exchange rate, ∆nt – Population change, tbt/yt) – Trade balance/output.
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Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Table 4.18: Forecast error variance deomposition – U.K.
ηa ηa∗ ηr ηr∗ ηg ηg∗ ηm ηm∗ ηx ηx∗ ηb ηb∗
At 1 year horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.55 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.32 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.33 0.00 0.00
REER (Er,t) 0.70 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.97 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
At 10 years horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.25 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.00
REER (Er,t) 0.57 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.93 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Unconditional
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.23 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.44 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.07 0.01 0.31 0.01 0.00
REER (Er,t) 0.53 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.87 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Notes: One-year-, ten-year-, and unconditional FEVDs. ηa – technology shock, ηr – discount rate shock, ηg – markup shock, ηm – gold supply shock, ηx –
money demand shock, ηb – risk premium shock.
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Table 4.19: Forecast error variance deomposition – Sweden
ηa ηa∗ ηr ηr∗ ηg ηg∗ ηm ηm∗ ηx ηx∗ ηb ηb∗
At 1 year horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.87 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.50 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.02
REER (Er,t) 0.64 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.72 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
At 10 years horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.73 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.55 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.02
REER (Er,t) 0.58 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.70 0.04 0.01 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
Unconditional
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.16 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.54 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.02
REER (Er,t) 0.57 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.59 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02
Notes: One-year-, ten-year-, and unconditional FEVDs. ηa – technology shock, ηr – discount rate shock, ηg – markup shock, ηm – gold supply shock, ηx –
money demand shock, ηb – risk premium shock.
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Table 4.20: Forecast error variance deomposition – Belgium
ηa ηa∗ ηr ηr∗ ηg ηg∗ ηm ηm∗ ηx ηx∗ ηb ηb∗
At 1 year horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.10 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.58 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.50 0.13 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.03 0.01
REER (Er,t) 0.60 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.02
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.47 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.03
At 10 years horizon
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.09 0.14 0.00 0.03 0.39 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.02
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.50 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.01
REER (Er,t) 0.59 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.09 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.07 0.33 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.03
Unconditional
Per capita output - H (ypt ) 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.04 0.32 0.21 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.02
CPI inflation - H (Πt) 0.49 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.02
REER (Er,t) 0.55 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02
Trade balance/output - H (tbt/yt) 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.09 0.24 0.10 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.04
Notes: One-year-, ten-year-, and unconditional FEVDs. ηa – technology shock, ηr – discount rate shock, ηg – markup shock, ηm – gold supply shock, ηx –
money demand shock, ηb – risk premium shock.
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Bayesian Impulse Responses
Figure 4.25: Bayesian IRF - U.K.
Notes: The graphic depicts Bayesian impulse responses to negative shocks. ypt , Πt and Er,t are displayed as percentage deviations from steady state. tbt/yt
is displayed in percentage point deviations from steady state. At – technology shock H, A∗t – technology shock F, e
g
t – markup shock H, e
g∗
t – markup
shock F, emt – gold shock.
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Figure 4.26: Bayesian IRF -Sweden
Notes: The graphic depicts Bayesian impulse responses to negative shocks. ypt , Πt and Er,t are displayed as percentage deviations from steady state. tbt/yt
is displayed in percentage point deviations from steady state. At – technology shock H, A∗t – technology shock F, e
g
t – markup shock H, e
g∗
t – markup
shock F, emt – gold shock.
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Figure 4.27: Bayesian IRF -Belgium
Notes: The graphic depicts Bayesian impulse responses to negative shocks. ypt , Πt and Er,t are displayed as percentage deviations from steady state. tbt/yt
is displayed in percentage point deviations from steady state. At – technology shock H, A∗t – technology shock F, e
g
t – markup shock H, e
g∗
t – markup
shock F, emt – gold shock.
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Baseline and Counterfactual Impulse Responses
Figure 4.28: IRF baseline and counterfactual - U.K.
Notes: The graphic depicts the impulse responses to negative one standard deviation shocks. ypt , Πt and Er,t are displayed as percentage deviations from
steady state. tbt/yt is displayed in percentage point deviations from steady state. At – technology shock H, A∗t – technology shock F, e
g
t – markup shock
H, eg
∗
t – markup shock F, e
m
t – gold shock.
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Figure 4.29: IRF baseline and counterfactual - Sweden
Notes: The graphic depicts the impulse responses to negative one standard deviation shocks. ypt , Πt and Er,t are displayed as percentage deviations from
steady state. tbt/yt is displayed in percentage point deviations from steady state. At – technology shock H, A∗t – technology shock F, e
g
t – markup shock
H, eg
∗
t – markup shock F, e
m
t – gold shock.
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Figure 4.30: IRF baseline and counterfactual - Beglium
Notes: The graphic depicts the impulse responses to negative one standard deviation shocks. ypt , Πt and Er,t are displayed as percentage deviations from
steady state. tbt/yt is displayed in percentage point deviations from steady state. At – technology shock H, A∗t – technology shock F, e
g
t – markup shock
H, eg
∗
t – markup shock F, e
m
t – gold shock.
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Additional counterfactual volatilities (baseline model)



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (3|2) (4|2)
United Kingdom
ypt Per capita output 1.76 3.20 1.75 1.82 3.19 3.42
(81.50%) (-0.89%) (3.19%) (-0.16%) (7.03%)
Πt Inflation 1.73 1.56 1.73 1.51 1.56 1.39
(-9.61%) (-0.06%) (-12.47%) (-0.01%) (-10.93%)
Er,t REER 0.49 0.61 0.48 0.50 0.60 0.63
(23.93%) (-3.74%) (1.20%) (-2.01%) (3.14%)
tbt/yt Trade balance/output 0.81 0.84 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.84
(4.32%) (-4.91%) (-0.22%) (-4.94%) (-0.18%)
Sweden
ypt Per capita output 1.88 4.26 1.87 1.90 4.28 4.38
(126.77%) (-0.20%) (0.91%) (0.46%) (2.82%)
Πt Inflation 2.64 2.28 2.62 2.57 2.28 2.19
(-13.69%) (-0.58%) (-2.81%) (-0.13%) (-3.74%)
Er,t REER 1.65 1.88 1.64 1.66 1.89 1.89
(13.79%) (-1.13%) (0.15%) (0.19%) (0.67%)
tbt/yt Trade balance/output 0.87 1.16 0.84 0.87 1.08 1.17
(33.94%) (-2.91%) (0.03%) (-6.93%) (0.64%)
Belgium
ypt Per capita output 0.94 2.29 0.97 0.93 2.29 2.29
(145.15%) (3.77%) (-0.19%) (-0.01%) (-0.16%)
Πt Inflation 2.13 2.39 2.13 2.10 2.42 2.37
(12.32%) (0.38%) (-1.22%) (1.17%) (-0.83%)
Er,t REER 1.96 2.61 2.00 1.96 2.69 2.60
(32.96%) (1.87%) (-0.24%) (2.88%) (-0.20%)
tbt/yt Trade balance/output 0.84 1.90 0.81 0.84 1.80 1.90
(127.05%) (-3.22%) (0.08%) (-5.18%) (0.23%)
Notes: Percentage change in counterfactual S.D. relative to baseline S.D. in parenthesis. Rigid prices –
model with rigid prices. No migration – model without migration. No independence – model without
policy independence for central bank.
Various robustness checks on model estimation and simulation
Bayesian estimation of a hybrid model
The two-region baseline model in the main text abstracts from those countries that were not
part of the Gold Standard (GS). Catão and Solomou (2005) point out that external adjustment
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of GS countries was facilitated by their trade with non-GS countries. As a robustness check
we therefore also estimated a version of the model in which we treat the F-region as a hybrid
region that includes gold, as well as non-gold countries. We treat the U.K. as the H-region.
The distinguishing feature of the hybrid region is that its nominal exchange rate with
respect to the home region (the GS country) is more flexible than if the foreign region was a
strict adherent to the GS. This allows us to analyze whether our baseline results are robust to
larger fluctuations in the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER).
We collected new price level series, exchange rates, short-term rates and real per capita
GDP indices for 12 non-gold block countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Greece, India,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, Russia). On the basis of this data we then calculated
global trade-weighted averages which we treat as the F-region observables for the hybrid
model estimation: trade-weighted short-term rates and per capita GDP series, as well as REER
and NEER series that encompass the non-gold block. All other observables remain the same
as in the baseline U.K. model estimation.
Most of the estimated parameters are similar to those of the baseline model. Reassuringly,
the estimated monetary policy parameters reflect the hybrid setup. In particular, compared to
our baseline model, the H-region’s monetary policy now reacts less to the NEER (0.14 in the
hybrid setup, 0.72 in the baseline model). F-region’s monetary policy also reacts less to both
its NEER (0.16 in hybrid setup, 1.62 in baseline model).
Table 4.22, panel A presents the counterfactual model simulations for the estimated hybrid
model. We find that, even when the higher degree of NEER flexibility is taken into account, it
is still price flexibility that explains most of the benign adjustment experience under the GS.
Extended two-sector model
Appendix 4.A.2 presents a two-sector version of the GS model. Here we report the
counterfactual simulation volatilities it gives rise to.79
Based on the extended model, we can mimic the 20th century shift away from primary
goods production in order to take a look at the counterfactual volatilities this implies. Through
the lens of the extended model the 20th century sectoral shift is represented by the following
parameter changes. First, non-tradable goods and services, have become more important over
time as inputs to wholesale tradable goods (e.g. R&D). This is reflected by a lower value for
φ˜. We set φ˜ = 0.8 (as opposed to 0.9 during the early 20th century), which is consistent with
recent input-output tables.
Second, the composition of households’ consumption has shifted towards non-tradable
services, which can be captured as a decrease in the weight of wholesale tradable goods in
the final consumption bundle, i.e. a lower γ˜ and γ˜?. Another reason for why γ˜ and γ˜? have
become smaller is that retail tradable goods require a larger amount of local distribution
services today than 100 years ago (e.g. marketing and retail sales).80 We calibrate these two
79The model calibration is described in Appendix 4.A.2.
80One of the earliest input-output tables available that indicate this is indeed the case is the German
table for 1936 (see Fremdling and Staeglin, 2014).
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parameters to target today’s tradable sector share (i.e. the share of tradable value added in
total value added of 16% for the H region, and 24% for the F region, as opposed to 47% and
40% during the early 20th century. This corresponds to the U.K. statistics for 2011).81
Table 4.22 panel B displays the results of the counterfactual analysis (see Section 6 for a
detailed description of the counterfactual exercise). The results for the extended model are
similar to the results for the baseline model. Nominal flexibility remains the most important
explanation for the benign adjustment experience under the GS. Migration- and monetary
policy played smaller roles.
Norway
Besides Sweden, another country which experienced large emigration flows in the late
19th century is Norway. It is thus interesting to see how important the migration channel
was for this country. Because we have no immigration series for Norway we replace the net-
immigration/population ratio with the emigration/population ratio among the observables.
The thus estimated model produces counterfactual volatilities that are broadly in line with
those of from other countries’ models (see Table 4.22 panel C). Price flexibility again is the
most important contributor to per capita output stability.
France
Similarly to the central bank of Belgium, the central bank of France is known for having
pushed the limits of monetary policy independence under the Gold Standard (Eichengreen
and Flandreau, 2014; Bazot, Bordo and Monnet, 2014). We therefore also estimated the model
with France as the H-region, and all other GS economies as the F-region. Unfortunately, there
does not exist an uninterrupted immigration series for France between 1880 and 1913. Among
the observables for model estimation we thus replaced the net-immigration/population series
with the emigration/population series.
Table 4.22 panel D displays the counterfactual simulation results for France. Price flexibility
again is the most influential factor when it comes to output stability.
81While the H value is based on the U.K. input-output table for 2011, the F value is an average for
Germany and Sweden. All input-output tables are from OECD Statistics.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (3|2) (4|2)
Panel A: United Kingdom hybrid
ypt Per capita output 1.72 3.16 1.71 1.78 3.17 3.51
(83.67%) (-0.76%) (3.55%) (0.31%) (11.00%)
Panel B: United Kingdom extended
ypt Per capita output 1.95 3.67 1.95 2.03 3.76 4.10
(88.23%) (-0.07%) (4.19%) (2.45%) (11.94%)
Panel C: Norway
ypt Per capita output 1.57 4.31 1.55 1.56 4.32 4.32
(175.09%) (-1.25%) (-0.17%) (0.17%) (0.33%)
Panel D: France
ypt Per capita output 2.84 4.57 2.84 2.82 4.56 4.62
(60.89%) (-0.12%) (-0.58%) (-0.26%) (1.06%)
Notes: Percentage change in counterfactual S.D. relative to baseline S.D. in parenthesis. Rigid prices –
model with rigid prices. No migration – model without migration. No independence – model without
policy independence for central bank.
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Chapter 5
Spotting the Danger Zone: Forecasting
Financial Crises with Classification
Tree Ensembles and Many Predictors
5.1. Introduction
The number of institutions whose explicit goal is to identify and address risks to the financial
system has increased in the post-2008 economic policy landscape. In the US for example, the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) has been given a statutory mandate to ‘identify[]
risks and respond[] to emerging threats to financial stability”.1 A core question policy makers
in these institutions face is: where is the economy currently operating relative to the economic
danger zones from which banking crises emanate? It is here that formal early-warning systems
can make a valuable contribution.
This paper introduces classification tree ensembles (CTEs) (Breiman, 1996a, 2001) to fi-
nancial crisis forecasting and analyzes their ability in making out-of-sample predictions for
binary banking crisis indicators on the basis of several datasets: One long run annual dataset
(1870-2011), covering 17 developed countries, and two post-1970 datasets – the first covering
162 countries annually and the second quarterly. The results suggest that the out-of-sample
forecasting performance of CTEs substantially surpasses current best-practice logit specifica-
tions. To give a concrete example of the trade-offs involved, the favorite CTE allows policy
makers to correctly forecast about 50% of banking crises, at the cost of a 5% chance of wrongly
forecasting a crisis when none will actually occur. The best-practice logit specification can
achieve the same 50% rate of correct crisis forecasts only at the substantially higher cost of
a 25% chance of making a wrong crisis call. If policy makers prefer a higher rate of correct
crisis forecasting, both prior models offer one. The CTE can correctly forecast about 90% of
banking crises, with a 30% probability of making a false crisis prediction. The best-practice
1The citation is taken from the FSOC’s website: http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/Pages/
home.aspx
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logit specification can achieve the same 90% rate of correctly forecasting a crisis, only at the far
higher cost of an 80% chance of erroneously predicting a crisis. In both scenarios, the CTE
offers the better trade-off. In light of their superior performance, CTE forecasts should become
an important tool of macroprudential policy.
This paper relates to the existent literature in the following ways: It adds to the modern lit-
erature on early-warning systems (EWS) for banking crises, which was pioneered by Kaminsky
(1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) in the wake of the 1997 Southeast Asian crises. More
recent contributions that analyze the predictability of banking crises in developed economies in
the long-run (since 1870) are: Schularick and Taylor (2012) and Jordà (2014), while others rely
on post-1970 samples covering more countries (see Drehmann and Juselius, 2012; Drehmann,
2013). This literature has shown that already relatively simple model structures, based on
few predictors – most notably credit aggregates – can convey valuable information on the
imminence of a banking crisis. This paper will explore whether more complex classification
tree structures, based on many predictors can improve upon this.
Thus, this paper is related to the literature on economic forecasts based on many predictors
(see Stock and Watson, 2002, 2006), which has stressed the possibility of improving forecasts
by drawing from a large set of indicators. It will be demonstrated that increasing the number
of predictors that are used in best practice early-warning systems from 7-10 to ca. 70-
80, will markedly improve forecasts. The literature on economic forecasts based on many
predictors has focused largely on factor modelling and prestep-dimensionality reduction
techniques. Such approaches do not easily lend themselves to banking crisis-forecasting.
First, most banking crisis indicators are binary 0-1 dummies that require discrete classification
techniques.2 Furthermore, widely held beliefs on the genesis of banking crises, namely that they
are characterized by discontinuous threshold effects and nonlinear interaction effects between
several risk factors (see Duttagupta and Cashin, 2011), are more naturally accommodated
by methods which dispense with linearity assumptions from the outset. This paper will
apply classification tree structures (see Breiman et al., 1984) which naturally accommodate
discontinuous threshold effects as well as nonlinear interactions and can harness many
predictors in doing so (also see Varian, 2014).
A classification tree can be seen as a recursive version of the more familiar signals approach
to crisis forecasting. Similar to the signals approach, classification trees split a sample into
two parts by searching for a predictor and a threshold along that predictor which separates
the crisis observations in the sample from the non-crisis observations. Credit growth in the
90th percentile, for example, might be indicative of an impending banking crisis. After the
sample has been split in two by the first threshold, the procedure is repeated for the two
resulting subsamples – containing observations above and below the 90th percentile credit
growth-threshold, respectively. In this way a sample can be recursively partitioned into crisis
2Exceptions are continuous crisis indices such as the exchange market pressure index pioneered by
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994). Such indices are available for fewer countries and cover shorter
time-spans than their binary counterparts.
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and non-crisis subsamples.3 Individual classification trees however are renowned for being
highly unstable, i.e. their high variance in mean-squared-error terms. This instability severely
impairs their forecasting ability. To overcome this, Breiman (1996a) has suggested to estimate
many trees on many bootstrap samples and then aggregate them into a classification tree
ensemble – or forest. This so-called bagging (short-hand for bootstrap aggregating) takes
high-variance trees and combines them into low-variance forests, which retain the ability of
individual trees to deal with many predictors and accommodate nonlinear threshold- and
interaction effects. Their ability to thus precisely delineate several danger zones, and their
ability to harness many predictors in doing so, has already made them a mainstay in other
research areas, such as genetics, where often thousands of genetic markers are analyzed
with respect to their contributions to particular diseases (e.g. Díaz-Uriarte and De Andres,
2006). Further examples for the wide applicability of tree-based ensemble methods come from
ecology (e.g. Prasad, Iverson and Liaw, 2006), bioinformatics (e.g. Chen and Liu, 2005) and
high energy particle physics (Albert et al., 2008). In parallel work, Alessi and Detken (2014)
have also recently investigated the potential of CTEs for banking crisis forecasting.4
This paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 provides an introduction to classification
tree-ensembles and section 5.3 introduces the datasets. These datasets form the basis for the
out-of-sample forecasting contest between CTEs and the best-practice logit specifications in
section 5.4. Section 5.5 concludes this paper by showing how a particular CTE, random forest,
would have fared in forecasting the 2007/2008 financial crisis.
5.2. Methodology: Classification Tree Ensembles
This section gives an introduction to classification trees and their ensembles (CTEs). It also
contrasts the classification tree-approach with the generalized linear models (GLM) framework,
in order to clarify how classification trees differ from logit and probit models – the backbone
of many current EWS’s for banking crises.
5.2.1. Single Classification Trees
Classification trees separate crisis- from non-crisis observations according to a set of discrete
threshold rules. For instance, if an economy’s private sector indebtedness exceeds a certain
threshold, and GDP growth is faltering below another threshold, a classification tree might
3Recent contributions have already begun to explore the potential of classification trees for the analysis
of banking crises (Davis and Karim (2008a) and Duttagupta and Cashin (2011)).
4Alessi and Detken (2014)’s approach differs considerably from the approach followed here. They
use a tree ensemble to identify important variables, and then estimate a single tree based off these
variables. Single tree forecasts allow for a better interpretation than ensemble based forecasts. However,
single tree forecasts are plagued by high variance and thus are unlikely to be precise. Furthermore,
identifying important variables with a CTE is problematic: Several methods exist to determine the
importance of a predictor in a CTE – they can produce very different results (see the series of papers
published in BMC Bioinformatics: Nicodemus, Wang and Shugart (2007), Strobl et al. (2007), Strobl
et al. (2008), Nicodemus and Malley (2009) and Nicodemus et al. (2010)).
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categorize the observation into the high risk category. If on the other hand, indebtedness was
lower and GDP growth were higher, the observation might be categorized as low risk.
Figure 5.1 illustrates this idea graphically. x1 and x2 are two predictors conveying informa-
tion about financial crisis risk. In the two-dimensional predictor space spanned by x1 and x2
black dots indicate crisis observations, while white dots stand for non-crisis observations. A
classification tree is characterized by a partition of the predictor space into M non-overlapping
regions Rm and an associated set of crisis-probabilities pm (m = 1, ..., M). The regions are
estimated through recursive partitioning – a step-wise algorithm. The algorithm will be
described in more detail in the following section, but a short description is given here in order
to provide an intuition for how the region estimates R̂m come about: Recursive partitioning
searches across predictors for a threshold that separates crisis from non-crisis observations (see
upper left panel of figure 5.1). Next, the sample splitting continues on the obtained subsamples
as indicated by the upper right and lower left panels of figure 5.1. Once recursive partitioning
stops a crisis probability p̂m for region R̂m (m = 1, ..., M) is estimated according to the fraction





where yi = 1 if a crisis occurs within the next two years, and yi = 0 in all other cases. In
the final partition depicted by the lower left panel of figure 5.1 for instance, regions 3 and 5
delineate danger zones of high crisis risk. Regions 1 to 3, conversely, predict 0 crisis risk. The
partitioning of the predictor space can also be represented as a dendrogram, in which the final
nodes correspond to the final region estimates – hence the name classification tree (see lower
right panel of figure 5.1).





p̂m I(Xi ∈ R̂m), (5.2)
where p̂m is the probability estimate of a crisis occurring within the following 2 years, Xi is
a J × 1 vector of predictor values, for observations i = 1, ..., N and I(Xi ∈ R̂m) is an indicator
function that equals 1 when region R̂m contains observation i.
A comparison to current workhorse specifications for banking crisis EWS, such as logit and
probit models, will help to put the characteristics of classification trees into sharper contrast. In
the specification of a generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomially distributed dependent
variable
P(yi|Xi) = g−1(X′iβ) (5.3)
a dual set of assumption is made: First, in the form of a link function g (e.g. the logit link),
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x1 ≤ t11
x1 ≤ t12 x2 ≤ t23
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x2 ≤ t24
Figure 5.1: Recursive Partitioning: An Illustration
Notes: The upper left panel shows the first recursive partitioning step, while the upper right panel
shows the second recursive partitioning step. The lower left panel shows a third and fourth partitioning
step. The lower right panel shows the tree corresponding to the partition in the lower left panel. Filled
circles (Crisis); empty circles (No crisis). xj predictors. tsj splits/thresholds. Rm terminal regions.
Second, by assuming that the predictor values enter crisis risk only as a linear additive
combination X′iβ.
5
An advantage of classification trees is that they are more flexible in both regards. First,
the nonparametric calculation of crisis probabilities according to (5.1) obviates the need to
map an unbounded predictor range to the [0, 1]-crisis probability domain with the help of
a particular mean function. Classification trees are thus free to approximate a multitude of
functional forms between the dependent variable and the predictors through the combination
of discrete thresholding rules.6 Secondly, contrary to the GLM framework, classification trees
are geared towards identifying nonlinear and discontinuous predictor interactions, while
5There exists however the possibility to explicitly define some interaction effects and higher order terms
and include them among the other predictors.
6The right sort and degree of functional flexibility depends on the problem at hand. Liu, Bowyer and
Hall (2004) present a set of conditions under which classification trees outperform artificial neural
networks although the latter are generaly more flexible; the financial crisis forecasting problem seems
to fit this set of conditions.
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maintaining the ability to also approximate smooth and even linear relationships.7 A downside
of this flexibility is that globally optimal estimation of all the parameters that characterize
a classification tree Θ = {Rm, pm}Mm=1 constitutes a NP-complete problem (Hyafil and Rivest,
1976). Thus classification tree regions are typically estimated through recursive partitioning –
a greedy search algorithm that conducts a step-wise locally optimal estimation.
5.2.2. Recursive partitioning
At each recursive partitioning step a thresholds, or split point, is selected in order to minimize
a loss function. This loss function is the (negative) information gain IG, which measures the
extent to which a split point is successful in separating crisis from non-crisis observations.
Evaluating the homogeneity of a region in terms of the crisis and non-crisis observations
contained in it necessitates the definition of a measure of region impurity. Gini impurity – a
parabolic function of the proportion of crisis observations pa in region Ra – is such a measure:
GI = −2p2a + 2pa,
GI reaches minima of 0 in regions that contain only crisis observations (pa = 1) or only
non-crisis observations (pa = 0). For 0 < pa < 1 GI exceeds 0 and reaches a maximum of
0.5 for regions that contain an equal amount of crisis and non-crisis observations (pa = 0.5).
As its name suggests, gini impurity is thus a measure of region impurity that penalizes the
mixing of crisis and non-crisis observations within a region. On the basis of this measure
it is possible to define the loss function according to which split points are selected at each
recursive partitioning step – the information gain:
IG(Ra, Rb) = GI(Ra ∪ Rb)− 0.5[GI(Ra) + GI(Rb)]
IG(Ra, Rb) compares the gini impurity of a parent region GI(Ra ∪ Rb) with the average gini
impurity of the two child regions GI(Ra) and GI(Rb) that a split point creates. The negative
IG constitutes the loss function that is minimized at each recursive partitioning step s = 2, ..., S
through the choice of a splitting predictor j and a split point t along the range of that splitting
predictor:





j |tˆ1j , ..., tˆs−1j ), Rsb(tsj |tˆ1j , ..., tˆs−1j )
)
(5.4)
7To see this, imagine crisis and non-crisis observations were separated along one of the two linear
diagonals in the panels of figure 5.1. In this case, a good separation of crisis from non-crisis observations
would necessitate the estimation of several more regions, but eventually a satisfying approximation to
the diagonal separation could be achieved through a somewhat more finely granulated partitioning of
the predictor space. Note, however, that smaller regions tend to contain fewer observations and the
corresponding crisis probability estimates would be less precise.
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The thrust behind (5.4) is to estimate thresholds that separate crisis and non-crisis observations
into different regions.8 Note that only the first split s = 1 is an unconditional one; all others
depend on all previously estimated splits tˆ1j , ..., tˆ
s−1
j .
Recursive partitioning can end in two ways: either running its course until the classification
tree has been “fully grown”, i.e. only pure regions are left, or recursive partitioning can be
ended through an ad hoc stopping rule. For example, each terminal region can be required
to contain a minimum number of observations.9 The final partition constitutes an estimate
of the M terminal regions {R̂m}Mm=1, on the basis of which the classification tree (5.2) can be
completed by estimating crisis probabilities { p̂m}Mm=1 according to (5.1). Algorithm box 1 gives
an overview of all the steps involved in estimating a classification tree.
Despite their ability to handle many predictors and accommodate nonlinear threshold- and
interaction effects, classification trees have been associated with poor out-of-sample forecasts of
banking crises (see Davis and Karim, 2008a). What is the reason for this? The most significant
constraint that holds back the forecasting performance of a single classification tree is its high
variance – an unwelcome side-effect of recursive partitioning. Small changes in the sample
under analysis can easily lead to changes in the early partitions and, due to the dependence of
later on earlier partitions, this change then reverberates throughout the tree. The results in
section 5.4 will confirm that this instability deals a severe blow to the forecasting performance
of single classification trees. Fortunately, as explained in the next section, combining many
classification trees into a CTE can provide a solution to this problem.
Algorithm 1 Classification Tree Pseudocode
1. Estimate regions {Rm}Mm=1 through recursive partitioning:
repeat . Recursive Partitioning
Select splitting predictor and split point according to (5.4).
until Stopping rule applies
⇒ Region estimates {R̂m}Mm=1:
2. Estimate crisis probabilities {pm}Mm=1 according to (5.1).
⇒ Classification Tree T̂ (Xi) = ∑Mm=1 p̂m I(Xi ∈ R̂m)
Notes: The pseudocode shows the steps involved in generating a single classification tree.
8Note that the step-wise estimation through recursive partitioning allows classification trees to make
use of many predictors, whereas generalized linear models estimated through maximum likelihood,
would run into problems associated with the curse of dimensionality.
9Usually the application of such an ad hoc stopping rule is necessary to avoid poor out-of-sample
predictions due to severe in-sample overfitting. The following analyses impose a lower bound of
10 observations on the terminal region size of single classification trees. The single tree results are
however, robust to variations in the stopping rule.
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5.2.3. Classification tree ensembles
As the name suggests an ensemble of trees – or forest F – consists of many classification trees
Tb, b = 1, ..., B. Each individual tree “grows” on an i.i.d. bootstrap-sample Xb, for which N
observations are drawn with replacement from the original data X. Such bootstrapping with
subsequent aggregation is referred to as bagging (Breiman, 1996a).10 If each tree is given the
same weight, a forest’s crisis probability estimate is





Thus the forest’s prediction is simply the average prediction of the B single trees.11
Why are tree ensembles expected to have better predictive ability than individual classifica-





































The main rationale behind bagging is its variance-reducing effect: The variance of the average
of B identically – but not independently – distributed variables (note that trees are grown on







where ρ is the pairwise correlation between any two trees13 and thus
σ2bag ≤ σ2tree.
10Note that the use of the bootstrap methodology in bagging is somewhat unusual, in that it is not
used for statistical inference here. Hence the choice of the i.i.d. boostrap is harmless at the bagging
stage. However, temporal and cross-sectional dependencies in the data presumably resurface later in
the form of temporally and cross-sectionally dependent crisis probability estimates. Therefore at a
later stage, for the evaluation and comparison of the models’ predictive ability on the basis of their
crisis probability estimates, block-bootstrap procedures become important for robustifying confidence
intervals and statistical tests (see appendix).
11CTEs appear to be rather unaffected by tree growth stopping rules (Segal, 2004). Fully growing each
tree in an ensemble has consequently established itself as a standard and has therefore been applied
to the following analysis.
12For ease of clarification, the following argument assumes fixed predictors and thus abstracts from
population MSE, which is in any case beyond the control of forecasters.
13Note the exchangeability assumption needed in the derivation of this expression: Cov(Ti , Tj) =
Cov(T1, T2) for any i 6= j.
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Hence the variance of a tree ensemble can generally be expected to be lower than the variance of
an individual tree (see Bühlmann and Yu, 2002; Buja and Stuetzle, 2006), with ρσ2tree constituting
the lower bound on variance that can be reached through bagging.
One of the most prominent ensemble algorithms that will be investigated in the following
sections is random forest (Breiman, 2001), which aims at lowering ensemble variance σ2bag even
further, by lowering ρ – or the correlation between trees. This is done by considering only
a random subset Jtry of all J predictors in the maximization problem faced at each recursive
partitioning step (5.4). This subset of predictors is drawn without replacement from the set of
all predictors.14 Individual trees thus no longer vary only with respect to the bootstrap sample
on which they are "grown", but also with respect to the selection of splitting predictors. The
trees become less similar (i.e. ρ is lower) and all else equal, ensemble variance decreases.15
Besides this, random forest equals bagging,




T̂ RFb (Xi). (5.6)
A concise overview of all the steps involved in obtaining the bagging- (5.5) and random forest
crisis probabilities (5.6) can be found in algorithm box (2).
Note that while the branches and leaves of an individual tree can still be traced and
interpreted in economic terms, one drawback of CTEs is that they lose this straightforward
interpretability. In this sense CTE-based forecasts might be thought of as a complement to
methodologies that are better suited for the evaluation of the relative importance of different
risk factors.16
14A widely used default choice for Jtry, which the following analysis will adhere to is b
√
Jc (see Breiman,
2002). Generally, the paper makes use of default settings sourced from the literature for fine-tuning
parameters (Jtry and tree growth stopping rules). Given the rarity of severe banking crises setting
aside part of the data for tuning considerations (i.e. validation data) is an excessive strain on the
samples.
15Bagging and randomization also have countervailing effects on prediction bias. Averaging across
many trees smoothens out the discontinuities found in any single tree. This can lower CTE-bias
(Buja and Stuetzle, 2006). However, each bootstrap sample leaves out ≈ 37% of observations, which
increases finite sample bias compared to larger resamples.
16Although several methods exist to determine the importance of a predictor in a CTE, for the
applications that follow I find few commonalities between the predictor rankings produced by two of
the most common variable importance measures (see appendix for results and further discussion).
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Algorithm 2 Random Forest Pseudocode
for b = 1 to B do . Estimate B Classification Trees
1. Draw i.i.d. bootstrap sample Xb of size N (with replacement).
2. Estimate regions {Rbm}Mm=1 through recursive partitioning:
repeat . Recursive Partitioning
a) Draw Jtry predictors (without replacement).
b) Select splitting predictor and split point according to (5.4).
until Stopping rule applies (i.e. trees are fully grown)
⇒ Region estimates {R̂bm}Mm=1:
3. Estimate crisis probabilities {pbm}Mm=1 according to (5.1).
⇒ Classification Tree T̂ RFb (Xi) = ∑Mm=1 p̂bm I(Xi ∈ R̂bm)
end for
⇒ B Classification Trees {T̂ RFb (Xi)}Bb=1




T̂ RFb (Xi) . Generate Ensemble
Notes: The pseudocode shows the steps involved in generating the RF -ensemble (5.6). This pseu-
docode also covers the generation of the F -ensemble (5.5) if the number of randomly drawn predictors
Jtry in step 2. a) is set equal to the total number of predictors J. In this case, the F - and the RF -
ensembles become equal.
5.3. Data
This section introduces three datasets on the basis of which I will evaluate the forecasting
performance of logit models, single classification trees and CTEs. Systemic banking crises
are rare. Their statistical analysis necessitates datasets, which cover large time spans or many
countries – one usually comes at the cost of the other. Therefore I make use of one long-run
sample spanning from 1870 to 2011, as well as two post-1970 samples with broader country
coverage.
5.3.1. The Long-Run Sample, 1870-2011
With regard to the long-run sample, this study utilizes the dataset introduced by Schularick
and Taylor (2012). After further extensions by Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2013), this dataset
now ranges from 1870 to 2011 and covers 17 countries. Usually, these countries cumulatively
constitute more than half of the world’s GDP (according to Maddison GDP estimates).
The dataset features macroeconomic indicators (GDP, consumption, investment, consumer
prices, the current account and exchange rates) as well as financial indicators (bank loans, total
bank assets, stock prices, interest rates, public debt and monetary aggregates). These are the
base indicators from which ca. 70 predictors are derived (see table A1 in the data appendix).
The bare nominal series (n) are utilized when they are deemed to be of interest with respect
to crisis risk (e.g. nominal interest rates). CPI-deflated quantities, growth rates (gr), trend
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Table 5.1: Datasets
Dataset Long-run 1870-2011 sample Broad post-1970 sample I Broad post-1970 sample II
Base indicators Schularick and Taylor (2012) IFS, PWT, Abbas et al. (2013) IFS, Datastream
Crisis dummy Schularick and Taylor (2012) Laeven and Valencia (2013) Laeven and Valencia (2013)
Frequency annual annual quarterly
Time Span 1870 - 2011 1970 - 2011 1970 - 2011
# of countries 17 162 162
# of predictors 77 (Table A1) 70 (Table A2) 73 (Table A3)
# of crises 93 147 147
N 2414 7081 30967
Notes: N number observations. IFS International Financial Statistics. PWT Penn World Tables. The
Schularick and Taylor (2012) dataset has subsequently been extended and updated (see Jordà, Schular-
ick and Taylor, 2013). All three datasets are unbalanced. The number of observations and crises will
vary across applications.
deviations (gap), to GDP ratios (/GDP), global (GDP-weighted) averages (glo), real exchange
rates and interest rate differentials are also obtained (see Alessi and Detken, 2011, for a similar
approach). Furthermore, to obtain an even more detailed snapshot of economic conditions
several of these transformations are combined when it makes economic sense, for example, the
gap of the loans to GDP ratio (Loans/GDP (gap)). Schularick and Taylor (2012) also provide a
binary banking crisis indicator, the definition of which follows Laeven and Valencia (2008):
The indicator takes a value of 1 for years characterized by bank runs, a jump in default rates
and large capital losses associated with public interventions as well as bankruptcies or forced
mergers of major financial institutions. Otherwise the indicator takes a value of 0. Overall, the
dataset contains 93 systemic banking crises (for the country-year incidence of crises see the
crisis map, figure A1, in the data appendix).
5.3.2. The Broad Post-1970 Samples
For the post-1970 period, this paper makes use of the binary banking crisis indicator provided
by Laeven and Valencia (2013). This indicator encompasses 162 countries and 147 systemic
banking crises between the years of 1970 and 2011 (for the country-year incidence of crises see
the crisis map, figure A2, in the data appendix).17
Next, annual and quarterly base indicators from the IMF IFS-database and Datastream
were obtained. When selecting base indicators, it was paramount to consider their availability
across a wide range of countries, as a multitude of missing values would further endanger the
already small number of financial crises. The annual indicators include consumer prices, net
exports, exchange rates, bank loans, stock prices, interest rates and public debt (provided by
17For the quarterly dataset, the quarterly crisis dummy was set to 1 for all quarters, if the year dummy
was 1. This is also the case if a financial crisis began later in the year.
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Abbas et al., 2013). The quarterly indicators include GDP, consumer prices, exchange rates,
bank loans, stock prices, house prices, interest rates, foreign liabilities and reserves. For the
post-1970 annual sample, further use is made of the GDP-, consumption- and investment-series
from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer, 2013), as well as the public debt
to GDP ratios from Abbas et al. (2013). A detailed list of all the predictors can be found in
the data appendix (see tables A2 and A3). An overview of the characteristics of all datasets is
given in table 5.1.
5.4. Performance Comparison
This section stages the competition between logit models, single classification trees and CTEs.
The rules are simple: the method whose crisis-probability predictions achieve the highest out-
of-sample area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC) wins.18 The following
paragraph gives a short introduction to the AUC measure:
Each crisis forecasting model faces a true positive rate (TPR) – false positive rate (FPR)
trade-off. At one extreme, the model could make a crisis call for each period, thus correctly
predicting all crises (100% TPR). However, this comes at the price of never correctly giving
the all-clear (100% FPR). At the other extreme, a model could never issue a crisis warning,
and thus be correct for all non-crisis periods (0% FPR) at the cost of never correctly predicting
a crisis (0% TPR). Crisis probability estimates can be translated into crisis-calls or all-clears
depending on whether crisis probability passes a certain threshold η ∈ [0, 1]. For different
thresholds different TPR-FPR combinations are obtained. By slowly shifting the threshold η
from 0 to 1 all of the TPR-FPR combinations that a model is capable of can be depicted in
the TPF-FPR plane (a unit square). The resulting curve is the receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve, which gives a comprehensive description of a model’s predictive ability. The area
under this curve (AUC) is a slightly more aggregate measure, which most of the following
model comparisons will be based on. The AUC ranges from 0.5 to 1. An AUC of 1 indicates
a perfect EWS, which correctly forecasts all crises as crises, and all non-crises as non-crises.
An AUC of 0.5 indicates an entirely uninformative EWS. The corresponding ROC curve is
a diagonal in the TPR-FPR plane: a higher TPR only comes at the cost of an equally higher
FPR. Intuitively, the AUC represents the probability that for a randomly selected pair of one
crisis and one non-crisis observation, the crisis probability estimate for the crisis-observation is
higher than that for the non-crisis observation. For a comprehensive introduction to the ROC
curve and the AUC in the context of financial crisis forecasting see Jordà (2014).
All model evaluations are based on out-of-sample data. For the CTEs, so-called out-
of-bag (OOB) data is used (see Breiman, 1996b). A tree’s OOB data are those ≈ 37% of
observations that are not contained in the bootstrap sample on which this tree was estimated.
18The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve and the AUC are useful for the evaluation of
predictive performance in classification problems where one class constitutes a minority class (e.g.
banking crises). Under such circumstances, many other criteria tend to inflate the predictive ability of
models that blindly predict the majority class.
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Correspondingly, each observation constitutes OOB data to ≈ 37% of the trees in an ensemble.
Out-of-sample crisis probability estimates are obtained by evaluating each observation by only
those trees in an ensemble for which it constitutes OOB data. For single classification trees
and the logit models, this section conducts Monte Carlo Cross-Validation (MCCV) evaluations
that are comparable to the OOB evaluations. For instance 100 logit models are estimated
based upon 100 bootstrap samples (drawn with replacement). With the observations not
contained in the bootstrap samples 100 out-of-sample AUCs are calculated and their average
constitutes the MCCV estimate. The MCCV-AUC is comparable to the OOB-AUC in that
both are estimates of expected out-of-sample performance (AUC = E(AUCT )) as opposed to
conditional out-of-sample performance – i.e. performance conditional on a particular training
dataset T (AUCT ) (see Haste, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2013, pp.254-257).
5.4.1. Logit EWS
To obtain a yardstick against which to measure the performance of CTEs this subsection first
reports logistic regression-based results. Bi- and multivariate logit models were estimated on
the basis of a selection of predictors, which are comparable to those found in the literature.
Among the single predictors the largest AUCs come from the private burden (AUC=.64)
and the loans/GDP gap (AUC=0.63). They are significantly different from 0.5 at the 1%
significance level.19 The public debt/GDP gap (AUC=0.59) and the public burden (AUC=0.58)
achieve significance at higher levels. Most of the other AUC estimates hover closely above 0.5 –
a rather poor result. Generally, these results are similar to the ones obtained by Jordà (2014)
who, based on comparable specifications, reports AUCs ranging from 0.52 to 0.67.20
Next are multivariate specifications. The variable selections are displayed on the right half
of table 5.2. They are inspired by similar specifications in Schularick and Taylor (2012) and
Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2011). AUCs of all three multivariate models are significantly
different from 0.5 at the 1% significance level. They range from 0.62 to 0.65.
19The reported results hold up when confidence bands and tests are robustified against serial and
cross-sectional correlation in the crisis probability estimates (see appendix).
20On the basis of 19 systemic crises (11 of which are associated with the most recent global financial
crisis) Drehmann and Juselius (2013) report mean AUC estimates between 0.8 and 0.9 for their logit
specifications. These high AUC estimates may hint at important country- and time specificities in the
development of financial crises. The soon to be introduced CTEs also enter the 0.8-0.9 range of AUC
estimates, but on the basis of a more diverse set of banking crises (≥ 70). This will allow forecasters







Loans/GDP (gap) 0.63 * * [0.55,0.71] 1283
Public Debt/GDP (gap) 0.58 * [0.51,0.66] 1347
Narrow Money/GDP (gap) 0.55 [0.48,0.63] 1308
LT Interest Rate 0.52 [0.45,0.6] 1425
GDP (gr) 0.52 [0.44,0.6] 1402
Inflation 0.54 [0.47,0.61] 1492
Exchange Rate (gap) 0.51 [0.44,0.59] 1502
Public Burden 0.57 † [0.5,0.65] 1321
Private Burden 0.64 * * [0.56,0.72] 1223
Joint Burden 0.52 [0.44,0.61] 1180
Multivariate
Baseline 0.62 * * [0.55,0.7] 1144
IA 0.65 * * [0.57,0.73] 1144
FE & IA 0.65 * * [0.57,0.73] 1144
Specification
Baseline IA FE & IA
Variables
Loans/GDP (gap) X X X
Public Debt/GDP (gap) X X X
Narrow Money/GDP (gap) X X X
LT Interest Rate X X X
GDP (gr) X X X
Inflation X X X
Exchange Rate (gap) X X X
Interaction Terms
Public Burden X X
Private Burden X X
Joint Burden X X
Loans/GDP x GDP (gr) X X
Public Debt/GDP x GDP (gr) X X





Notes: Dependent variable: two-year horizon before crisis. Out-of-sample AUC- and confidence band estimates are based on Monte Carlo Cross-
Validation (see Picard and Cook, 1984; Arlot, Celisse et al., 2010): 100 MC-draws of training (63,2%) - test (36,8%) data partitions. IA interaction terms; FE
country fixed effects; N number of training observations (= 0.632×total number of observations). † p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01
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Compared to the baseline specification, the IA specification with interaction terms is suc-
cessful in conveying extra information on the imminence of a banking crisis (AUC=0.65). The
AUC remains the same after the additional inclusion of country-fixed effects. These results are
very close to the out-of-sample results reported by Schularick and Taylor (2012) (AUC=0.646),
which are based on similar logit specifications and data.
5.4.2. Classification Tree-based EWS
CTEs are not just an ensemble of trees but also an ensemble of techniques. To obtain an
impression of the relative efficacy of bagging, randomization and the use of many predictors,
the following analysis will build up to the final RF model one step at a time. First, a single
classification tree, based on the same restricted selection of ten predictors as the IA logit model
was, will be presented, before bagging and randomization is added to the recipe. After that,
the same three steps – i) single tree, ii) bagging, iii) randomization – will be analyzed on the
basis of the broader set of 76 predictors.
5.4.2.1 Single Tree
The left hand side of table 5.3 displays results for the restricted predictor selection. Here, a
single tree performs badly (AUC = 0.55). This confirms similar findings by Davis and Karim
(2008a). When put in terms of the MSE equation (5.2.3), a likely explanation for this is the high
variance of single classification trees. Estimation through recursive partitioning makes them
highly susceptible to small changes in finite training samples.
5.4.2.2 Bagging
Indeed, the dramatic improvement in forecasting performance for an ensemble made up of
many trees over an individual tree, appears to confirm that tree variance was to blame for
an individual tree’s bad performance. The second row in the upper left quadrant of table 5.3
displays the effect of bagging in the ten-variable setting. The AUC leaps by more than 0.2 to a
value of 0.77. This AUC is significantly higher than that displayed by the FE & IA-logit model.
5.4.2.3 Random Forest
The third model in the upper left quadrant of table 5.3 is the RF -estimator. The additional
randomization, in form of randomly analyzing only three out of the ten predictors at each
recursive partitioning step, leads to a slightly higher mean AUC estimate of 0.79. CTEs have
already left behind their logistic competitors without yet having capitalized on their ability to
make forecasts with far more predictors.
5.4.2.4 Many Predictors
I now turn to the more predictor-intensive contenders. The results are displayed in the upper
right quadrant of table 5.3. The extension of the list of predictors to a total of 76 results in a
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Table 5.3: CT -EWS: Long-run 1870-2012 Sample
Results
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
Model AUC 95%-CI N AUC 95%-CI N
Single Tree 0.55 [0.5,0.6] 1816 0.63 § [0.57,0.7] 1742
Bagging 0.77 [0.73,0.81] 1816 0.87 § [0.84,0.9] 1742
Random Forest 0.79 [0.75,0.83] 1816 0.88 § [0.85,0.91] 1742
Specification
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
Parameter Single Bagging RF Single Bagging RF
B 1 5000 5000 1 5000 5000
Jtry 10 10 3 76 76 9
J 10 76
# of crises 72 70
Notes: Dependent variable: two-year horizon before crisis. Restricted Selection: Loans/GDP (gap),
Public Debt/GDP (gap), Narrow Money/GDP (gap), LT Interest Rate, GDP (gr), Inflation, Exchange
Rate (gap), Loans/GDP, Public Debt/GDP, LT Interest Rate (n). Many Predictors: see table A1 in the
data appendix. For single tree: out-of-sample mean AUC- and confidence band estimates are based on
Monte Carlo Cross-Validation (see Picard and Cook, 1984; Arlot, Celisse et al., 2010); 100 MC-draws
of training (63,2%) - test (36,8%) data partitions. For ensembles: out-of-sample AUC-estimates (and
confidence intervals) are based on out-of-bag (OOB)-data (see Breiman, 1996b). N number observations.
J number of predictors under analysis. Jtry number of predictors randomly selected and considered as
a splitting variable at each recursive partitioning step. B number of trees. Specification table: If there is
only a single entry in the bagging column, this means that all models share the same specification. §
H0: AUCmany − AUCrestricted = 0. Bold H0: AUC− AUClogitFE&IA(= 0.65) = 0.
second significant leap in forecasting performance, by about 0.1 for the F - (AUC=0.87) and
RF (AUC=0.88) estimators. Even the single classification tree (AUC=0.63) now performs
similarly to the multivariate logit EWS. In summation, the combination of many classification
trees into an ensemble and the making use of many predictors result in marked improvements
in banking crisis forecasts.
5.4.3. ROC-Comparison
Depending on how much weight policy makers put on making correct crisis calls as opposed
to correct all-clears, the logit EWS might be the preferable EWS after all. To see whether this is
the case, figure 5.2 displays the ROC curves of both EWS’s. The RF model offers the higher
TPR for any given FPR – equivalently the RF model offers a lower FPR for any given TPR.
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RF: AUC=0.88
Logit: AUC=0.65
Logit AUC = RF AUC (p−value) :  0.00
Figure 5.2: ROC-Comparison
Notes: Receiver Operating Characteristic curves of the logit model with country FE and interaction
terms (grey) and RF model (black). The p-value corresponds to a test for equality of AUCs according
to (DeLong, DeLong and Clarke-Pearson, 1988). TPR true positive rate. FPR false positive rate.
In order to get a better indication of RF EWS’s performance, some of the exemplary
TPR-FPR combinations from figure 5.2 should be studied. The RF EWS offers a balanced
TPR-FPR trade-off at about TPR = (1− FPR) = 0.80, i.e. it enables policy makers to correctly
forecast 80% of crises and 80% of non-crises. However, if a 20% probability of mistakenly
forecasting a crisis is deemed too high by policy makers, the RF EWS allows for a reduction
of the probability of mistakenly forecasting a crisis to 5%, while still correctly forecasting
about 50% of banking crises. At the other extreme, policy makers eager not to miss any crisis
could use the RF estimator to correctly forecast 95% of crises. This will however result in
only correctly predicting about 40% of non-crises. Any of these trade-offs leaves policy makers
substantially better off than when using the logit EWS.
5.4.4. Robustness
In order to check whether the main results generalize, the analysis is repeated for the annual
and quarterly post-1970 samples, emerging market and good quality data-subsamples, a
different crisis dummy as well as 1-year and 3-year pre-crisis horizons. In an effort to save
space and to counteract repetitiveness table 5.4 presents an abbreviated analysis that only
reports the results for the random forest models.21
Concerning the 1-, 2-, and 3-year pre-crisis horizons, AUCs generally increase with the
21See the robustness appendix for an extended analysis of the annual and quarterly post-1970 samples.
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Table 5.4: Robustness: Various Random Forest-EWS
Restricted selection Many predictors
Model AUC 95%-CI N [crises] AUC 95%-CI N [crises]
Long-run 1870-2011 dataset
1-year horizon 0.63 [0.56,0.69] 1816 [71] 0.79 § [0.73,0.85] 1742 [70]
2-year horizon 0.79 [0.75,0.83] 1816 [70] 0.88 § [0.86,0.91] 1742 [70]
3-year horizon 0.82 [0.8,0.85] 1816 [69] 0.89 § [0.87,0.91] 1742 [69]
RR dummy 0.76 [0.72,0.8] 1800 [84] 0.86 § [0.83,0.89] 1726 [84]
Post-1970 annual dataset
1-year horizon 0.64 [0.58,0.69] 4465 [103] 0.74 § [0.7,0.79] 4373 [103]
2-year horizon 0.78 [0.75,0.81] 4465 [102] 0.85 § [0.83,0.87] 4373 [102]
3-year horizon 0.8 [0.77,0.82] 4465 [102] 0.88 § [0.87,0.9] 4373 [102]
Emerging markets 0.77 [0.72,0.82] 823 [33] 0.82 [0.78,0.87] 804 [33]
Quality data 0.8 [0.76,0.84] 3325 [77] 0.86 § [0.84,0.89] 3256 [77]
Post-1970 quarterly dataset
1-year horizon 0.84 [0.82,0.86] 19126 [104] 0.93 § [0.92,0.94] 19061 [104]
2-year horizon 0.85 [0.84,0.86] 19126 [102] 0.95 § [0.95,0.96] 19061 [102]
3-year horizon 0.84 [0.83,0.85] 19126 [101] 0.96 § [0.95,0.96] 19061 [101]
Q4 only 0.77 [0.74,0.8] 4820 [103] 0.83 § [0.8,0.85] 4800 [103]
Emerging markets 0.88 [0.86,0.89] 3110 [30] 0.95 § [0.94,0.96] 3110 [30]
Quality data 0.86 [0.84,0.87] 15033 [84] 0.96 § [0.95,0.96] 15010 [84]
Notes: Dependent variable:1/2/3-year horizon before crisis. § H0: AUCmany − AUCrestricted = 0. Bold
H0: AUC− AUClogitFE&IA = 0. All tests at the 5% significance level. Long-run sample restricted selec-
tion: Loans/GDP (gap), Public Debt/GDP (gap), Narrow Money/GDP (gap), LT Interest Rate, GDP
(gr), Inflation, Exchange Rate (gap), Loans/GDP, Public Debt/GDP, LT Interest Rate (n). Long-run sam-
ple many predictors: see table A1 in the data appendix. Annual post-1970 sample restricted selection:
Loans/GDP (gap), Public Debt/GDP (gap), GDP (gap), Inflation, Real Exchange Rate (gap), Loans/GDP,
Public Debt/GDP, Net Exports/GDP (gap). Annual post-1970 sample many predictors: see table A2 in
the data appendix. Quarterly post-1970 sample restricted selection: Loans (gap), Loans (gr), Foreign Li-
abilities (gap)(glo), LT Interest Rate (gap)(glo), GDP (gap)(glo), Inflation, Exchange Rate (gap), Reserves
(gap), GDP (gr)(glo). Quarterly post-1970 sample many predictors: see table A3 in the data appendix.
length of the horizon. This implies that it is harder to assess whether there will be a crisis next
year than to assess whether there will be a crisis within the next few years. This conforms to
accounts which picture banking crisis risks as building up slowly over time. At the same time,
the actual crisis realization is less determinate – usually triggered by a shock, which may or
may not occur in any particular year.
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EWS’s may provide different results for different banking crisis dummies. In order to
investigate whether the high AUCs are specific to the banking crisis dummy by Schularick and
Taylor (2012), table 5.4 displays AUCs obtained for the banking crisis dummy by Reinhart and
Rogoff (2010) (RR dummy). The mean AUC estimates for the RR dummy are only marginally
lower, otherwise the core results hold: the CTE model ouperforms the logit model based on the
same set of predictors and the inclusion of many predictors significantly improves forecasts.
For the post-1970s datasets it is possible to look at emerging markets- (EM) subsamples.22
Despite the fact that the EM subsamples contain only about a third of the crisis-events from
the full sample, the EM AUC estimates are remarkably similar to the baseline results. Note,
however, that in the annual post-1970 EM sample the inclusion of many predictors no longer
significantly improves the AUC.
Excluding countries of presumably poor data quality23 reduces the number of crises by
about one fifth (from approximately 100 to around 80). AUCs tend to improve marginally by
about 0.01. The fact that the exclusion of noisy data and several outliers does not significantly
alter the results, highlights the robustness of the recursive partitioning algorithm.24
Finally, AUCs for the quarterly dataset are systematically higher than for the two annual
samples, particularly in the case with many predictors. This is not due to the slightly different
set of predictors contained in the quarterly sample. This can be seen in the “Q4 only” row
of table 5.4 that reports the AUCs for a random forest model estimated only with the 4th
quarter-observations from the quarterly dataset. In this case, AUC estimates converge with
those for the two annual samples. CTEs seem to thrive on the larger number of observations
contained in the quarterly sample.
In summary, the core results hold up very well: The CTE-based EWS’s yield significantly
higher AUCs than the logit alternative and the inclusion of many predictors further improves
the accuracy of banking crisis predictions.
5.5. Case Study: 2007/2008
To round out this study, the performance of the RF EWS based on many predictors is
compared with the IA-logit EWS in forecasting the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Both
22The emerging markets subsample consists of Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Thailand, Turkey and
Vietnam
23Sample excludes Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central
African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, El Salvador,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, The Gambia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Lao People’s Democratic Republic,
Liberia, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone,
Swaziland, Syria, Timor-Leste, Togo, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia.
24Recall that recursive partitioning is robust to outliers since extreme values do not influence the
internally optimal split points. Noise-resilience also appears to make CTEs outperform one of their
most prominent competitors – boosting – whose out-of-sample AUC estimates appear to be held back
by the level of noise in macroeconomic data (also see Long and Servedio, 2010) (see the appendix for
results and further discussion of boosting-based EWS).
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EWS’s are estimated using the long-run sample, where only the data up to 1997 is incorporated
and the rest of the data is used as test data. The resulting crisis probability estimates for the
test data (1998 to 2011) are reported in figure 5.3.
It is immediately clear that the RF crisis risk evaluation exhibits considerably more
variation than the logit model. For most countries it would have signaled a build-up in
crisis risk in the mid-2000s. Thus, the RF model would have signaled rather clearly that the
developed world as a whole was embarking upon a path, which historically has often ended
in crisis. The evidence for the logit model is less flattering. While for some countries it signals
a (slightly) higher crisis risk, for others it signals no big changes or even shows an increasing
resilience during the 2000s.
The RF model produces mixed results with respect to the country-specific incidence of the
2007/2008 crisis. For the following countries crisis risk went up and a crisis did indeed occur:
Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Spain, France, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and
the USA. Although the RF crisis risk is upward trending for all of these countries, its level
is relatively low for some, namely Switzerland and the USA. Germany, for which crisis risk
does not even trend upwards, also exhibits a very low risk level. How can these cases be
explained? What brought down German and Swiss banks was their exposure to foreign assets.
For the USA, nonbank intermediation was at the heart of its banking crisis. Neither exposure
to foreign assets, nor nonbank intermediation are well reflected by any of the base indicators
in the long-run sample. Extending the list of base indicators may help improve forecasts.
Several countries show clear signs of being in a danger zone prior to 2007/2008, but did
not experience a systemic banking crisis according to the binary indicator: Australia, Canada,
Finland, Norway. There is a notable concentration of Scandinavian countries and primary
good exporters in this group. Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998) show that primary-product
exporting countries possess a distinct set of early-warning indicators, which might explain the
poor performance of the RF -EWS in these cases. What is also interesting is that, excluding
Canada, all of these countries experienced a banking crisis in the late 1980s or early 1990s. The
ensuing institutional changes might have rendered their banking systems more resilient 20
years later. Giannone, Lenza and Reichlin (2010) present related evidence for the importance
of regulatory quality in credit markets for explaining cross-country differences in weathering
the global recession. Also note, that in Australia and Norway banking systems did in fact
come under considerable stress during the relevant period – they are knife-edge cases with
respect to the dummy categorization that was applied.
The last group consists of countries that did not see their risk profiles rise and indeed did
not experience a systemic event: Japan is the only country in this category.
Formalizing these observations into conditional25 out-of-sample AUC measures yields
AUCs of 0.53 and 0.76 for the logit and RF model, respectively. The difference is statisti-
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Figure 5.3: The 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis
Notes: 1998-2011 out-of-sample probability estimates of being in the two year horizon before a banking
crisis for 17 countries. 10 country-year observations between 1998 and 2011 exhibit missing values and
were replaced by the respective variable’s mean to obtain a probability estimate. Vertical gray bars
indicate years with a systemic banking crisis.
cally significant (p-value=0.00)26, while the logit AUC does not significantly differ from the
uninformative 0.5 at the 5% significance level.
In summary, the results of the RF model on the most recent crisis is mixed. While the
26The p-value corresponds to the test for equality of AUCs by (DeLong, DeLong and Clarke-Pearson,
1988).
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model would not have performed as convincingly with respect to the country-specific incidence
of the crisis, it would have clearly signaled that the developed world as a whole, was on a
dangerous path from the early 2000s on. The first part of this conclusion nicely mirrors results
reported by Claessens et al. (2010), Rose and Spiegel (2010b), Rose and Spiegel (2010a) and
Rose and Spiegel (2012), who find that prior to the global financial crisis hardly any predictor
conveyed reliable information about the crisis’ subsequent cross-country severity. While
Rose and Spiegel (2012) continue to argue that their results warrant skepticism towards the
potential of EWS to accurately predict a crisis, the analysis provided above suggests a different
conclusion. Although even CTE EWS would have found predicting the 2007/2008 crises
somewhat more difficult than their historical track record suggests, their use is still generally
very promising. Also note that the evaluation of the RF EWS’s performance in 2007/2008
depends on the categorization of two knife-edge cases. Given a more lenient evaluation
of these cases (Australia and Norway) figure 5.3 shows that even in terms of cross-country
incidence for 2007/2008 the RF predictor did not perform badly. Especially if combined with
country-specific knowledge, as exemplified above, the proposed RF -EWS would have given
policy makers a valuable warning as to the vulnerability of the world financial system prior to
the crisis.
5.6. Conclusion
This paper explored the potential of classification tree ensembles (CTEs) for forecasting binary
banking crisis indicators. Their out-of-sample performance surpasses current best-practice
early-warning systems that are based on logit models, by a substantial margin. The good
forecasting performance of CTEs contrasts with the poor performance of single classification
trees. However, the combination of many classification trees into an ensemble on the one hand,
and the making use of many predictors on the other, result in an EWS that has the potential to





The following is a more precise account of the predictors used in the analysis:
1. In regard to the gap measure I used deviations from a slowly adjusting HP-trend
(λ = 1600), which captures the slow build-up of financial imbalances (see Borio and Drehmann,
2009). Since the following is an exercise in forecasting, I used a one-sided HP-filter (Mehra,
2004).
2. I standardized the "to GDP" ratios when there was a lack of cross-country comparability
between series, e.g. the loan aggregates (see Schularick and Taylor, 2012).
3. I calculated the global averages at time t as the GDP-weighted average of all countries
with values at time t. For the quarterly post-1970 sample I calculated the non-weighted global
average, due to the limited availability of quarterly PPP GDP data.
4. I calculated the real exchange rate for observation i as: RERi = NERi · Pi/P∗, where
NERi denotes the nominal USD-exchange rate in price notation, Pi is the domestic CPI and P∗
is the U.S. CPI.
5. I obtained the interest rate differential-predictors by subtracting global average interest
rates from country interest rates.
6. Specifically for the logit analysis I generated six interaction terms.27 I proxied private
debt servicing costs by the multiplicative interaction-term of the Loans/GDP (gap) with long-
term interest rates. Analogously public debt servicing costs are proxied by Public Debt/GDP
(gap) x long-term interest rates (see Jordà, 2014). I defined the joint debt burden as the
interaction-term of long-term rates with the Loans/GDP (gap) and the Public Debt/GDP (gap).
The remaining three interaction terms are: Loans/GDP x GDP (gr) and Public Debt/GDP
x GDP (gr) – aimed at capturing debt sustainability considerations in the face of low GDP
realizations – and Loans/GDP (gap) x Exchange Rate (gap) – aimed at capturing effects from
devaluations on the banking system.
I only make use of predictors which are broadly available across countries and time,
because the limited number of crisis observations does not allow for large data losses due to
missing values. For each of the three samples I eventually opt for an eclectic, though to some
extent ad hoc, selection of ≈ 70 predictors. The number of predictors is often considered as
a fine-tuning parameter. Such fine-tuning however is problematic when it comes to banking
crisis forecasting for several reasons: Given the rarity of severe banking crises, setting aside
part of the data for tuning considerations (i.e. validation data) is an excessive strain on the
samples. Also, the crisis dummy bunches together a variety of different types of banking
crises. This makes large training datasets necessary for any statistical procedure to uncover the
different predictor signatures that foretell the advent of such a generically defined crisis event.
27I do not use these interaction terms in the classification tree-based analysis, as classification trees
automatically identify important predictor interactions.
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Finally, although the paper replicates results in more than one dataset, they are not entirely
independent. These conditions leave little room for fine-tuning the model, as is commonly
done in “big data” applications where separate validation data is more readily available. When
it comes to forecasting banking crises, parsimony with respect to data is important.28
An exhaustive list of all predictors can be found in tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7.29 These can be
compared to other variable selections found in the literature (table 5.14).
28For the stated reasons, this paper makes use of default settings sourced from the literature also with
respect to other fine-tuning parameters, such as tree growth stopping rules.
29Note the extreme means and standard deviations that show up for some predictors in tables A1 to A3.
These are due to extreme outliers (e.g. those associated with the German hyperinflation of 1923). No
attempt was made to remove these outliers, because the estimation of internally optimal split points
via recursive partitioning renders classification trees immune to them.
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Table 5.5: Indicators
Indicator Obs. Mean S.D. 5th perc. 95th perc.
Bank Assets (gap)(glo) 2380 2.77 4.58 -4.06 9.30
Bank Assets (gr)(glo) 2397 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.11
Bank Assets/GDP (gap)(glo) 2380 -0.02 1.02 -1.97 1.47
Bank Assets/GDP (glo) 2414 9.03 2.25 4.18 11.53
Bank Assets/GDP (gr)(glo) 2397 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.02
Broad Money (gap)(glo) 2380 3.06 5.42 -3.71 9.07
Broad Money (gr)(glo) 2397 0.04 0.03 -0.02 0.08
Broad Money/GDP (gap)(glo) 2380 0.11 2.35 -3.12 2.69
Broad Money/GDP (glo) 2414 10.46 1.68 9.27 14.40
Broad Money/GDP (gr)(glo) 2397 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03
C (gap) 2261 1.28 7.53 -8.82 13.18
C (gap)(glo) 2380 1.19 4.17 -6.09 9.24
C (gr) 2278 0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.09
C (gr)(glo) 2397 0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.05
C/GDP 2140 8.64 19.78 0.00 43.67
C/GDP (gap) 2079 0.96 6.40 -8.11 10.64
C/GDP (gap)(glo) 2380 0.65 5.31 -6.19 6.05
C/GDP (glo) 2414 10.04 4.93 5.08 18.98
C/GDP (gr) 2109 -0.01 0.06 -0.08 0.06
C/GDP (gr)(glo) 2397 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.03
Exchange Rate (gap) 2380 3.21 25.98 -18.10 35.34
Exchange Rate (gr) 2397 249,929.16 12236321.00 -0.14 0.22
Exchange Rate (n) 2414 45.79 196.22 0.05 166.00
GDP (gap) 2192 1.22 7.17 -8.29 11.84
GDP (gap)(glo) 2380 1.49 4.97 -5.30 9.68
GDP (gr) 2223 0.02 0.06 -0.06 0.10
GDP (gr)(glo) 2397 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.07
I (gap)(glo) 2380 4.56 23.95 -21.74 36.39
I (gr)(glo) 2397 0.08 0.34 -0.13 0.31
I/GDP (gap)(glo) 2380 1.67 17.70 -21.94 22.97
I/GDP (glo) 2414 0.18 0.04 0.12 0.24
I/GDP (gr)(glo) 2397 0.03 0.23 -0.12 0.22
Inflation 2363 0.04 0.15 -0.06 0.17
Inflation (glo) 2397 0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.18
LT Interest Rate 2259 0.02 0.12 -0.11 0.10
LT Interest Rate (gap) 2197 -0.00 0.09 -0.08 0.07
LT Interest Rate (gap)(glo) 2363 -0.00 0.04 -0.08 0.06
LT Interest Rate (glo) 2397 0.02 0.06 -0.11 0.09
LT Interest Rate (n) 2300 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.12
LT Interest Rate (n)(gap) 2242 -0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01
LT Interest Rate (n)(gap)(glo) 2380 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01
LT Interest Rate (n)(glo) 2414 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.10
LT Interest Rate Diff. 2259 -0.00 0.10 -0.07 0.09
LT Interest Rate Diff. (n) 2300 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03
Loans (gap) 2151 4.50 15.41 -17.75 27.13
Loans (gap)(glo) 2380 3.34 9.29 -13.00 20.28
Loans (gr) 2177 0.05 0.12 -0.09 0.20
Loans (gr)(glo) 2397 0.05 0.06 -0.03 0.15
Loans/GDP 2101 10.00 1.00 8.61 11.77
Loans/GDP (gap) 2035 0.05 2.63 -4.40 4.28
Continued on next page
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Table A1: Indicators (continued)
Indicator Obs. Mean S.D. 5th perc. 95th perc.
Loans/GDP (gap)(glo) 2380 -0.07 2.83 -5.73 4.81
Loans/GDP (glo) 2414 9.68 2.14 2.93 11.73
Loans/GDP (gr) 2068 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.03
Loans/GDP (gr)(glo) 2397 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Narrow Money (gap) 2150 3.59 11.86 -12.69 24.15
Narrow Money (gap)(glo) 2380 3.56 7.71 -8.24 18.75
Narrow Money (gr) 2183 0.04 0.10 -0.08 0.18
Narrow Money (gr)(glo) 2397 0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.12
Narrow Money/GDP (gap) 2075 0.68 3.08 -3.77 5.65
Public Debt (gap) 2135 5.75 22.14 -19.11 39.48
Public Debt (gap)(glo) 2380 8.97 16.09 -8.69 36.90
Public Debt (gr) 2169 0.04 0.17 -0.11 0.24
Public Debt (gr)(glo) 2397 0.05 0.12 -0.04 0.24
Public Debt/GDP 2207 0.54 0.39 0.10 1.20
Public Debt/GDP (gap) 2135 13.98 109.21 -21.77 47.65
Public Debt/GDP (gap)(glo) 2380 8.97 16.09 -8.69 36.90
Public Debt/GDP (glo) 2414 0.66 0.29 0.34 1.09
Real Exchange Rate 2384 10.00 0.97 8.96 11.95
Real Exchange Rate (gap) 2342 -0.10 2.74 -4.21 3.52
Real Exchange Rate (gr) 2363 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.03
ST Interest Rate (gap)(glo) 2363 -0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.07
ST Interest Rate (glo) 2397 0.01 0.07 -0.10 0.08
ST Interest Rate (n)(gap)(glo) 2380 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.02
ST Interest Rate (n)(glo) 2414 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.09
Stock Prices (gap)(glo) 2380 22.10 62.05 -28.26 108.38
Stock Prices (gr)(glo) 2397 0.03 0.15 -0.23 0.25
Notes: (n) nominal; (gr) growth; (glo) global GDP-weighted average; (gap) percentage deviation from
(one-sided) HP-trend ( λ = 1600). The high mean and standard deviation for the exchange rate growth
predictor are due to the German hyperinflation of 1923.
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Table 5.6: Indicators, annual post-1970 sample
Indicator Obs. Mean S.D. 5th perc. 95th perc.
C (gap) 5821 3.15 10.69 -10.24 18.94
C (gap)(glo) 6440 3.50 2.95 -1.04 8.47
C (gr) 5979 0.04 0.10 -0.10 0.17
C (gr)(glo) 6601 0.05 0.03 -0.00 0.10
C/GDP 6157 0.66 0.17 0.39 0.92
C/GDP (gap) 5841 2.87 205.36 -11.32 10.29
C/GDP (gap)(glo) 6440 2.08 3.57 -2.93 7.72
C/GDP (glo) 6762 0.58 0.03 0.53 0.62
C/GDP (gr) 5999 0.00 0.09 -0.10 0.11
C/GDP (gr)(glo) 6601 -0.00 0.04 -0.06 0.06
Exchange Rate (n) 6197 301.52 1341.10 0.00 1083.01
Exchange Rate (n)(gap) 5881 14.69 42.79 -18.94 85.78
Exchange Rate (n)(gr) 6039 3.6e+05 2.8e+07 -0.11 0.79
GDP (gap) 5821 3.35 12.31 -9.82 20.46
GDP (gap)(glo) 6440 2.18 4.31 -5.38 8.57
GDP (gr) 5979 0.02 0.06 -0.07 0.10
GDP (gr)(glo) 6601 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.07
I (gap) 5821 12.62 278.75 -29.92 49.16
I (gap)(glo) 6440 4.93 9.61 -13.16 18.03
I (gr) 5979 0.06 0.44 -0.25 0.39
I (gr)(glo) 6601 0.08 0.13 -0.07 0.23
I/GDP 6157 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.39
I/GDP (gap) 5841 1.99 21.27 -27.49 35.00
I/GDP (gap)(glo) 6440 0.56 7.31 -13.42 10.09
I/GDP (glo) 6762 0.27 0.03 0.23 0.32
I/GDP (gr) 5999 0.02 0.51 -0.25 0.32
I/GDP (gr)(glo) 6601 0.02 0.11 -0.13 0.16
Inflation 5979 3.7e+05 2.9e+07 -0.01 0.71
Inflation (glo) 6601 12671.34 80145.44 0.09 0.48
LT Interest Rate (gap)(glo) 6440 -0.13 0.83 -1.66 1.46
LT Interest Rate (gap)(glo) 6279 -0.12 0.84 -1.74 1.79
LT Interest Rate (glo) 6601 5.85 3.04 1.91 10.45
LT Interest Rate (n)(glo) 6762 5.79 3.02 1.88 10.52
Loans (gap) 4936 14.44 149.33 -28.34 62.48
Loans (gap)(glo) 6440 4.71 9.75 -14.90 21.53
Loans (gr) 5099 3.8e+06 2.7e+08 -0.20 0.43
Loans (gr)(glo) 6601 326.77 2065.77 -0.04 0.34
Loans/GDP 5294 10.00 0.99 8.74 11.87
Loans/GDP (gap) 6440 -0.36 2.46 -6.16 2.74
Loans/GDP (gap) 4960 0.66 4.71 -7.26 8.64
Loans/GDP (glo) 6762 10.21 2.06 7.47 13.17
Loans/GDP (gr) 5127 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.06
Loans/GDP (gr)(glo) 6601 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03
Net Exports (gap) 5813 -4.94 1510.24 -189.64 220.52
Net Exports (gap)(glo) 6440 10.31 91.74 -177.73 191.82
Net Exports (gr) 5964 -0.33 17.49 -2.38 2.27
Net Exports (gr)(glo) 6601 -0.55 3.63 -3.87 2.10
Net Exports/GDP 6157 -0.06 0.17 -0.31 0.15
Net Exports/GDP (gap) 5833 -7.08 3359.35 -193.22 209.44
Net Exports/GDP (gap)(glo) 6440 -98.12 941.21 -127.61 138.78
Continued on next page
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Table A2: Indicators, annual post-1970 sample (continued)
Indicator Obs. Mean S.D. 5th perc. 95th perc.
Net Exports/GDP (glo) 6762 -0.00 0.03 -0.04 0.04
Net Exports/GDP (gr) 5984 -0.34 16.79 -2.37 2.13
Net Exports/GDP (gr)(glo) 6601 -0.55 3.45 -3.74 1.79
Public Debt (gap) 4780 4.90 88.01 -29.00 38.47
Public Debt (gr) 5009 0.07 0.27 -0.19 0.43
Public Debt (gr)(glo) 6601 0.08 0.22 -0.06 0.29
Public Debt/GDP 5388 62.18 65.19 10.41 158.71
Public Debt/GDP (gap) 4913 7.20 158.25 -37.52 45.04
Public Debt/GDP (gap)(glo) 6762 40.54 15.50 15.56 65.75
Public Debt/GDP (gap)(glo) 6440 3.00 16.65 -20.92 35.54
Public Debt/GDP (gap)(glo) 6440 3.00 16.65 -20.92 35.54
Real Exchange Rate 6137 10.00 0.98 8.82 11.80
Real Exchange Rate (gap) 5821 0.51 3.60 -5.86 6.65
Real Exchange Rate (gr) 5979 0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.05
ST Interest Rate (gap)(glo) 6279 -26.53 303.98 -567.80 212.32
ST Interest Rate (glo) 6601 77.58 351.66 4.83 49.50
ST Interest Rate (n)(gap)(glo) 6440 -25.78 300.19 -502.86 118.05
ST Interest Rate (n)(glo) 6762 76.06 347.62 4.90 50.04
Stock Prices (gap)(glo) 6440 61.01 71.81 1.24 229.83
Stock Prices (gr)(glo) 6601 0.05 0.38 -0.33 0.79
Notes: (n) nominal; (gr) growth; (glo) global GDP-weighted average; (gap) percentage deviation from
(one-sided) HP-trend ( λ = 1600). With the exception of the level predictors, the high means and stan-
dard deviations for the exchange rate-, inflation- and loan predictors are due to outlier values found
for the following countries: Bolivia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Nicaragua, Nigeria,
Serbia and Zimbabwe.
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Table 5.7: Indicators, quarterly post-1970 sample
Indicator Obs. Mean S.D. 5th perc. 95th perc.
CPI 22279 65.27 59.65 0.27 139.27
CPI (glo) 30780 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.09
Exchange Rate (n)(gap) 27866 4.16 51.78 -10.72 23.99
Exchange Rate (n)(gr) 28051 14.76 2201.33 -0.06 0.13
Foreign Liabilities (gap)(glo) 30600 23.76 43.45 -0.98 102.19
Foreign Liabilities (glo) 30960 215.68 159.83 26.62 605.61
Foreign Liabilities (gr)(glo) 30780 1.3e+06 1.7e+07 -0.01 0.52
Foreign Liabilities (n)(gap)(glo) 30600 18.75 70.67 0.27 37.65
Foreign Liabilities (n)(glo) 30960 6.6e+10 8.6e+11 113.11 84491.38
Foreign Liabilities (n)(gr)(glo) 30780 7.1e+06 7.8e+07 0.02 1.74
Foreign Liabilities/GDP (gap)(glo) 30600 0.15 1.92 -2.31 2.39
Foreign Liabilities/GDP (glo) 30960 10.00 0.32 9.73 10.44
Foreign Liabilities/GDP (gr)(glo) 30780 -0.06 0.72 -0.02 0.10
GDP (gap)(glo) 30600 114.90 497.82 -209.48 507.08
GDP (glo) 30960 7404.10 41252.75 -996.98 34855.12
GDP (gr)(glo) 30780 0.26 6.27 -2.00 3.14
GDP (n)(gap)(glo) 30600 57.42 234.64 -251.87 356.51
GDP (n)(glo) 30960 3.55 1.97 0.45 6.08
GDP (n)(gr)(glo) 30780 0.33 6.18 -3.32 4.66
House Prices (gap)(glo) 30060 -0.00 2.88 -5.22 3.56
House Prices (glo) 30420 3.75 3.32 1.36 11.31
House Prices (gr)(glo) 30240 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.03
House Prices (n)(gap)(glo) 30600 0.55 3.02 -5.16 5.22
House Prices (n)(glo) 30960 373.19 495.26 42.69 1542.70
House Prices (n)(gr)(glo) 30780 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.05
Inflation 21866 0.04 0.35 -0.01 0.11
Inflation (glo) 30780 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.09
LT Interest Rate (glo) 30780 9.76 2.92 6.06 12.87
LT Interest Rate (n)(glo) 30960 10.69 3.38 6.28 15.27
LT Interest Rate Diff. (glo) 30780 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
LT Interest Rate Diff. (n)(glo) 30960 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Loans 20266 1015.99 2947.06 1.28 5872.05
Loans (gap) 19775 20.82 1828.59 -13.20 24.86
Loans (gap)(glo) 30600 16.96 136.05 -1.06 31.13
Loans (glo) 30960 973.98 571.51 493.79 2331.87
Loans (gr) 19961 0.02 0.11 -0.09 0.13
Loans (gr)(glo) 30780 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.06
Loans (n) 24234 2.0e+14 3.1e+16 2.40 3.8e+05
Loans (n)(gap) 23729 7.86 165.20 -8.55 27.96
Loans (n)(gap)(glo) 30600 7.53 13.14 0.55 12.53
Loans (n)(glo) 30960 1.7e+14 2.2e+15 756.76 4.0e+05
Loans (n)(gr) 23920 2.6e+07 4.1e+09 -0.05 0.20
Loans (n)(gr)(glo) 30780 2.2e+07 2.9e+08 0.02 0.11
Loans/GDP (gap)(glo) 30600 0.08 1.03 -1.49 1.82
Loans/GDP (glo) 30960 9.97 0.20 9.79 10.30
Loans/GDP (gr)(glo) 30780 0.00 0.25 -0.03 0.08
Real Exchange Rate (gap) 21332 0.13 2.18 -3.26 3.43
Real Exchange Rate (gr) 21529 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Reserves 20982 7.1e+11 2.1e+13 0.46 2199.54
Reserves (gap) 20514 307.29 27492.34 -33.83 129.20
Continued on next page
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Table A2: Indicators, quarterly post-1970 sample (continued)
Indicator Obs. Mean S.D. 5th perc. 95th perc.
Reserves (gap)(glo) 30600 310.91 2723.12 -2.19 179.45
Reserves (glo) 30960 1.0e+12 2.6e+12 140.56 8.0e+12
Reserves (gr) 20719 0.03 0.66 -0.28 0.35
Reserves (gr)(glo) 30780 0.03 0.08 -0.05 0.14
Reserves (n) 25411 14489.74 96910.52 14.23 47255.90
Reserves (n)(gap) 24975 13.42 379.33 -31.25 54.95
Reserves (n)(gap)(glo) 30600 13.03 28.28 -3.51 39.61
Reserves (n)(glo) 30960 12554.25 15958.76 1239.33 53696.80
Reserves (n)(gr) 25178 0.07 0.86 -0.25 0.42
Reserves (n)(gr)(glo) 30780 0.07 0.09 -0.02 0.25
Reserves/GDP (gap)(glo) 30600 0.07 1.17 -1.71 2.32
Reserves/GDP (glo) 30960 9.96 0.18 9.74 10.34
Reserves/GDP (gr)(glo) 30780 0.00 0.10 -0.03 0.07
ST Interest Rate (glo) 30780 5011.86 57413.27 4.11 70.80
ST Interest Rate (n)(glo) 30960 4330.27 49689.00 4.24 72.36
ST Interest Rate Diff. (glo) 30780 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
ST Interest Rate Diff. (n)(glo) 30960 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
Stock Prices (gap)(glo) 30600 7.48 14.26 -12.56 32.09
Stock Prices (glo) 30960 0.60 0.28 0.29 1.27
Stock Prices (gr)(glo) 30780 0.01 0.07 -0.11 0.10
Stock Prices (n)(gap)(glo) 30600 9.95 60.50 -7.98 20.45
Stock Prices (n)(glo) 30960 610.50 6942.76 6.78 135.30
Stock Prices (n)(gr)(glo) 30780 0.04 0.07 -0.08 0.15
Notes: (n) nominal; (gr) growth; (glo) global GDP-weighted average; (gap) percentage deviation from
(one-sided) HP-trend ( λ = 1600). With the exception of the level predictors, the high means and
standard deviations for the foreign liability-, loan-, reserve- and ST rate predictors are due to outlier
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Figure 5.4: Crisis Map: Long-run 1870-2011 sample
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Figure 5.5: Crisis Map: Post-1970 Samples




This section discusses variable importance measures (VIMs) for classification tree ensembles
by means of the random forest EWS estimated on the basis of the long-run (1870-2011) sample
(corresponding to the results reported in table 3 that is included in the paper). The two most
commonly applied VIMs are permutation importance30 and gini importance. Permutation
importance evaluates the importance of a predictor j according to the decrease in out-of-sample
prediction accuracy, which results from the random permutation of that predictor. For each
tree b the following variable importance measure is calculated:
VIMbPerm(j) =








where Xb indicates the bootstrap sample on which the tree b is estimated and yi is the binary
crisis indicator. |Bb| indicates the number of observations contained in bootstrap sample
b. ŷbi is the model’s out-of-bag (OOB) crisis prediction. It is either 0 or 1, depending on
how observation i is categorized by the majority of trees for which it constitutes an out-of-
bag (OOB) observation. ŷbi,perm is the same prediction made with the randomly permuted
predictor j. If the permutation of j results in many more false warnings then j has a high
variable importance VIMbPerm(j). The final permutation importance measure is then obtained
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Figure 5.6: Variable importances for the random forest model based on the restricted variable selection
Notes: (n) nominal; (r) real; (gr) growth; (glo) global GDP-weighted average; (gap) percentage deviation
from (one-sided) HP-trend (λ = 1600).
The left panel of figure 5.6 shows that according to this measure CPI inflation is the most
important predictor in the restricted predictor set, followed by the Loans/GDP (gap) and
30The following discussion concentrates on the unscaled version of the permutation importance
measure because its statistical properties compare favorably to the scaled version (see Díaz-Uriarte
and De Andres, 2006; Strobl and Zeileis, 2008; Nicodemus et al., 2010).
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long-term interest rates.
An alternative variable importance measure is the gini importance, which is the average of











where ∑Sbs=1 IG(t̂sj ) is the sum of information gains across all splits s that occur along predictor
j in tree b. The right panel of figure 5.6 shows the Gini importance ranking for the random
forest model based on few predictors. The two Loans/GDP predictors come out on top of the
ranking, followed by the exchange rate gap. The dissimilarity of the Gini- and Permutation
importance rankings is striking. The only exception to this is the Loans/GDP (gap), which
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Figure 5.7: Variable importances for the random forest model based on many predictors; top 10
Notes: (n) nominal; (r) real; (gr) growth; (glo) global GDP-weighted average; (gap) percentage deviation
from (one-sided) HP-trend ( λ = 1600).
Figure 5.7 displays the top-10 predictors according to the Permutation- and Gini-importance
measures for the random forest model based on many predictors. Yet again in this case, the
two importance measures produce conflicting rankings with only two predictors showing up
in both top-10: the ST Rate (gap)(glo) and the Loans (r)(gap). Otherwise the permutation-based
measure is dominated by global predictors (glo), while the gini-based top-10 are dominated by
domestic loans.
These results caution against the reliance on variable importance measures for identifying
the main drivers behind banking crisis risk. Different importance measures can produce very
different results.31 Given that the theoretical analysis of the properties of different variable
importance measures is in its early stages (see Ishwaran, 2007; Grömping, 2012; Louppe et al.,
2013) and strong theoretical reasons for the adoption of one importance measure over another
is lacking, it may be preferable to supplement CTE-based forecasts with additional modes of
31See the series of papers published in BMC Bioinformatics: Nicodemus, Wang and Shugart (2007),
Strobl et al. (2007), Strobl et al. (2008), Nicodemus and Malley (2009) and Nicodemus et al. (2010).
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assessing the relevance of particular risk factors.
5.A.3. Robustness
Post-1970 annual sample
Here, the analysis is repeated for the annual post-1970 sample in order to check whether the
main results replicate. With the exception of a slightly different set of predictors, the analysis
proceeds along the same lines as for the annual long-run sample. The main results hold up
very well: Bagging and the inclusion of many predictors substantially improves the accuracy
of banking crisis predictions.
The results are reported in table 5.8. As in the case of the long-run sample, a single
classification tree estimated on the basis of the restricted set of seven predictors performs
poorly (AUC = 0.54). This poor performance is again remedied through bagging: Compared to
the single classification tree, the mean AUC estimate for the F estimator jumps by more than
0.2 to 0.76. The additional randomization in the RF estimator (AUC=0.78) is again associated
with a 0.02 increase in the mean AUC estimate. Estimation on the basis of 70 predictors yields
a second increase in predictive performance for the two CTEs. For both, a mean AUC estimate
of 0.85 is calculated. Overall, the results for the annual long-run- and annual post-1970 sample
are very similar.
Results for the quarterly post-1970 sample, with again a different set of predictors, confirms
that two significant increases in out-of-sample predictive performance can be obtained by
moving from single trees to tree ensembles, and from a few to many predictors.
Quarterly data
Table 5.9 illustrates the results for the quarterly post-1970 sample. For the quarterly data
the mean AUC estimates are generally higher than for the long-run dataset and the annual
post-1970 sample – regardless of specification. However, the mean AUC estimate for the single
classification tree based on the restricted set of predictors (AUC=0.58) is still rather close to
the uninformative 0.5. Once again it is their aggregation into an ensemble which renders
classification trees fit for forecasting: the mean AUC estimate for the two CTEs that are based
on the restricted set of predictors is 0.83. As opposed to the other two samples, the RF
estimator does not perform better than the F estimator.
Estimation on the basis of the eclectic set of 73 predictors again improves forecasts. Even
the single classification tree now achieves an AUC of 0.69. For the two CTEs I obtained high
AUC estimates of 0.97 and 0.95. In this case, the additional randomization puts the RF
estimator at a small disadvantage in comparison to the plain F estimator.
Table 5.10 shows how much of the improvement was due to the higher data frequency as
opposed to the different predictor set. The results are for the same quarterly post-1970 data,
but using only Q4 of each year. Stars (∗) indicate that at the 5% significance level, the AUCs
of the Q4-only analysis are significantly lower than the AUCs of the analysis that uses all
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Table 5.8: CT -EWS: Annual Post-1970 Sample
Results
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
Model AUC 95%-CI N AUC 95%-CI N
Single Tree 0.54 [0.5,0.57] 4465 0.56 § [0.52,0.6] 4373
Bagging 0.76 [0.73,0.8] 4465 0.85 § [0.83,0.87] 4373
Random Forest 0.78 [0.75,0.81] 4465 0.85 § [0.83,0.87] 4373
Specification
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
Parameter Single Bagging RF Single Bagging RF
B 1 5000 5000 1 5000 5000
Jtry 7 7 3 70 70 8
J 7 70
# of crises 102 102
Notes: Dependent variable: two-year horizon before crisis. Restricted Selection: Loans/GDP (gap),
Public Debt/GDP (gap), GDP (gap), Inflation, Real Exchange Rate (gap), Loans/GDP, Public Debt/GDP,
Net Exports/GDP (gap). Many Predictors: see table A2. For single tree: out-of-sample mean AUC- and
confidence band estimates are based on Monte Carlo Cross-Validation (see Picard and Cook, 1984; Arlot,
Celisse et al., 2010); 100 MC-draws of training (63,2%) - test (36,8%) data partitions. For ensembles: out-
of-sample AUC-estimates (and confidence intervals) are based on out-of-bag (OOB)-data (see Breiman,
1996b). N number observations. J number of predictors under analysis. Jtry number of predictors
randomly selected and considered as a splitting variable at each recursive partitioning step. B number
of trees. Specification table: If only the bagging column has an entry this means all models share the
same specification. § H0: AUCmany − AUCrestricted = 0. Bold H0: AUC− AUClogitFE&IA(= 0.62) = 0. All
tests at the 5% significance level. Logit specification: restricted variable selection + interaction terms as
in table 5.2 + country fixed effects.
four quarters. This suggests that EWS’s based on quarterly data will be more accurate than
comparable EWS’s based on annual data.
More generally, the strong performance across at least three datasets (differing in frequency,
predictors as well as country- and time-coverage) suggests that CTEs are a reliable choice
when it comes to forecasting a banking crisis.
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Table 5.9: CT -EWS: Quarterly Post-1970 Sample
Results
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
Model AUC 95%-CI N AUC 95%-CI N
Single Tree 0.58 [0.55,0.6] 19126 0.69 § [0.66,0.72] 19061
Bagging 0.85 [0.83,0.86] 19126 0.97 § [0.97,0.98] 19061
Random Forest 0.85 [0.84,0.86] 19126 0.95 § [0.95,0.96] 19061
Specification
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
Parameter Single Bagging RF Single Bagging RF
B 1 5000 5000 1 5000 5000
Jtry 9 9 3 73 73 9
J 9 73
# of crises 102 102
Notes: Dependent variable: two-year horizon before crisis. Restricted Selection: Loans (gap), Loans
(gr), Foreign Liabilities (gap)(glo), LT Interest Rate (gap)(glo), GDP (gap)(glo), Inflation, Exchange
Rate (gap), Reserves (gap), GDP (gr)(glo). Many Predictors: see table 5.7. For single tree: out-of-
sample mean AUC- and confidence band estimates are based on Monte Carlo Cross-Validation (see
Picard and Cook, 1984; Arlot, Celisse et al., 2010); 100 MC-draws of training (63,2%) - test (36,8%)
data partitions. For ensembles: out-of-sample AUC-estimates (and confidence intervals) are based on
out-of-bag (OOB)-data (see Breiman, 1996b). N number observations. J number of predictors under
analysis. Jtry number of predictors randomly selected and considered as a splitting variable at each
recursive partitioning step. B number of trees. Specification table: If only the bagging column has an
entry this means all models share the same specification. § H0: AUCmany − AUCrestricted = 0. Bold H0:
AUC− AUClogitFE&IA(= 0.65) = 0. Logit specification: restricted variable selection + interaction terms
in table 2 (main text) (excluding terms with public debt) + country fixed effects.
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Table 5.10: CT -EWS: 4th Quarter only Post-1970 Sample
Results
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
Model AUC 95%-CI N AUC 95%-CI N
Single Tree 0.54 [0.51,0.58] 4820 0.57 [0.53,0.61] 4800
Bagging 0.76 [0.73,0.79] 4820 0.84 § [0.81,0.86] 4800
Random Forest 0.77 [0.74,0.8] 4820 0.83 § [0.8,0.85] 4800
Specification
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
Parameter Single Bagging RF Single Bagging RF
B 1 5000 5000 1 5000 5000
Jtry 9 9 3 73 73 9
J 9 73
# of crises 103 103
Notes: Dependent variable: two-year horizon before crisis. Restricted Selection: Loans (gap), Loans
(gr), Foreign Liabilities (gap)(glo), LT Interest Rate (gap)(glo), GDP (gap)(glo), Inflation, Exchange
Rate (gap), Reserves (gap), GDP (gr)(glo). Many Predictors: see table 5.7. For single tree: out-of-
sample mean AUC- and confidence band estimates are based on Monte Carlo Cross-Validation (see
Picard and Cook, 1984; Arlot, Celisse et al., 2010); 100 MC-draws of training (63,2%) - test (36,8%)
data partitions. For ensembles: out-of-sample AUC-estimates (and confidence intervals) are based on
out-of-bag (OOB)-data (see Breiman, 1996b). N number observations. J number of predictors under
analysis. Jtry number of predictors randomly selected and considered as a splitting variable at each
recursive partitioning step. B number of trees. Specification table: If only the bagging column has
an entry this means all models share the same specification. § H0: AUCmany − AUCrestricted = 0. Bold
H0: AUC − AUClogitFE&IA(= 0.65) = 0. ∗ H0: AUCQ4 − AUCquarterly = 0. All tests at the 5% signifi-
cance level. Logit specification: restricted variable selection + interaction terms in table 2 (main text)
(excluding terms with public debt) + country fixed effects.
243
Serial correlation- and cross-sectional correlation
The paper makes use of macroeconomic panel data. Serial and cross-sectinal correlation of
macroeconomic predictors could induce correlated crisis probability estimates. This could bias
estimates of confidence bands and hypothesis tests. To ensure that the results are robust to
serial and cross-sectional correlation this section replicates the paper’s main results on the
basis of various robustified confidence bands.
1. Robustified AUC confidence bands for serially dependent data are calculated according
to the recent contribution by Lahiri and Yang (forthcoming). These confidence bands are
sligthly wider, but generally close to the ones reported in the paper (e.g. Lahiri & Yang:
0.84-0.92 vs. conventional: 0.85-0.91 for the AUC of the favorite random forest model on the
long-run dataset).
2. It is possible to calculate AUC confidence bands on the basis of bootstrap samples that
reflect the temporal and cross-sectional structure of the data. In particular, cross-sectional
resampling (see Kapetanios, 2008) and temporal resampling with a block structure are carried
out, in order to check the robustness of the paper’s main results. The block size for the
temporal resampling is set to T1/4, as suggested by e.g. Andrews (2002) and Lahiri (2003).
Table 5.11 shows the results for the cross-sectional-, temporal- and the two double-resampling
schemes (all defined as in Kapetanios, 2008) for the long-run dataset. The 95% - confidence
bands are somewhat wider, but the main results hold; for all bagging- and random forest-
models the AUC significantly differs from 0.5. Furthermore, the models with many predictors
always have an significantly higher AUC than the models based on only few predictors.
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Table 5.11: CT -EWS: Long-run 1870-2012 Sample, Robust 95%-CI
Restricted Selection Many Predictors
low AUC up low AUC up
Cross-sectional resampling
Bagging 0.69 0.77 0.83 0.83 0.87 § 0.93
RF 0.71 0.79 0.86 0.82 0.88 § 0.92
Temporal resampling
Bagging 0.72 0.77 0.81 0.83 0.87 § 0.91
RF 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.85 0.88 § 0.92
Cross-sectional/Temporal resampling
Bagging 0.71 0.77 0.83 0.89 0.87 § 0.96
RF 0.75 0.79 0.87 0.86 0.88 § 0.95
Temporal/Cross-sectional resampling
Bagging 0.73 0.77 0.86 0.83 0.87 § 0.94
RF 0.59 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.88 § 0.94
Notes: 95% bootstrap confidence bands (5000-fold bootstrap). low: lower band. up: upper band. § H0:
AUCmany − AUCrestricted > 0. Restricted Selection: Loans/GDP (gap), Public Debt/GDP (gap), Narrow
Money/GDP (gap), LT Interest Rate, GDP (gr), Inflation, Exchange Rate (gap), Loans/GDP, Public
Debt/GDP, LT Interest Rate (n). Many Predictors: see table A1 in the data appendix. Out-of-sample
AUC-estimates (and confidence intervals) are based on out-of-bag (OOB)-data (see Breiman, 1996b).
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Different Crisis Horizons
Up to this point in the analysis, all models were trained to correctly identify the 2-year horizon
before a banking crisis occurs. If however, next year’s crisis risk is of particular concern, then a
1-year crisis horizon would be more desirable. In other cases, a 3-year crisis horizon might be
preferred. I therefore estimate the RF EWS for 1- and 3-year crisis horizons as well. Generally,
AUCs for the 1-year horizon are significantly lower than for the 2-year horizon, while the
AUCs for the 3-year horizons are not statistically-speaking significantly different from those
for the 2-year horizons.
Table 5.12 illustrates the results. The 1- and 3-year horizon AUC estimates for the long-run
sample are displayed in the first two columns. For the 2-year horizon case, the mean AUC
estimate was 0.88 (see table 3). The mean AUC estimate for the 1-year horizon (AUC=0.78) is
lower than that. On the other hand, the 3-year horizon mean AUC estimate (AUC=0.89) is
almost identical to the 2-year horizon estimate. Thus it is harder to assess whether there will
be a crisis next year than to assess whether there will be a crisis within the next two or three
years.
The results for the post-1970 samples lead to the same conclusion. As regards the annual
post-1970 sample, the 1-year horizon AUC estimate (AUC=0.75) again falls by 0.06 compared
to the 2-year horizon estimate (AUC=0.81) (see table 4). However, the 3-year horizon AUC
estimate of 0.88 exceeds the corresponding 2-year horizon estimate by 0.07.
Finally, the 1-year horizon AUC estimate for the quarterly post-1970 sample (AUC=0.93)
is somewhat lower than that for the 2-year horizon (AUC=0.95) (see table 5.9). The 3-year
horizon AUC estimate is 0.96 – close to the 2-year horizon estimate.
To sum up, while the AUC estimates for the 3-year horizon are generally very close to
those for the 2-year horizon, the AUC estimates for the 1-year horizon are significantly lower.
As a results, it is harder to assess whether there will be a crisis next year, than to assess
whether there will be a crisis within the next few years. On a more general note: The fact that
the data allowed the RF algorithm to better discern the 3-year crisis horizon from all other
observations than the 1-year horizon did, conforms to accounts which picture banking crisis
risks as building up slowly over time. At the same time, the actual crisis realization is less
determinate – usually triggered by a shock, which may or may not occur in any particular
year.
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AUC 0.79 § 0.89 0.75 § 0.88 0.93 § 0.96
95%-CI [0.73,0.85] [0.87,0.91] [0.7,0.79] [0.86,0.9] [0.92,0.94] [0.95,0.96]
N 1742 1742 4189 4189 19061 19061
B 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000 5000
Jtry 9 9 8 8 9 9
J 76 76 70 70 73 73
# of crises 70 70 100 100 102 102
Notes: Random forest results. Predictors: see tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. Out-of-sample AUC-estimates (and confidence intervals) based on out-of-bag
(OOB)-data (see Breiman, 1996b). N number observations. J number of predictors under analysis. Jtry number of predictors randomly selected and
considered as a splitting variable at each recursive partitioning step. B number of trees. Specification table: If only the bagging column has an entry this
means all models share the same specification. § H0: AUC1/3−years = AUC2−years
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Boosting
Boosting is a relative to the CTE family. It shares many of CTE family characteristics and thus is
interesting to look at in the context of banking crisis forecasting. Boosted classification trees can
be described as a forest with directed tree growth: In the estimation of each new tree, particular
weight is put on the correct classification of those observations which have been misclassified
by the aggregate of all previously estimated trees (for a comprehensive introduction to boosting
see Haste, Tibshirani and Friedman, 2013, chapter 10). As a tree-based method, tree-boosting
principally features many of the properties which make CTEs fit for banking crisis forecasting.
This, and their exceptional track record is reason enough to check what their crisis forecasting
performance is like. In particular, a stochastic gradient boosting machine that is based on many
predictors is applied. As regards the parameter specification, standard recommendations
prevalent in the literature are followed (see Friedman, 2002; Buehlmann, 2006).
Columns one to three in table 5.13 display the results for the three samples. The AUC esti-
mates range from 0.75 to 0.84. This places boosting somewhere between a single classification
tree and bagging. Why does boosting stay behind the F - and RF EWS? A likely explanation
is the vulnerability of boosting algorithms to noisy data (Long and Servedio, 2010). In putting
extra weight on the correct classification of observations that are hard to classify, boosting
often ends up giving undue weight to datapoints that are merely noisy. The level of noise in
macroeconomic data and in particular, the crisis dummies, should be expected to constrain the
performance of boosting algorithms. Hence, when it comes to forecasting banking crises the
F - and RF EWS are preferable.
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AUC 0.78 § 0.75 § 0.84 §
95%-CI [0.71,0.85] [0.7,0.81] [0.82,0.86]
N 1742 4189 19061
B 5000 5000 5000
J 76 70 73
η 0.5 0.5 0.5
ν 0.1 0.1 0.1
# of crises 70 100 102
Notes: Dependent variable: two-year horizon before crisis. Predictors: see tables 5.5, 5.6 and 5.7. Out-
of-sample AUC-estimates (and confidence intervals) based on Monte Carlo Cross-Validation (see Picard
and Cook, 1984; Arlot, Celisse et al., 2010) – 100 MC-draws of training (63,2%) - test (36,8%) data parti-
tions. N number observations. J number of predictors under analysis. B number of trees. η random
fraction of observations in training data that are used to estimate each tree. ν shrinkage parameter
indicating the weight given to each new tree. § H0: AUCBoosting = AUCRF.
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5.A.4. Literature Review
Table 5.14: Banking Crises and Variable Selection
Publication Method Domestic External Financial Fiscal
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Publication Method Domestic External Financial Fiscal






Signals - - - - (/GDP gap) - (r gap) - -
Barrell et al.
(2010)

















Logit (r) (gr) (/GDP)
(gr /GDP)






























Signals - - - - (gr gap)
(/GDP gap)
(n gap)
- (n gap) (n gap) -
Duttagupta and
Cashin (2011)
CT (r gr) (gr) (r) (n gr) (r gr) (r) - (r) -
Gourinchas and
Obstfeld (2012)
Logit (r gap) - (/GDP) (rer gap) (/GDP) - - - (/GDP)
Drehmann and
Juselius (2012)

























(r gr glo) (gr) - - (/GDP gap) (r) - (glo) -
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Drehmann and
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Notes: (r) real; (n) nominal; (gr) growth; (glo) global GDP-weighted average; (gap) percentage deviation from (one-sided) HP-trend ( λ = 1600); CT
Classification Tree; IA Interaction Terms; FE Fixed Effects; RE Random Effects; BMA Bayesian Model Averaging; MIMIC Multiple Indicator Multiple
Cause Model. There is an overlap between 3rd generation currency crises and banking crises, also termed twin crises. Publications on these 3rd
generation currency crises have been included in the table if they exhibit a focus on the banking crisis aspect. The table does not list all variables the
authors use in each publication. Instead it maps the variables into nine variable categories. The focus is on macroeconomic predictors (see Gavin
and Hausmann, 1996) while microeconomic, (e.g. González-Hermosillo, 1996; Caprio and Klingebiel, 1996; Gonzalez-Hermosillo, 1999), political or
institutional (see Acemoglu et al., 2003) factors are not listed in the table. Also, interaction terms between any two variables included in the table are not
made explicit. In some cases the mapping is rather coarse. For example, non-core liabilities (Hahm, Shin and Shin, 2012) are listed as a real monetary
variable in table 5.14. The main aim of the table is to give an impression of the variance and selectivity in - and not an exact overview of - variable
selections in the literature on banking crises.
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